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Abstract 
 
Why do state leaders adopt competitive strategies in pursuit of great-power status? 
Competitive status-seeking acts incur tremendous risks for a state’s geopolitical security as it 
entails challenging a higher-ranked power. To explain why leaders opt for such risky 
policies, this study underscores the instrumental importance of great-power status for states 
and that of personal prestige for the leaders. My central assertion is that leaders undertake 
competitive status-seeking measures in hopes of furthering their interests in both 
geopolitical and domestic political arenas. Competitive status-seeking strategy is a 
preferable policy for leaders who rely upon personal prestige as a dominant vehicle for 
political survival at home while regarding great-power status as a route to geopolitical 
security.  
Through an in-depth study of three cases from the 1962-1979 period of China’s foreign 
and security policy, this thesis illustrates how this political logic informed the leadership 
decision on competitive assertions of status. During this period, China’s policy illustrates 
three varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy—namely, offensive alliance, 
delegitimation strategy, and display of military power. These strategies respectively display 
diplomatic, ideological, and military aspects of state power, which serve as central vehicles 
for leaders to assert great-power status. Invariably they were motivated by leaders’ 
pragmatic concerns for great-power status in geopolitics and personal prestige in domestic 
elite politics. As demonstrated by the case studies, competitive stats-seeking measures 
provide a critical vehicle for leaders to cope with imperatives of geopolitical competition 
and domestic political survival simultaneously. 
This study seeks to make three original contributions to the literature on status 
ambitions and international conflict. First, it treats status aspirations as a variable rather than 
an invariant driver of state policy as often assumed. Second, it claims that leaders may assert 
great-power status on their nation’s behalf with a view to enhancing geopolitical security. In 
this regard, status and security are treated as complementary rather than antithetical. The 
final aspect of originality in my argument lies in its integration of rationalist and 
psychological microfoundations. While my argument highlights the instrumental rationality 
of state leaders in trying to advance geopolitical security and legitimize their authority in 
domestic elite politics, it also addresses how leaders inspire emotional reactions from 
domestic audiences to support their risky policy.   
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Introduction  
 
 
When those who are in office behave arrogantly, and seek their personal advantage, people start 
factional intrigues against each other and against the constitution which permits this to happen……It 
is also clear what influence honor exerts and how it may be a cause of faction. People form factions 
when they suffer dishonor themselves and when they see others honored.   
Aristotle1  
 
Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as 
intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations 
between individuals……Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation 
actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or want the other nations to believe, it possesses. 
Hans Morgenthau2   
 
While the literature……convincingly shows that those who manage the affairs of states are likely to 
place a value on positive status comparisons, we still do not know how strong this preference is.  
William Wohlforth3  
 
  
Status is a positional good in world politics as well as our daily life. In theory, one’s 
acquisition of status means a relative loss by others in the field where the actors strive for 
social preeminence.4 Status competition tends to be zero-sum. “Social competition [for 
status] aims to equal or outdo the dominant group in the area on which its claim to superior 
status rests,” Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko note. “In international relations, 
where status is in large part based on military and economic power, social competition often 
entails traditional geopolitical rivalry, such as competition over spheres of influence or arms 
racing.”5 Status competition thus could be a crucial source of international conflict. 
In spite of this, social competition does not have to be the dominant strategy for states 
aspiring to status preeminence vis-à-vis others. As some prominent scholars have noted, 
status-enhancing strategies do not necessitate competitive acts of displaying state power; 																																																																		
1 Aristotle, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 183. 
2 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1985), 
86-87. 
3 William Wohlforth, "Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict," in Status in World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch 
Larson, and William Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 124. 
4 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985). 
5 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," 
International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 72. 
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rather, leaders can also try to advance national status by emulating the competent practices 
of status achievers (e.g. social mobility strategy) or by creatively carving out a realm of social 
activities in which the status aspirant can outperform others (e.g. social creativity strategy).6 
Strategies of social mobility and creativity are conductive to the peaceful change of 
international order, in that pursuing them entail lower risks of conflict escalation and the 
means involved tend to facilitate reciprocal accommodation between the status seeker and 
the conferrer.7 In the final analysis, acquiring status by competition is not the only choice for 
status seekers. Given that competitive strategy represents perhaps the staunchest effort at 
status seeking, it is theoretically interesting and practically imperative to investigate why it 
is in policymakers’ interest to advance great-power status vis-à-vis other nations at the risk 
of conflict escalation and even war.8  
Thus, why do leaders adopt competitive policies in pursuit of great power status—thus 
undertaking acts to display state power? Such acts could incur tremendous risks for a state’s 
geopolitical security as they entail challenging a higher-ranked power. Importantly though, 
competitive status-seeking acts may help enhance long-term security for the status-aspiring 
state. If the very means to great-power status in the security realm—state power—gains 
favorable recognition by target states and helps elicit their voluntary deference, then those 
states would respect the state’s core claims, thus enhancing its geopolitical autonomy. 
However, while competitive status-seeking strategy could serve to advance a state’s 
geopolitical security, it is too risky to be a preferable choice for prudent leaders.  
Inasmuch as leaders often grapple with tradeoffs between status ambitions and other 
political objectives, it may not be analytically helpful to consider status aspirations a 
constant driver of foreign and security policy. They should be treated as a variable. True, 																																																																		
6 See Peter Gries, “Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Relations,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign 
Policy eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Larson and 
Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy”; "Managing Rising Powers: The Role of 
Status Concerns," in Status in World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
7 See, for instance, Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the 
Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," International Organization 57, no. 1 (Winter 2003); Steven Ward, Status and the 
Challenge of Rising Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), chaps. 1-2; Benjamin De Carvalho and Iver B. 
Neumann, eds., Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing (London: Routledge, 2014); Yong 
Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
8 Empirically, competitive status-seeking measures may include acquiring overseas territory, instituting expensive arms 
programs, and strengthening commitment to overseas allies, or initiating military conflict for defending their status claim. 
For the scholarly investigation into the status motive behind them, see Joslyn Barnhart, "Status Competition and Territorial 
Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa," Security Studies 25, no. 3 (2016); William Thompson, "Status Conflict, 
Hierarchies, and Interpretation Dilemmas," in Status in World Politics, ed. T.V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. 
Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); William Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great 
Power War," World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009); "Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict."; Tudor A. Onea, "Between 
Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry," Review of International Studies 40, no. 1 (2014); 
Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Michelle Murray, "Identity, 
Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition before the First World War," Security Studies 
19, no. 4 (2010); Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2017). 
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leaders and ordinary citizens alike value social preeminence vis-à-vis the peers with whom 
they interact frequently and what to compare favorably. Unlike ordinary citizens, however, 
state leaders arguably need to grapple with multiple, and often conflicting commitments. 
They at times may not find it politically imperative to uphold great-power status as a 
national aspiration. Whether leaders are inclined to promote great-power status as a 
national interest may depend on the political circumstances they face, both at home and 
abroad. Thanks to the symbolic role of leaders in representing state sovereignty, state 
leaders can expect to derive personal prestige from their status-seeking activities abroad. As 
such, promoting great-power status could serve to enhance leaders’ domestic authority. The 
choice on competitive status-seeking policies, therefore, entails leaders reconciling status 
ambitions, geopolitical security, and domestic political survival. Herein lies the political logic 
of status competition. 
The Political Logic of Status Competition proposes a theoretical framework for 
understanding the nature of status aspirations as state preference, and it seeks to explain 
why and how ambitions for great-power motivate leaders to undertake competitive policies. 
At its core, my study underscores the instrumental role of personal prestige for state leaders 
to legitimize (and thus enhance) their power positions at home, and that of great-power 
status for their quest for geopolitical security. Its central assertion is that competitive 
status-seeking strategy is a preferable policy for leaders who rely upon personal prestige as a 
dominant vehicle for political survival at home while regarding great-power status as a route to 
geopolitical security. Competitive status-seeking strategy could manifest itself as symbolic acts 
undertaken by leaders to display state power against the target states. By such acts, leaders 
seek to assert great-power status for their nation while deriving benefits of personal prestige 
to enhance the chance for political survival. This argument reveals a political logic behind 
the seemingly imprudent acts of status assertion. It helps solve a set of puzzles as regards 
why leaders undertake such acts at the risk of conflict escalations with other states, which 
could put other political interests in jeopardy. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Why do leaders engage in competition for international status preeminence vis-à-vis states, 
at the risk of conflict escalation and even war? Why are they willing to promote great-power 
status as a national aspiration? And what are the implications of competitive status-seeking 
strategy for national security and leaders’ own political fortunes? While various political 
thinkers from Niccole Machiavelli to Hans Morgenthau have acknowledged status, prestige, 
or national glory as desirable goals for leaders and their subjects,9 they also advised 																																																																		
9 See Daniel Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism's Roots," Security Studies 8, no. 4 (1999). 
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prudence for leaders in pursuing such objectives. They were never tired of invoking 
examples in which leaders excessively pursued status and prestige at the expense of their 
political fortunes. It is therefore puzzling from the standpoint of statecraft as to why leaders 
have seemingly put their political fortunes and national security at risk in pursuit of such 
nebulous goals as status and prestige.  
Scholars in general tend to assume this issue away by settling for the argument that 
leaders like ordinary people simply care so dearly about their social preeminence among the 
peers as to become willing to sacrifice other values. Yet, despite the solid psychological 
findings in support of this assertion, it does not consider the political implications of status 
seeking. In asserting that national leaders, like all human beings, tend to become obsessed 
with enhancing status of the group they identify with, scholars tend to equate the realm of 
power politics with our ordinary life. They do not tackle the question head on: why are 
leaders willing to put national security aside, which is also critical to their political fortunes? 
Crucially, it does not explain why status and prestige are worth pursuing in the realm of 
politics governed by necessity more than desirability. Common sense can tell that leaders 
often grapple with multiple commitments, of which national security and domestic political 
survival matter no less significantly than the psychological satisfaction of gaining status. 
Remarkably indeed, experimental evidence has shown that the leadership posts by 
themselves can have a moderating, rather than aggravating, effect on status aspirations of 
the occupants.10 Given that competitive status-seeking strategy may incur considerable risks 
and uncertainties for state leaders, great-power status may not be worth pursuing if it holds 
out little promise for promoting other political interests.  
States appear “assertive” when they employ state power to assert status claims. Status, 
in theory, is an indivisible good; as such, the status aspirant has to claim or abandon it in its 
entirety. Accordingly, state leaders asserting great-power status would find it difficult to 
back down in the face of counter-pressures from an international opponent. Carrying 
through their status claim, however, may aggravate the tension they have provoked.11 At 
worst, international conflict would imperil leaders’ domestic fortunes and eventually 
undermine their power and prestige. The puzzle here is why leaders hold prestige and 
status aspirations so dear that they are willing to run the risk of conflict escalations and even 
war with other states.  
To date, status and prestige are taken as ends so fundamental to human beings that 
																																																																		
10 See Jonathan Renshon, "Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and 
Military Leaders " International Organization 69 (Summer 2015). 
11 James Fearon alludes to this scenario as a likely cause for war, whereas other scholars accords it greater importance. See 
James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," ibid. 49, no. 3 (1995); Monica Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time 
Horizons as Rational Explanaitions for War," Security Studies 15, no. 1 (2006); Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations 
for War?," Security Studies 10, no. 1 (2000). 
	 8	
scholars often neglect to discuss their varied relevance to foreign policy making. And yet, the 
drive for social preeminence is not just an inherent trait of human nature; it also has 
pragmatic aspects granting the distinguished members access to various prerogatives and 
privileges. Thus, an alternative perspective focused on the instrumental roles of great-power 
status and personal prestige for individual leaders may be warranted. This perspective 
treats status and prestige as intermediate ends toward other objectives. As such, they allow 
for variation on leaders’ concerns for social preeminence both internationally and 
domestically. As regards international security affairs, this instrumental perspective treats 
acts of status assertion as a means to geopolitical security. It in turn prompts a different set 
of questions: why do leaders try to further national security interests via competitive 
status-seeking acts? When are they inclined to promote great-power status as a national 
objective? Competitive status-seeking strategy involves symbolic acts of displaying state 
power, which enables leaders to assert great-power status on the nation’s behalf. In the 
anarchical international system where security anxiety is pervasive and security dilemmas 
are omnipresent, competitive status-seeking acts arguably incur risks of aggravating 
tensions between states. Arguably, there are multiple strategies for advancing national 
security such as balancing, conventional diplomacy, and the prudent conduct of coercive 
diplomacy. Compared to competitive status-seeking strategy, they entail less confrontational 
postures, thereby incurring less severe security risks in a short run. Still, they may have 
distinct incentives to pursue competitive status-seeking strategy, given the instrumental 
values of prestige for states and themselves.   
This study seeks to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the logic of status 
competition from the standpoint of statecraft. This entails asking: what is distinctive about 
status as a national objective? How do concerns for great-power status and personal prestige 
relate to other imperatives leaders need to grapple with—notably national security and 
domestic political survival? And given the perceived benefits of great-power status and 
personal prestige, when do leaders opt to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy 
toward other states?  
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MATTER 
Rising powers can either harbor appeasable ambitions or aspire to systemic changes of the 
international order. A potential determinant of their aspiration is their perceived standing 
relative to others, which could encourage them either to abide by norms of peaceful change 
or to overturn the existing order. A sense of status allows leaders to judge if their 
interlocutors take their honor seriously—and this could inform their resolve to press 
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claims.12 When state leaders “perceive a gap between what they think others should think 
about their state’s standing and what they estimate others actually do think,” according to 
William Wohlforth, they “seek to rectify it, possibly through assertive action.”13 In this 
circumstance, leaders are motivated to assert status claims by pressing their advantage. 
Doing so helps to impress the observer with the kind of superiority the actor enjoys.  
Recent controversies around the so-called “assertiveness” of China’s international 
behaviors after 2010 serve as a case in point. Scholars and policy analysts are keen on 
characterizing China as an “assertive” player poised to use its newly acquired coercive 
capacities to defend its territorial claims in the South and East China seas.14 The debate 
revolves around whether China’s ambition is unlimited and will generate disruptive 
impacts on the international order. Undoubtedly, it reflects substantial concerns for 
competitive status-seeking acts that Beijing appears to have undertaken. For some scholars, 
the term “assertiveness” can broadly refer to the level of activity in a state engages, which 
can be measured by “the state’s willingness to pay the costs……of following a particular 
strategy.” 15  “Assertiveness” in this sense suggests a high degree of engagement in 
international affairs. From this standpoint, scholars have shed favorable light on China 
becoming a more assertive power.16 However, those wary of China’s rise tend to emphasize 
the violent potential of assertive behaviors. While doing so, they stress Chinese tendency to 
rely on coercive means in pursuit of international ambitions.17 Both conceptions suggest 
that an “assertive” China is inclined to demonstrate material and ideational power to 
strengthen its international claims. And yet, they generate divergent expectations regarding 
its impact on the international order by positing differing motives behind the perceived 
																																																																		
12 Honor constitutes a critical source of resolve as demonstrated in human behaviors, and this pattern is applicable to 
international politics. For the experimental evidence on this, see Joshua Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
13 William Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,” in Status in World Politics eds. T. V. Paul, Deborah 
Welch Larson, and William Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 118. 
14 Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Debating China's Assertiveness," International Security 38, no. 3 
(Winter 2013/14); Thomas J. Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China-Responding to Bejing's Abrasive 
Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011); Zhou Fangyin, "Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding 
China's South China Sea Policy," International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016); Aaron Friedberg, "The Sources of Chinese Conduct: 
Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness," The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014); Björn Jerdén, "The Assertive China 
Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 1 
(2014); Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?," International Security 37, no. 4 
(Spring 2013); Nien‐Chung Chang Liao, "The Sources of China's Assertiveness: The System, Domestic Politics or 
Leadership Preferences?," International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016); Oriana Skylar Mastro, "Why Chinese Assertiveness Is Here 
to Stay," The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014); Michael Swaine, "Perceptions of an Assertive China," China 
Leadership Monitor 32, no. 2 (2010); Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," Journal of 
Contemporary China 22, no. 81 (2013). 
15 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), 11. 
16 Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Debating China's Assertiveness," International Security 38, no. 3 
(Winter 2013/14); Thomas Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China-Responding to Bejing's Abrasive 
Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011); Yan Xuetong, "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement," 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014). 
17 See, for instance, Friedberg, "The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness."; Oriana Skylar 
Mastro, "Why Chinese Assertiveness Is Here to Stay," ibid. 
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Chinese assertive acts.  
Thanks to the literature on social psychology and the usage of the term “assertive” in 
social life, we can posit the status motives behind an assertive style of foreign policy.18 In a 
nutshell, assertive acts signal one’s readiness to defend his/her claims about a social role in 
relation to others. In this context, the dispute at hand assumes symbolic implications for 
relative standing. Status (as well as prestige), by definition, indicates a state actor’s quest for 
preeminence within a social context composed of intersubjectively shared norms. 19 
Inasmuch as status involves public recognition of an actor’s achievements or qualities, it 
could act as a vehicle for legitimizing a state’s claim for authority over others.20  In 
international politics, though, such kind of authority is fluid—and it varies across issues 
over which states contend for relative gains. The status seeker therefore needs to show its 
superiority by constant performative acts. Doing so allows the audience to see where the 
actor’s prestige lies.21  
Positing status motives behind the seemingly assertive acts is particularly pertinent to 
the rising powers. Rising powers are arguably prone to demonstrate its newly acquired 
power for asserting greater roles in international politics.22 By undertaking symbolic acts as 
such, a rising power may seek international recognition of their newly acquired power and 
the proliferating interests abroad. While doing so, it may still observe self-restraint to some 
extent in order not to provoke an international coalition against them. In spite of this, it may 
still appear “assertive” to those who can readily see a significant change in its policy and 
may feel alarmed by this.  
German foreign policy at the turn of the twentieth century can serve as an illustrative 
case. Harold Nicolson, a prominent British diplomat and scholar, noted that the Germans 
too often engaged in a kind of “sudden diplomacy.” The “theoretical basis [of German 
diplomacy] is that it demonstrates strength, causes perturbation, and thereby increases 
opportunity for pressure. Its practical justification is that it provides the negotiator with 
‘something in hand.’”23 These features by no means suggest that German diplomacy at the 
time aimed single-mindedly at expansion. It was instead an outgrowth of half-hearted 
measures to demonstrate German power as a symbol of great-power status.24 Nevertheless 																																																																		
18 See, for instance, Arthur J. Lange, Patricia Jakubowski, and Thomas V. McGovern, Responsible Assertive Behavior: 
Cognitive/Behavioral Procedures for Trainers (Champaign, Ill.: Research Press, 1976); Sue Hadfield and Gill Hasson, How 
to Be Assertive in Any Situation (London: Pearson, 2013). 
19 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, "Status and World Order." 
20 Barry O'Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2001), xii, 193-94; Rodney 
Bruce Hall, "Moral Authority as a Power Resource," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997). 
21 Pouliot, International Pecking Orders. 
22 See, for instance, Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role: The Unusual 
Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
23 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, 
Georgetown University, 1988), 79. 
24 See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 183-91. 
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it aroused widespread misgivings.  
The Chinese and German cases share this crucial similarity: leaders in both countries 
opted to display state power well before they explored the chance for negotiation.25 Positing 
status motives could shed novel light on this behavioral style. Crucially, displaying power 
signals a resolve to boost national status, and prevailing over the adversary helps enhance 
one’s status in the field where state power performs a symbolic role in asserting status. As 
such, the practitioners of competitive status-seeking strategy typically undertake to display 
an aspect of national strength to bolster status claims. Once a rising state manages to 
establish great-power status based on the display of its strength in a field of international 
activity, its claims tend to be justified and other powers would find it difficult to challenge it 
later on. In this way, competitive status-seeking measures could help to advance geopolitical 
security. As Hans Morgenthau remarked, “the policy of prestige is one of the 
instrumentalities through which the policies of the status quo and of imperialism try to 
achieve their ends.”26  
And yet, a rising power that frequently engages in competitive status-seeking strategy 
may disturb other states, precisely because its very assertions of great-power status—if not 
frustrated—could boost the geopolitical influences at the expense of other powers. Status 
assertions, therefore, constitute a litmus test for the resilience of order upheld by one or 
several status-quo oriented major powers. For an emerging power to successfully integrate 
into the international community, it is crucial that its status aspiration be fully 
accommodated—with positive implications for other claims. The display of Chinese power, 
for instance, allows Beijing’s leaders to signal their resolve to safeguard the expanding 
overseas interests derivative of China’s growing international influences. This is 
instrumental in defining the terms on which China is willing to integrate with the 
Western-created liberal international order.27 It is then critical for status-quo powers to 
define the range of internationally acceptable behaviors while keeping an open eye on the 
emerging power’s demands. For status-quo powers, defending its status can act as a vehicle 
for defining the range of the acceptable and the terms on which international peaceful 
change can be achieved. As James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon argue, signaling resolve 
via the display of American power is necessary to show the U.S. commitment to the 
principles on which the stability of international order rests.28  
Predictably, both emerging and the status quo-oriented powers are likely to undertake 																																																																		
25 See Kissinger, Diplomacy, 183-91; Fangyin, "Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China's South 
China Sea Policy."  
26 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 86. 
27 Yongjin Zhang, "China and Liberal Hierarchies in Global International Society: Power and Negotiation for Normative 
Change," ibid. 
28 James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First 
Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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competitive status-seeking strategy. By displaying state power as a status symbol, 
competitive status-seeking strategy represents a distinctive way of signaling status claims. It 
thus deserves particular attention from scholars and policymakers alike. Given, moreover, 
that competitive status-seeking strategy features symbolic acts of displaying of state power, 
it has the potential to aggravate geopolitical tensions. It is less likely, after all, for other states 
to stand by than to react forcefully to the state asserting status claims. Competitive acts may 
thereby exacerbate international tensions and even trigger crises of war. Given this perilous 
dynamic, competitive policies for status enhancements are worth being studied as a pattern 
of state behavior in international politics. 
 
THE LITERATURE 
There is a growing body of literature regarding the importance of status and prestige as 
leaders’ aspiration. In particular, scholars are keen to point out that states suffering 
frustrations in their status claims are prone to competitive policies. This study questions 
their assumption that the status aspiration is a constant driver of state international 
behaviors. Relatedly, it problematizes the assumed links between frustrated status ambitions 
and conflict-prone behaviors of states. It asks: why leaders value status in the first place? 
And when do status aspirations assume salience in leaders’ foreign policy statecraft?  
To date, scholars have managed to distinguish status ambitions from other foreign 
policy concerns such as power and security, arguing that status aspirations by themselves 
could motivate state leaders to risk other national values by engaging in international 
conflict. This is certainly a laudable step in establishing a research agenda on status politics 
in international relations. However, this approach also suffers from a lack of attention to the 
nexus between great-power status on the one hand and the imperatives of power politics on 
the other. Arguably, leaders face tradeoffs of status and power-political ends such as 
geopolitical security and political survival in elite politics. A neglect of how leaders cope 
with the tradeoffs among multiple commitments, I argue, would hinder further 
investigation into the logic of status competition among states.  
 
Social Identity Theory and Status Competition among Nations 
Theorists of international relations have drawn upon an influential sociological paradigm 
known as Social Identity Theory (SIT) to suggest that states not only pursue power and 
security in the international system; they also seek recognition of their preeminence in a 
given area of activity.29 SIT has established that human beings often aspire to favorable 																																																																		
29 For pathbreaking works that introduce SIT to IR theorizing, see Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, "Status and World Order."; 
Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics; Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and 
Great Power War."; Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995); Lebow, A 
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comparisons with one another in various realms of social activities. 30  Because one’s 
preeminence means a comparative advantage over others, status tends to be a “relative gain” 
rather than an absolute one.31 The criteria by which a community member gains status tend 
to reflect the intersubjectively shared norms within a community. Status is socially 
constructed, as it depends on subjective perceptions as opposed to objective measurements. 
One cannot acquire status without a willingness of other community members to endorse 
his/her performance. In brief, status is a relative, perceptual, and social good for members 
within a community.   
Status ambitions are rooted in the universal drive for self-esteem of human beings. SIT 
highlights that this drive can be projected to collective levels such as ethnic groups and 
nation-states. Once an individual identifies a group as the source of their esteem—along 
with other material benefits, he/she tends to expand their conception of self to the group 
level, thereby linking personal psychological wellbeing to that group’s interactions with 
others. Perceived denial of self-esteem by others could foster resentment and perception of 
hostility, which in turn leads to intergroup conflict.32 This is apt to be a crucial mechanism 
inducing conflicts between states, as interactions among states are susceptible to 
exaggeration of hostile intentions.33  
In drawing upon insights from SIT, however, scholars have glossed over two issues. 
First, why should leaders promote status as a national aspiration? As Richard Ned Lebow 
shrewdly points out, it takes complex processes to elevate the status aspiration from the 
individual to the state level. The state is composed of a multiplicity of individuals and 
interest groups with disparate aspirations leaders need to take care of.34 Why leaders 
concern themselves with status as a national interest thus warrants explanations. Second, 
why could not leaders undertake other status-enhancing measures than competitive strategy 
in response to the perceived humiliations? SIT does indeed prescribe multiple strategies for 
attaining self-esteem. Of course, there is no guarantee that a state can always gain favorable 
recognition by demonstrating competence in a different domain of international practices; 																																																																																																																																																																																																								
Cultural Theory of International Relations. 
30 See, for instance, Michael Hogg, "Social Identity Theory," in Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, ed. Peter 
Burke (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006); Henri Tajfel, "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations," Annual 
Review of Psychology 33, no. 1 (1982). 
31 Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory " American Political Science Review 85, 
no. 4 (1991). 
32 Tajfel, “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations”; Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict; Jonathan Mercer, 
"Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity," International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014). 
33 This is due to the common patterns of cognitive bias and anarchical conditions of international politics Robert Jervis, 
How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017); Keren 
Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); Sebastian Rosato, "The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers," 
International Security 39, no. 3 (Winter 2014/15). 
34 Richard Ned Lebow, National Identities and International Relations (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
2016). 
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nor could they necessarily succeed in emulating the practices of other competent players. 
Nevertheless, state leaders have every reason to opt for these relatively risk-averse policies 
over competitive status-seeking strategy. Hence it is theoretically puzzling as to why they at 
times prefer competitive status-seeking measures over other status-enhancing strategies.   
In short, the SIT-informed arguments on the sources of status competition have tended 
to dismiss the political elements in intergroup relations, as they give short shrift to the 
intervening processes between identity formation and political pragmatism. It is worth 
emphasizing, as Russell Hardin points out, that with social identifications always come 
material and social benefits including wealth, job opportunities, and even high offices. They 
could, in turn, motivate ambitious leaders to exploit the psychological dynamics of identity 
formation.35 Hence there is a need to highlight political motives of leaders in organizing the 
group around an identity.36  
It is also important to note that leaders often grapple with multiple conflicting 
commitments. And yet, scholars have selectively focused on competitive policies of 
materially secured states in order to isolate the effect of status aspirations from power and 
security. In so doing, though, they are able to make the case for status aspirations as a key 
driver of foreign policy.37 But this “selection bias” also leads them to neglect a crucial aspect 
of status. Crucially, enhanced status promises geopolitical influences. As state power is 
multidimensional and it is always difficult to calculate how disparate elements of state 
power can work together on a stable basis, the very aspect of power symbolizing 
great-power status can translate into actual influences. As Kenneth Waltz famously noted, 
“states have different combinations of capabilities which are difficult to measure and 
compare, the more so since the weight to be assigned to different items changes with time… 
Any ranking at times involves difficulties of comparison and uncertainties about where to 
draw lines. Historically, despite the difficulties, one finds general agreement about who the 
great powers of a period are.”38  
One school expands on the classical realist conception of national prestige as a 
reputation for power. It views prestige as outcome-based, as it is derivative of a successful 
employment of power. An alternative viewpoint considers prestige to be process-based. It 
regards prestige as a function of performative acts. In this view, an actor gains prestige by 
appealing to the audience’s emotional predispositions. Recognizing the instrumental roles of 
status and prestige for states and their leaders allows for integration of these conceptions in 
																																																																		
35 Harding, The Logic of Group Conflict.  
36 See Leonie Huddy, "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory," Political 
Psychology 22, no. 1 (2001). 
37 See, for instance, Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”; Barnhart, "Status Competition 
and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa." 
38 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 131. 
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study of international relations. Since status and prestige are synonymous in most 
theoretical discourses, in reviewing the literature I use the two terms interchangeably. 
 
Prestige as A Reputation for Power  
Scholars informed by classical realist insights tend to treat power and prestige as the two 
sides of the same coin. For Morgenthau and Gilpin, prestige could be derived from 
successful exercises of power. And over time it helps to consolidate a state’s power position. 
“A policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing it such a 
reputation for power as to enable it to forgo the actual employment of the instrument of 
power,” argued Morgenthau. Two types of such reputation follow—in Morgenthau’s term, 
“reputation for unchallengeable power” and “reputation for self-restraint.” 39  Gilpin 
expands on the former to suggest that prestige is “achieved primarily through the successful 
use of power, and especially through victory in the war.”40 Significantly, Gilpin elevates 
prestige up to a systemic level, treating it as equivalent to authority in the international 
system. Prestige legitimizes the “right to rule” on the part of the hegemonic power.  
Gilpin views prestige as deriving from a preponderance of material power. In his words, 
“prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities 
and its ability and willingness to exercise its power.”41 And it is based on a great power’s 
“victory in the last hegemonic war and its demonstrated ability to enforce its will on other 
states.”42 In advancing these arguments, Gilpin regards prestige as outcome-based: it is 
determined by the outcome of power as opposed to the process in which power is exercised.  
Students of deterrence have followed Gilpin in assuming that prestige reflects the 
credibility of power. To make state power credible, it is desirable for leaders to display an 
advantageous aspect of the power capabilities at their disposal frequently.43 Some empirical 
evidence, though, have come to challenge this line of reasoning. Recent scholarship has 
revealed that state leaders do not normally form beliefs about the credibility of another 
state’s power capabilities by assessing its past behaviors.44 But this claim remains a matter 
of debate, as statistical findings also exist to confirm the deterrent effects of international 
prestige.45 Regardless, all participants in the debate have implicitly viewed prestige as the 																																																																		
39 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 95-96.  
40 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 32.  
41 Ibid., 31. 
42 Ibid., 34.  
43 See, for instance, Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); 
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008). For the summary of this line of 
thought, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap.1; 
Shiping Tang, "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict," Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005). 
44 Mercer, Reputation and International Politics; Daryl Grayson Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess 
Military Threats (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
45 See, for instance, Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International 
Politics," International Organization 69, no. 2 (Spring 2015). 
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credibility of power. Their dominant focus is on the functional value of prestige in deterring 
the adversary.  
By contrast, John Ikenberry devotes his attention to a second type of reputation of state 
power—namely, “reputation for self-restraint.” His theoretical concern is with how the 
winning powers at the end of a major war could signal self-restraint in order to establish a 
rule-based order. In contrast to Gilpin’s emphasis on prestige as a reputation for superior 
power, Ikenberry investigates how the hegemonic power through institution building could 
cultivate a “reputation for self-restraint.” International institutions feature norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures designed to restrain the dominant state from abusing its 
unrivaled power. Building international institutions, in Ikenberry’s view, is essential for the 
hegemonic power to signal self-restraint—for a benign hegemon is more able to attract the 
lesser states to join rather than resist its proposed order. In joining the order led by the 
hegemon with a reputation of restraint, the materially weaker states worry much less about 
their vulnerability to exploitation by the powerful. Also for this reason, the prestige derived 
from a reputation of self-restraint would dampen incentives to challenge the hegemon that 
will suffer relative decline in the future.46 As such, a reputation for self-restraint is essential 
to the leading power if it seeks to perpetuate leadership authority in the international 
system.  
Although Ikenberry focuses on a different type of prestige, he does not challenge 
Gilpin’s view of prestige as outcome-based. While he emphasizes that democratic system 
and power disparities provide structural incentives and opportunities for a hegemonic state 
to derive prestige from self-restraints, the strategies pursued by a hegemonic state to acquire 
prestige is given short shrift in Ikenberry’s narrative. In this way, Ikenberry assumes away 
the performative aspect of prestige.  
  
Prestige as Norm-based 
International order features normative dynamics.47 The English School literature notes that 
the normative issues are of fundamental importance in the construction and perpetuation of 
international order.48 Viewed in this light, prestige as an ingredient of international order 
rests on the normatively acceptable practices—it is based on norms. Likewise, following 																																																																		
46 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
47 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
48 See, for instance, Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and 
the Constitution of International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: 
A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2012); Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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Erving Goffman, one can think of prestige as a function of competent performances of 
his/her role in a norm-based society.49 As such, prestige can be derived from the symbolic 
acts by which states and other actors alike demonstrate their competence in a realm of social 
activities.  
Put differently, whereas prestige aspirations motivate them to engage in such acts, the 
success of prestige-seeking acts depends on the shared beliefs among the participants about 
what constitutes prestige. This fashion of thought resonates with the growing study of the 
cultural practices of international relations. As the scholars embracing it invoke differing 
concepts—such as honor, status, and prestige—to make the case that states are motivated by 
higher aspirations than merely surviving in the anarchical international system, they share 
the view that the drive for individual and collective eminence in social life is universal to 
mankind, the ways to achieve that are conditioned by norms and rules embedded in a 
particular cultural context of the international community.50 Operating in a culture-laden 
international society, states need to concern themselves with the shared norms, rules, and 
practices by which their interests are to be advanced.51 Prestige, as such, is norm-based. 
To be sure, the resilience of international norms cannot be overstated. It is well noted 
that international norms are competing with one another, and their meanings and 
legitimacy are subject to contestation. As Stephen Krasner shows, even one of the principles 
fundamental to the viability of international society—sovereign independence—is 
inconsistently observed throughout modern international history.52 As a matter of fact, 
inequalities among sovereign states have been institutionalized to grant “great powers” 
privileges to intervene in the domestic arena of “outlaw states.”53 Great powers have 
privileges to create norms favoring their interests. Furthermore, states not only tend to 
follow norms selectively; they also seek to rally international audiences around their favored 
norms in an effort to counter their rivals’ authority claims.54 As Vincent Pouliot argues, 
states often act on their perceived normatively appropriate norms in diplomatic practices 																																																																		
49 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London: Penguin, 1990). 
50 Lebow, Why Nations Fight; Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War: Returning to Realism's Roots." 
51 See, for instance, Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional 
Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological 
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(2006); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
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52 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); Martha 
Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity," World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009). 
53 Gerry Thompson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). Also see, Edward Keene, "International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern 
Practice of Intervention," Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (2013).  
54 See, for instance, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, 
Norms, and Order in International Society," International Organization 68 (Winter 2014); Finnemore, "Legitimacy, 
Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity."; Ian Hurd, "The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the 
U.N. Sanctions, 1992–2003," International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005); Thomas Risse, "“Let's Argue!”: Communicative 
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with a view to boosting their status relative to others.55 
All being said, the performative aspect of prestige could lead us to see differing ways of 
prestige seeking. Prestige is not only outcome-based but also norm-derived. That is, for the 
audience to confer prestige, they not only evaluate outcomes of prestige-seeking acts but 
also make normative judgment about the way those acts are undertaken. The latter issue 
underscores the performative aspect of prestige seeking.  
While as noted, the IR theorists drawing the insights from SIT have given short shrift to 
the political motives of state leaders seeking status internationally, SIT and the related 
psychological theories nevertheless offer insights on how norm-driven acts could yield 
prestige. Particularly, the mechanisms underpinning identity formation are relevant to 
studying how leaders could legitimize personal authority in domestic elite politics through 
status assertions in the international arena. To date, the psychological findings have 
identified critical microfoundations of identity formation. Drawing upon them, IR scholars 
now gives increasing emphasis to the role of emotions in triggering collective identification 
with the state. Among others, Neta Crawford and Jonathan Mercer lead an effort to bring in 
emotions for theorizing international politics.56 Following them, various scholars have 
identified three important themes linking emotional dynamics to identity formation. Simply 
stated, they include: identity formation entails intense emotional arousals; individuals 
experiencing similar emotional feelings are apt to identify with one another, thus forming 
collective identities; and in such processes individuals can monitor each other’s emotional 
reactions and bring the uncommitted on board, thereby perpetuating influences of the 
inspired emotions on state policy and even community building.57  
These three themes suggest that leaders may use the emotional dynamics underpinning 
identity formation to their advantage. Inasmuch as emotions induce individuals to see 
themselves as being committed to a collective cause, leaders could undertake competitive 
status-seeking acts with a view to inspiring a feeling of identity among the domestic 
audiences. This in turn allows them to legitimize personal authority in elite politics. In this 
way, competitive status-seeking measures help to ensure political survival for leaders.  
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To sum up, the existing literature provides the following insights: 1) prestige both 
motivates and meditates relations of dominance among political actors; 2) prestige is 
derivative of the process by which states demonstrate competence in pursuing a given end; 
3) this process is driven by symbolic acts; and 4) state leaders in their capacity of 
representing the sovereign authority are uniquely placed to assert great-power status in 
geopolitics and personal prestige in domestic politics. And yet, scholars have yet to give 
sufficient attention to the agency of leaders. They tend to identify leaders with the state, 
thereby assuming away their role in handling the conflicting imperatives of geopolitics and 
domestic politics. This study seeks to integrate the insights of outcome-based status and 
norm-based prestige into a two-level game framework for studying the politics of status 
competition. Because state leaders are central players in the international arena and they 
arguably often play their international roles with a view to domestic politics, their acts 
should be viewed as strategies to navigate the “two-level game.”58 The two-level analytical 
approach takes the rationalist view that leaders are preoccupied with matters of political 
survival. Challenges to their political fortunes could arise from both international and 
domestic arenas. Leaders in turn face a dual task in the daily practice of statecraft: to 
advance national security while securing the interests of their key constituents.59 It is 
questionable, however, that a strictly rationalist position is adequate for operationalizing 
this assumption in analytic endeavors. The political interests essential to leaders such as 
power and prestige simply cannot be calculated in tangible terms. 60   As such, it is 
imperative to address how the subjective experiences of national status and personal 
prestige underpin leaders’ pragmatic considerations.  
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THE ARGUMENT  
This study departs from the existing literature on status aspirations and international 
conflict in two ways. First and foremost, it assumes that state leaders take great-power status 
and personal prestige to be instrumental. Specifically, great-power status provides a route to 
geopolitical security, whereas personal prestige could help leaders legitimize their authority 
in elite politics. A second assumption is that leaders often need to manage tradeoffs among 
objectives as related to great-power status, geopolitical security, and domestic political 
survival.  
On these assumptions, I advance the central assertion that when individual leaders rely 
upon great-power status as a means to geopolitical security and on personal prestige for domestic 
political survival, for pragmatic reasons they would engage in competitive status-seeking policies. I 
test this hypothesis against the backgrounds of geopolitical threat and institutional change 
dynamics. These two types of events could heighten the instrumental importance of 
great-power status and personal prestige to other imperatives leaders face in distinct realms 
of power politics. Specifically, in the midst of institutional changes leaders may rely upon 
prestige as the principal vehicle for domestic political survival. On the other hand, a great 
power extending its geopolitical influences to a third party in the nearby region—usually a 
materially weaker state—could sensitize leaders to the instrumental role of great-power 
status as a route to geopolitical security. These incentives can combine to make competitive 
status-seeking strategy a preferable policy for leaders.  
In my assertion, states compete for status not for its intrinsic values but for instrumental 
purposes. I argue, moreover, that by competitive status-seeking measures leaders seek to transcend 
the tradeoffs among geopolitical security, domestic political survival, and status aspirations. While 
such tradeoffs are imposed by exogenous events including (but not limited to) geopolitical 
threat and domestic institutional change, those events could also motivate leaders to use 
great-power status and personal prestige as vehicles for addressing various political 
challenges. Herein lies the political logic of status competition among nations: it is about 
how leaders seize the opportunity to transcend the value tradeoffs.  
Two points in my argument are worth elaborating. First, this study posits two major 
audiences—geopolitical adversaries and domestic opponents—to competitive status-seeking 
acts undertaken by leaders. These two audiences operate respectively within the anarchical 
structure of geopolitics and the hierarchical structure of domestic politics. Leaders’ symbolic 
acts could follow a distinct logic in each of these domains. Relatively sparse social ties and 
heterogeneous identities are defining characteristics of the geopolitical domain; as such, 
“actors pursue their own interests in the absence of durable interactions through which they 
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can monitor and enforce compliance with collective agreements.”61 Adversaries in this 
domain must be defeated, accommodated, or deterred. When leaders signal claim to 
great-power status by displaying state power to a geopolitical adversary, they could hope to 
deter it once the aspect of power being demonstrated is recognized as a symbol indicative of 
status superiority.  
By contrast, the state structure in its ideal type features a homogeneous identity, 
hierarchical organizations, and dense networks that sustain collective actions of politicians 
and bureaucrats. It then features facilitates the generation of pressures for conformity once a 
leader takes the initiative to mobilize others around a cause of status competition with 
foreign nations. That leader can expect to gain prestige by taking competitive status-seeking 
measures. Their acts of status assertion, however, carry tremendous security risks for the 
state. Therefore, competitive status-seeking strategy is no normal statecraft; it is unlikely to 
be a preferable policy unless leaders are cross-pressured by imperatives to advance both 
great-power status and personal prestige.  
Second, concerns for social preeminence can arise for pragmatic reasons—specifically, 
leaders may view great-power status and personal prestige as crucial means to tangible 
political interests such as geopolitical security and domestic political survival. Such concerns 
would arguably become salient as leaders face significant challenges of geopolitics and 
domestic politics. This study therefore proposes geopolitical threat and institutional change 
dynamics as stimuli for leaders’ pragmatic concerns for great-power status and personal 
prestige. Such types of events highlight the circumstances in which leaders may feel 
compelled to value great-power status and personal prestige as crucial political resources. In 
such circumstances, leaders’ concerns for great-power status and personal prestige arise out 
of political necessity, and are therefore distinguishable from the innate psychological desire 
for social preeminence. The latter is constant. Pragmatic concerns for social 
preeminence—notably great-power status and personal prestige—are variable. In addition, 
events associated with geopolitical threat and institutional change dynamics can impose on 
leaders the tradeoffs among geopolitical security, domestic political survival, and status 
ambitions. Such events, therefore, provide good settings for applying my theoretical 
assumptions about state preference for status.  
 
Hypotheses 
Why do leaders engage in competitive status-seeking strategy that carries tremendous 
security risks? In tackling this question, I focus on the instrumental importance of 
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great-power status and personal prestige respectively to geopolitical security and leaders’ 
domestic political survival. I therefore propose the prime hypothesis: pragmatic concerns for 
social preeminence—notably great-power status and personal prestige—can motivate leaders to 
undertake competitive status-seeking measures.  
This hypothesis contrasts with, and seeks to improve on the conventional viewpoint 
that leaders pursue great-power status for its intrinsic values, ranging from the need for 
avoiding frustrating feels to a full satisfaction of self-esteem. Three auxiliary hypotheses 
follow. They describe distinct mechanisms uncovered by the conventional viewpoint. 
Chapter 2 will specify how these three hypotheses support the prime one—hence the focus 
here is on their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the conventional view.  
Hypothesis 1 The aspect of state power leaders would display as a status symbol has to do with the 
strategic role of a third party (normally a lesser power) in a geopolitical competition between the 
major powers.  
The conventional view suggests that a geopolitical rivalry arises when state leaders feel 
humiliated in diplomatic bargaining, especially when their status claims are unheeded or 
misunderstood by the interlocutor. The mishandling of status claims tends to foster a sense 
of “status inconsistency” that can exacerbate leaders’ threat perception. But this view is 
indeterminate as to the aspects in which leaders would endeavor to enhance great-power 
status. By contrast, my hypothesis adds “status symbols” into the equation, stressing the 
instrumental purpose of leaders in utilizing status symbols to enhance the state’s 
geopolitical security. Meanwhile, an emphasis on status symbols allows for differentiation of 
competitive status-seeking strategy from normal security-seeking behavior.  
Hypothesis 2 When driven by the quest for geopolitical security alone, concerns for great-power 
status are permissive but not sufficient for leaders to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy.  
This hypothesis contrasts with the conventional view that state leaders care about status 
for its intrinsic values. To the extent that this viewpoint the holds true, status cannot be 
traded off for other national objectives. If, however, leaders concern themselves with status 
for instrumental purposes, they are not likely to pursue status at the expense of other critical 
interests. Thus, while competitive status-seeking strategy may further security interests as 
enhanced status could elicit deference from other states and increase a state’s geopolitical 
autonomy, leaders would tend to be prudent and adopt risk-efficient strategies in dealing 
with geopolitical threats.  
Hypothesis 3 When preoccupied with personal prestige at home, leaders would be averse to 
escalation of international conflict that could undermine their ability to advance national wellbeing.  
The conventional viewpoint asserts that leaders share with the general public a 
universal drive for status preeminence in the international community. It follows that 
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leaders pursue status in order to satisfy their public’s desire for status. My hypothesis, 
however, contends that state leaders derive prestige from their perceived ability to advance 
national wellbeing at large. Hence, when their priority is to legitimize their authority at 
home by enhancing personal prestige, it is preferable to avoid escalation of an international 
conflict that may intrude on their domestic agenda.  
 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
Several key concepts form the basis for my theoretical claims. They warrant particular 
clarifications.  
Power is an ability to carry out one’s will despite resistance from other individuals. This 
definition underscores the compulsory aspect of power and is adopted most frequently by 
political scientists. 62  It is actor-centric; as such, it is oblivious of scenarios in which 
significant asymmetries of influence are not derived from an actor’s possession of resources 
but rather from structural inequalities that grant some actors prerogatives at the expense of 
others.63 This study is inclined toward this actor-centric view of power as its central focus is 
on foreign policy statecraft by individual leaders. Leaders engage in power 
politics—whether at home or abroad—when they regard power as prerequisite for fulfilling 
other aspirations.  
Authority means legitimate power. Legitimate power (e.g. authority) would elicit 
voluntary compliance from the target actors, thereby perpetuating dominance of the power 
wielders.64 In this sense power begets legitimation. For state leaders, legitimizing political 
power could enhance their power positions and the chance for political survival.  
Power vs. state power. Throughout this study, I differentiate between power and state 
power. State power refers to coercive resources exercised by the state authorities. As social 
and physical conditions underpinning interpersonal interactions are different than those 
underlying interstate relations, power arguably follows distinct operating logics in different 
realms. In this study, I assume that among individual persons power takes the form of 
coordination capacity: it resides in an actor’s ability to get a group of people to work toward 
an end. Coordination enables leadership. That is, persons who succeed in coordinating a 
group of supporters can exercise leadership and impose personal will upon the outsiders. By 
contrast, state power suggests material or ideational resources that state leaders could 
employ to influence their counterparts of other states. 65 This amounts to what Hans 																																																																		
62 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich ed., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al trans. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 53; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral 
Science 2, no. 3 (1957); Terry M. Moe, "Power and Political Institutions," Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 2 (2005). 
63 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005). 
64 Weber, Economy and Society, 53.   
65 For this distinction between power based on coordination and power based on resources, see Russell Hardin, One for All: 
The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 35-37.   
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Morgenthau termed as “elements of national power.”66 State power is multidimensional in 
that the resources at state authorities’ disposal are disparate.  
Status refers in international relations to “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking 
on valued attributes.” And these attributes include “wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, 
demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout.”67 Status could 
manifest itself either as membership in a club of state actors, or as a state’s superior standing 
relative to others.68 The former can be more inclusive than the latter. Although the “club” is 
by nature exclusive, it can nevertheless accommodate quite a few actors and allow them to 
live with one another peacefully. By contrast, the quest for superior standing—especially 
great-power status—is apt to cause zero-sum competitions. This study is focused on this 
competitive aspect of status. Acquiring such type of status could contribute to the state’s 
geopolitical autonomy and security.  
Relatedly, status aspirations represent a projection onto the state level of individual 
ambitions for preeminence in a given hierarchy; they are thereby associated with leaders’ 
quest for international preeminence of the nation. Conceptually, status aspirations could 
originate from the innate drive for honor, which is normally conferred by the community 
due to an actor’s admirable traits. As such, it is essential that an actor follow certain rules on 
the way to obtaining honor. However, “the value placed on honor……and the intensity of 
the competition for it tempt actors to take shortcuts to gain honor,” argues Richard Ned 
Lebow, and “if the rules governing the honor are consistently violated……competition for 
honor is transformed into competition for standing, which is more unconstrained and 
possibly more violent.”69 Thus, inasmuch as the competition for status does not require an 
actor to internalize the normative commitments, state actors can achieve great-power status 
by virtue of the advantages they establish over the adversaries. In such cases, status 
preeminence is outcome-based. This tends to be prevalent in the geopolitical arena, where 
no overarching authority exists to define and maintain the norms of state behaviors.   
Competitive status-seeking strategy (in other words, “competitive assertions of 
status”) involves acts, measures, or policies as undertaken by leaders to assert great-power 
status for the nation. It is characterized by symbolic acts of displaying an aspect of state 
power to bolster leaders’ status claims. State power is a central vehicle for leaders to 
undertake competitive status-seeking acts. Conceivably, certain state assets at the leaders’ 
disposal are essential to a state’s capacity to operate in the anarchical international system 
and physically not easy to manipulate—as such, they are too important and too vast to be 
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67 Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” in Status in World Politics, 7. 
68 Ibid.; Renshon, Fighting for Status.  
69 Lebow, Why Nations Fight, 71.  
	 25	
used for deception. Accordingly, if leaders can achieve status preeminence for their nation 
vis-à-vis other nations by demonstrating a superior aspect of state power, that aspect of state 
power would provide an “index” for international audiences to predict what the leaders 
would do in the future in accordance with their claim to great-power status.70 Moreover, 
outcompeting adversaries—that is, to make the target state recognize the advantage of 
power resources that leaders employ to pursue great-power status—serves to deter the 
geopolitical adversaries and could thereby enhance national security. Pursuing security via 
competitive status-seeking strategy is a distinctive strategy. It is distinguishable from other 
types of security strategy, such as coercive diplomacy, balancing strategies, and 
conventional diplomacy—Chapter 1 will undertake this conceptual task. 
Similar to status, prestige means public recognition of an actor’s prominence in a realm 
of social activities. It amounts to “external honor,” a symbolic award that “must be 
conferred by others and can only be gained through deeds they regard as honorable.”71 I 
consider prestige to be norm-based. Inasmuch as prestige involves normative assessment of 
an actor’s social performance, this study associates prestige with leaders’ efforts to 
legitimize their grip on state authority. Hence, in this study “status” is the shorthand for 
national status, whereas “prestige” for personal prestige. State leaders seek great-power status 
vis-à-vis their counterparts of other states; they seek to boost personal prestige among 
domestic political elites.  
Both great-power status and personal prestige rest on favorable beliefs held by relevant 
audiences. For leaders to foster that belief, they need in the first place to demonstrate traits 
of state assets or their personalities that might confer great-power status or personal 
prestige.72 Such acts are symbolic by nature and are subject to varying interpretations by 
audiences. In this study, I treat competitive status-seeking strategy as a “two-level game” in 
which leaders try to assert great-power status and personal prestige simultaneously. Hence, 
in undertaking competitive status-seeking acts, leaders do not necessarily differentiate 
between great-power status and personal prestige. While leaders are asserting status claims 
to international audiences via competitive status-seeking acts, such symbolic acts also serve 
to boost personal prestige to home audiences.  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study seeks to make three original contributions to the bodies of literature on status 																																																																		
70 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 26-40.  
71 Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67.  
72 Following Robert Jervis, I suggest that signaling acts are symbolic behaviors to boost one’s claims. According to him, a 
state actor fosters its own “signaling reputation” by “issuing signals ties the actor’s reputation to acting according to [those 
signals].” See Jervis, The Logic of Images, 80. Further, Larson, Paul and Wohlforth argue that typical of status seeking are 
“symbolic” and highly “visible” acts. Such acts are intended to “draw attention to [a state’s] accomplishments and make a 
claim.” Larson et al., “Status and World Order,” 12.   
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aspirations and international security. First, the existing scholarship considers status 
aspirations an invariant and universal drive underlying states’ international conduct. This 
study challenges this notion by treating status aspirations as a variable to be explained 
rather than a constant motive as often assumed. Status aspirations, by definition, are a 
projection onto the state level of individual ambitions for preeminence in an international 
hierarchy. Whether leaders view great-power status as worth pursuing is arguably 
contingent on the geopolitical and domestic political challenges they face. An investigation 
into the manners in which they reconcile status ambitions with these commitments could 
highlight non-psychological sources of competitive status-seeking behaviors. On this matter, I 
argue that geopolitical security threats can heighten leaders’ preference for great-power 
status, but the relevance of this preference to national security policy is also a function of 
necessity of personal prestige for leaders’ political survival.  
Stressing the rationalist microfoundation of status aspirations means that as state 
objectives, status and security are complementary rather than antithetical. This is my second 
departure from conventional wisdom. My claim is that a state may seek higher status with a 
view to enhancing security in the geopolitical arena—that is, maximizing its autonomy from 
other states’ interference. And yet, with a few exceptions this line of reasoning has yet to be 
extended theoretically very far and examined empirically in detail.73 
To be clear, this study does not privilege either status aspirations or security 
imperatives in ontological terms. Given its central focus on the instrumental roles of 
great-power status for states and of personal prestige for the leaders, my argument 
underscores the interplay between status aspirations and security imperatives. Specifically, I 
argue that status aspirations assume much significance when they become intertwined with 
conflict of security interests, as individual leaders tend to assess security threats according to 
their sense of status recognition by the state they are interacting with. 
The final aspect of originality in my argument lies in its integration of rationalist and 
psychological microfoundations altogether. While the argument highlights the instrumental 
rationality of state leaders trying to advance national security and legitimize their authority 
in domestic elite politics, leaders may also need to elicit emotional attachment from 
audiences who can provide crucial support to their political activities. The symbolic acts of 
displaying state power against a foreign adversary, I argue, allow leaders to translate the 
great-power status into personal prestige. This is achievable because domestic 
audiences—political elites organized in small groups—tend to put their trust in leaders who 
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can signal the readiness to defend their corporate interests couched in terms of national 
status.74 In this way, my argument highlights the psychological underpinnings of domestic 
prestige politics in which leaders engage. It is the very psychological dynamics that enable 
leaders to gain support from the “veto players” at home for their policy of status 
competition abroad.  
 
PLAN OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the dependent variable—namely, 
competitive status-seeking strategy. In particular, it defines the behavioral traits of this 
strategy and specifies three varieties of it—namely, offensive alliance, delegitimation 
strategy, and the display of military power. In each variety, leaders demonstrate a distinct 
aspect of state power to assert great-power status. The state power being displayed provides 
a vehicle for bolstering status claims. Chapter 1 also discusses why the existing theories fall 
short in explaining status competitive seeking. Chapter 2 lays out my theoretical argument 
on why leaders would adopt competitive policies to pursue great-power status. It is focused 
on the role of personal prestige in power politics and the logic of symbolic acts in leaders’ 
practice of status competition. Relatedly, this chapter addresses the empirical matter of 
when leaders are likely to engage in competitive status-seeking strategy. It specifies two 
types of events—namely, geopolitical threat and institutional change dynamics—that could 
inspire leaders’ pragmatic concerns in geopolitical or domestic arenas while exacerbating 
the tradeoffs among geopolitical security, domestic political survival, and great-power 
status. 
Chapters 3-5 investigate three empirical varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy 
by scrutinizing Chinese security strategy from 1962 to 1979. Each chapter is devoted to 
addressing one variety. Chapter 3 examines China’s pursuit of offensive alliance from 1962 
to 1965. This was motivated by Chinese leaders’ pragmatic concerns for great-power status 
as fueled by the presence of the US-centric alliance network in East Asia on the one hand, 
and for personal prestige on the other, which was related to the Mao-Liu split following the 
Seven Thousand Cadre Conference in early 1962. Chapter 4 focuses on China’s pursuit of 
delegitimation strategy against the Soviets till the outbreak in 1969 of armed conflicts along 
the Sino-Soviet borders. This strategy was manifest in Mao’s rejection of the Soviet 
leadership’s proposed collaboration on aiding North Vietnam as well as the peace initiatives. 
The Chinese leadership was determined to undermine the Soviet leadership in the 
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Politics," International Security 36, no. 2 (2011); Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. 
	 28	
international communist movement in general and extrude Moscow’s influences from 
Vietnam in particular. To this end, it resolved to promote its ideological appeal in fighting 
against the US-backed Saigon regime. This period also witnessed one of the most dramatic 
events in Chinese political history—that is, the Cultural Revolution. The CR established Mao 
as the absolute leader in China by eliminating his once designated successor Liu Shaoqi. 
Although factionalism was rampant in Chinese elite politics during the CR, Mao’s absolute 
authority removed the necessity for him to engage in prestige politics, as well as the 
domestic political motive of competitive status-seeking strategy. After 1968, when the most 
radical phase of the Cultural Revolution came to an end and the Liu-Deng faction that had 
been perceived as rivaling Mao prior to 1966 was out of power, China’s delegitimation 
strategy against the Soviets began to phase out.  
Chapter 5 investigates the evolution of Chinese security policy from 1969 to 1979. It 
begins with the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 and ends with the case of China’s 
invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. The primary aim of this chapter is to compare two 
cases in which China employed military force to deal with a geopolitical threat. The 
empirical scrutiny suggests that while both cases feature displays of military force by China, 
only the 1979 case can be coded as a competitive status-seeking measure. The 1969 
Sino-Soviet border conflict is better categorized as coercive diplomacy. During the conflict, 
the Chinese conducted the military act in a relatively prudent manner. Through reassurance 
signals and diplomatic concessions, the Chinese leaders meant to stabilize the border 
conditions after they exerted military pressures upon the Soviets. By contrast, China’s 
punitive war against Vietnam in 1979 was mainly designed to display military power. While 
its geostrategic purpose was to deter the Soviet Union from encircling China through its 
alignment with Vietnam, the military operation qualifies as a competitive status-seeking act 
for its lack of conflict-preventive measures and reassurance signals that were present in the 
1969 case. 
The final chapter summarizes the key findings of this study, lays out its implications for 
policy and theoretical debates, and suggests avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 1  
The Security Logic of Status Competition 
 
 
Behavior that is felt to be too important or costly in its own right to be used for other ends is an index, 
and such behavior tends to make the greatest impact on observers. Thus a state that attacks one of its 
neighbors will generally be predicted to be aggressive in the future. A state that is willing to sacrifice 
major values rather than fight will be thought weak in capability or resolve. A state that runs very 
high risks in one situation will be thought to be willing to run risks under similar circumstances. In 
these situations……the actors cannot manipulate their behavior to give the desired image without 
incurring prohibitive costs to the values the image is supposed to serve.  
Robert Jervis1 
 
 
While status goods are of intrinsic importance for human psychology, their instrumental 
relevance for power politics should not be disregarded. Great-power status, in particular, 
could help to advance geopolitical security for a state. A state could earn great-power status 
by displaying some material and ideological assets that lesser states do not possess and are 
thereby incapable of displaying to international audiences. And if the relevant international 
audience recognizes the displayed aspect of state power as an “index” of great-power status, 
the symbolic acts of displaying state power will achieve certain deterrent effects on the 
adversary’s future actions. As some prominent scholars recently note, “high status…confers 
tangible benefits in the form of decision-making autonomy and deference on the part of 
others concerning issues of importance, including but not limited to security and prosperity. 
The higher a given state’s status, the more other states adjust their policies to accommodate 
its interests, institutions, and ideas.”2  
This chapter explores the security rationale behind competitive status-seeking strategy 
and critically examines some mainstream theories on why states undertake conflict-prone 
behaviors in the international arena. After introducing the puzzle of “assertiveness,” it 
undertakes to define the meaning of competitive status-seeking strategy in a restrictive 
manner. This would allow for its clear differentiation from the security strategies normally 
practiced, including balancing, coercive diplomacy, and the conventional practice of 
diplomacy. The third section distinguishes competitive status-seeking strategy from these 
types of security strategy. The fourth section elaborates on three ways in which states 
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undertake competitive status-seeking strategy: offensive alliance, delegitimation strategy, 
and the display of military force. Finally, I critically examine a few theories on why states 
are prone to use coercive power. The analytic gaps they leave off highlight the need for a 
theory of competitive status-seeking strategy.  
 
The Puzzle of “Assertiveness” 
My conceptualization of competitive status-seeking strategy is more than an intellectual 
exercise. Rather, it involves a critical engagement with the term “assertiveness” in current 
discourses. When a state displays a certain aspect of power to assert status claims, it shows a 
tendency to impose one’s claim upon others—as such, its behavior may be considered 
“assertive.” This issue rose to prominence as China has shown greater willingness to bring 
its state power to bear upon the conflict of interests with other states after 2008.3 Often, 
students of China’s “new” assertiveness tacitly equate competitive status-seeking acts with 
coercive diplomacy, stressing the Chinese inclination to use coercive power. 4 
Conceptualizing competitive status-seeking strategy this way is not essentially wrong, but 
inadequate. It misses some defining characteristics of this strategic act.  
A close inspection does reveal that China’s international conduct after 2008 fits 
uncomfortably with the security strategies commonly practiced. Quite evidently, China’s 
growing readiness to resort to coercive power signals a clear departure from its previous 
grand strategy known as “peaceful rise.” The grand strategy of peaceful rise commits China 
to fostering a favorable geopolitical environment for its economic modernization. It accords 
priority to accommodating other states’ aspirations and avoiding international conflict.5 By 
contrast, China’s assertiveness seems to prioritize the use of coercive power over the practice 
of diplomatic engagement that has characterized China’s “peaceful rise.” 
More controversial is whether the Chinese assertive acts fit the categories of balancing 
and coercive diplomacy. On careful scrutiny, both categories risk obfuscating some crucial 
aspects of China’s conduct. “Balancing,” by definition, is characterized by state efforts to 
acquire resources within or beyond a state’s borders to safeguard core security interests.6 
This concept does not tell how a state would employ the power resources at its disposal. For 
instance, a strategy of balancing may commit China to enhance its capacity for power 																																																																		
3 See, for instance, Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Debating China's Assertiveness," International 
Security 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/14); Thomas J. Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China-Responding to Bejing's 
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Assertiveness?," International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013); Michael Swaine, "Perceptions of an Assertive China," China 
Leadership Monitor 32, no. 2 (2010); Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," Journal of 
Contemporary China 22, no. 81 (2013). 
4 Aaron Friedberg, "The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing's Assertiveness," The Washington Quarterly 37, 
no. 4 (2014).  
5 Zheng Bijian, "China's" Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005). 
6 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 118. 
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projection in defense of its territorial claims being challenged by other states, but it has little 
to say about the precise way in which China would demonstrate its newfound power to 
deter others from challenging its territorial claims. Conceptualizing the Chinese 
assertiveness as a balancing strategy also conveys an impression that China has been trying 
to balance against America’s geopolitical influences in East Asia.7 But there is no clear 
evidence to suggest that China’s assertive acts in the South and East China Seas are directed 
against the United States per se. It may be true that Beijing’s assertive acts signify an overall 
geopolitical challenge to the U.S. in East Asia, as the 2008 Financial Crisis reduced the power 
disparities between China and the United States.8 But it might also be the case that China 
was just intent on gaining a local advantage in the maritime disputes. After all, it was the 
growth of Chinese power and the intensification of China’s disputes with other states that 
encouraged America to “rebalance” to Asia.9 Viewed in this light, the balancing elements in 
Chinese security policy are less salient than commonly assumed.  
Coercive diplomacy is inadequate too for conceptualizing Chinese international conduct 
in recent years. By definition, the conduct of coercive diplomacy entails two coordinated 
steps: the exercise of coercive power and the signaling of reassurances. The latter component 
is meant to signal that the coercive acts are contingent upon the opponent’s behaviors and 
will observe restraint. It thus requires the coercer state to specify its demands well before 
taking actions to exert coercive pressures.10 China’s assertiveness lacks this component 
critical to the practice of coercive diplomacy.11 On top of that, even when Beijing tried to 
reassure its opponent in a given dispute about its limited aim, its attempt to show 
self-restraint often lagged much behind the coercive acts. Often, the Chinese government 
shows little inclination for reassurance acts until it believed that an effective level of 
deterrence has been established by its previous exercise of coercive power.12 As such, 
China’s behavior does not meet the definition of coercive diplomacy as a practice of 
“forceful persuasion.” It instead consists of a set of incoherent and half-hearted measures to 																																																																		
7 For the range of grand strategic options that could allow China to enhance its regional influence, see Barry Buzan, "The 
Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’as China’s Grand Strategy," The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 7, no. 4 (2014).  
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10 Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute 
of Peace Press, 1991). 
11 For the overall lack of a consistent signal in Chinese great power diplomacy, see Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, "New 
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should further clarify its sovereignty claims over the area.” See Wu Xinbo, "Agenda for a New Great Power Relationship," 
The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2014): 71. 
12 For an examination of this behavioral pattern, see Zhou Fangyin, "Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: 
Understanding China's South China Sea Policy," International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016); Edward Luttwak, The Rise of China 
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establish a sphere of Chinese influence based on the displays of China’s coercive power.13  
If the existing categories of security strategy cannot fully account for the salient aspects 
of China’s international assertiveness, then a new conceptual category is warranted. 
Inasmuch as China’s seemingly assertive behaviors entail any novel conceptualization, the 
prerequisite is to impart a coherent meaning into its conventional usage. It turns out, 
however, that the term “assertive” is often invoked too loosely in foreign policy discourse. 
“Early in the [William] Clinton years,” according to Charles Krauthammer, “Madeleine 
Albright formulated the vision of the liberal internationalist school then in power as 
‘assertive multilateralism.’” 14  Here, “assertive multilateralism” suggests a strong 
willingness to marshal America’s diplomatic resources (notably allies and security partners) 
around the globe for coping with the post-Cold War security challenges.15 Paradoxically, 
foreign policy analysts attached the same label to the Bush doctrine, characterizing it as a 
kind of assertive approach to national security—although it represents a radical departure 
from Clinton’s grand strategy.16 Even a more aggressive policy than the Bush Doctrine had 
the same tag on it. In the wake of Japanese annexation of Manchuria, a prominent observer 
referred to Tokyo’s attitude to the international affairs as “assertive,” suggesting that Japan 
had embarked on vindicating its vision for Monroe Doctrine in Asia.17 Needless to say, if 
the term tends to be used in such a loose manner, it is imperative to specify it in a way that 
grants it analytic purchase on a definitive range of phenomena.  
While the term “assertive” has been loosely employed to characterize apparently 
disparate foreign policies, it is still possible to instill coherence into its meaning by focusing 
on behavioral style and by positing the underlying motive. In the cases invoked above, all 
leaders sought to demonstrate a certain aspect of state power. In the Clinton case, America’s 
assertive international approach features a display of diplomatic aspect of US power by 
mobilizing allies through multilateral institutions. By contrast, the Bush administration and 
the militant leaders in Japan of the 1930s were disposed to demonstrate superior military 
strengths of their states.  
On the other hand, some prominent scholars have taken note of a persistent theme of 																																																																		
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assertiveness throughout the history of American foreign policy, regardless of the concrete 
form of strategy the leaders adopted in response to the particular challenges. Without 
specifying the term “assertive” though, their works nevertheless show an America 
persistently obsessed with vindicating its national greatness and cultural, as well as ethnic, 
superiority over other countries via the use of coercive power.18 These historical accounts 
demonstrate that by acting assertively American leaders at various times unanimously 
sought international recognition of the nation’s positive traits on which its claim to 
great-power status rests.  
Motivated by the desire for status preeminence, an assertive act may entail a 
confrontational stance. Status is positional a good: it is based on one’s superiority over 
others by virtue of the activities or traits.19 When state leaders “perceive a gap between 
what they think others should think about their state’s standing and what they estimate 
others actually do think,” according to William Wohlforth, they “seek to rectify it, possibly 
through assertive action.” 20  The struggle for status therefore entails pressing one’s 
advantage with a view to impressing the observer with the kind of superiority the actor 
claims. In the realm of security affairs where no overarching authority reigns above states, 
leaders are prone to employ whatever they have at their disposal to attain positive 
comparisons with their counterparts. As such, state power may frequently act as a vehicle 
for status competition, and status-motivated policy can readily assume abrasive and 
risk-acceptant features.21 Not surprisingly, from the vast literature on China’s international 
conduct in 2009-2010 Alastair Iain Johnson succinctly summarizes the meaning of 
assertiveness as “a form of assertive diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on 
another actor that are clearly higher than before.” 22  Apparently, Beijing’s recent 
assertiveness was driven by status ambitions: that is, Beijing sought to gain international 
recognition of their enhanced power relative to the United States after the 2008 financial 
crisis.23  																																																																		
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The motives of an “assertive” power are puzzling from a hyper-rationalist standpoint. 
A prudent rising power should hide its capacity for challenging the status quo until it 
commands overwhelming advantages. As such, Chinese behaviors should not have signaled 
a departure from its decades-long commitment to “peaceful rise.” Some of Chinese 
endeavors to develop military power and consolidate military presence in the disputed 
maritime zones appeared as balancing strategies and coercive diplomacy, which represent 
self-help motivations. Yet, both categories fall short in capturing the Chinese ambitions for 
status as suggested by official and scholarly discourses. Addressing the puzzle of 
assertiveness thus requires careful analysis of how status motives could reshape leaders’ 
strategic considerations.  
 
Seeking Status for Security  
To attain “a positively distinctive identity,” group leaders may endeavor to “emulate the 
values and practices of the higher-status group with the goal of gaining admission into elite 
clubs” (e.g. social mobility), try to “equal or surpass the dominant group in the areas on 
which its claims to superior status rest” (e.g. social competition), or “reframe a negative 
attribute as positive or stresses achievement in a different domain” (e.g. social creativity).24 
Of these status-seeking strategies, competitive strategy arguably signals the strongest 
resolve for pursuit of status. Competitive status-seeking strategy can be distinguished from 
alternative strategies by its emphasis on the confrontational approach to enhancing status. 
As such, the “costly” signals issued by competitive status-seeking acts are most conspicuous. 
This is conducive to asserting great-power status. 
Competitive status-seeking strategy commits leaders to challenging a higher-ranked 
state in the area where its superior status is manifest—and this risks conflict escalation and 
even war. Many international conflicts are subject to this explanation, as scholars have 
invoked status aspirations in explaining states’ willingness to expend blood and money in 
international conflict, especially over peripheral matters loosely related to core security 
interests.25 These studies, however, suffer from a selection bias given their focus on the 
issues of relative insignificance to states’ geopolitical security. Absent security challenges, 
status aspirations can easily rise to prominence. Selecting the cases this way certainly 
simplifies the task of establishing status aspirations as a state objective in their own right. 
Yet, it leaves how status aspirations interact with other imperatives—notably, those related 
to security—unanswered. As such, status aspirations remain a contested factor for 
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explaining international conflict.26  
To meet this challenge, this study calls attention to the security rationale behind 
competitive status-seeking measures, and compares such measures with the relatively 
risk-averse strategies such as balancing strategies, conventional diplomacy, and the prudent 
conduct of coercive diplomacy. Here it is worth asking why leaders prefer to advance 
geopolitical security through competitive status-seeking policies. And because such policies 
could incur substantial security risks in the short term, another interesting puzzle is why the 
whole leadership could rally behind them. Analysts, in turn, should shift their attention 
from status aspirations as an individual-level psychology to a collective commitment, and 
take power politics (in both geopolitical and domestic arenas) into account. This is not to 
suggest that individual leaders and their psychological traits do not matter at all. Quite the 
contrary, my emphasis is precisely on how psychodynamics of individual leaders enable 
their collective actions. Next chapter will address the instrumental role of personal prestige 
for individual leaders in domestic political survival, whereas this chapter aims to explore the 
security-seeking logic behind competitive status-seeking strategy. Its central focus is on the 
instrumental importance of great-power status in safeguarding geopolitical security for 
states—and by extension, their leaders.    
Competitive status-seeking strategy has three defining features. First, the purpose of 
undertaking it is to outperform other states in a given realm of international politics. For this 
purpose, state leaders normally display an aspect of state power relevant to the field of 
status competition. Second, inasmuch as the aspect of state power being displayed would 
serve as a symbol of great-power status, leaders who perform competitive status-seeking 
acts want to elicit recognition of their preeminence in the issue area where they demonstrate 
state power. And they tend not to back down in the face of counter-pressures from others. 
Third, state leaders are inclined to appeal to or attack a third weaker party with close links 
with the dominant rival (e.g. the higher-ranked power). A lesser state (or middle power) is 
arguably easier to be coopted or coerced than a great power.27 Appealing to or taking on a 
weaker party therefore makes it easier for leaders to proclaim victory in status competition.  
Competitive status-seeking strategy, in short, features efforts to assert great-power 
status through symbolic acts displaying state power. Such acts help further states’ 
geopolitical security by virtue of the subjective nature of status. Because status is perceptual, 
it could arise out of an image of powerfulness, which helps to deter challenges from 
potential adversaries. Following Jonathan Renshon, I argue that when engaging in 
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competitive status-seeking strategy, state leaders seek to reshape the expectations of 
observers and update their assessment of the state’s demonstrated attributes. “For conflict to 
be ‘status enhancing,’” in his words, “states must reveal capabilities (military or otherwise) 
in conflict that provide new information on where they should stand in a given hierarchy.”28 
And because human mind is slow in coming to terms with substantive elements of power, 
an enhanced status would be “sticky.” That is, “once a state obtains a certain status along 
with the accompanying privileges, it retains a presumptive right to that status which can 
outlast the initial conditions that give rise to it.”29 Even if great-power status by itself does 
not secure tangible benefits for a state, it nevertheless promises to lower the costs of state 
actions and increase dramatically the prospects for success. As a few leading scholars note, 
“recognition by others as a major power creates legitimacy for a wide variety of foreign 
policy pursuits, making it less costly to intervene in disputes or creates mechanisms for 
cooperation. The reputation associated with major power status should strengthen the 
credibility of both threats and commitments made by these states.”30 For these reasons, 
status can be instrumental in advancing geopolitical security for a state. Prevailing in a 
status competition could elicit voluntary deference (albeit limited in scope and degree) from 
the adversaries over time.  
Whereas the subjective nature of status makes great-power status worth pursuing, the 
intersubjective nature of status makes state seeking possible. Status is social: what 
symbolizes status depends on what is commonly valued by the interacting players. To 
paraphrase Alexander Wendt, status is what states make of it.31 The intersubjective nature 
of status allows a certain aspect of state power to be attached symbolic significance. 
Inasmuch as people generally believe that certain material and ideological assets—such as 
the quality of allies, the regime’s ideological appeal, and military power—in large part 
determines a state’s autonomy and geopolitical influences, such aspects of state power are 
well suited for the purpose of asserting great-power status. And yet, state power is 
multidimensional: state authorities can possess a multiplicity of assets for safeguarding 
against external interference with the sociopolitical orders within the state’s territory. Which 
aspect of state power would be used to signal status claims? This is contingent on leaders’ 
interactions with their international counterparts. In particular, “status claims are related to 
the resources or capacities at a given state’s disposal, but the relationship between specific 
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resources or capacities and status is always contestable.”32 Undeniably, it is a matter of 
contingency as to how states find themselves competing for status in a particular field and 
by particular resources at their disposal. That noted, inasmuch as status is of instrumental 
importance for leaders in securing their claim to particular interests, they will pay close 
attention to the field that highlights the symbolic significance of concrete means. Status 
competition is by definition field-specific: it is contingent on the recognition by the 
interacting players that a certain aspect of state power can symbolize status preeminence, 
thereby highlighting a particular field of international activity. Often a field of status 
competition arises spontaneously. It manifests itself when leaders sense a challenge to their 
claimed status and see advantages in employing a given asset to signal status claims.33  
Interstate rivalry could sensitize leaders to the instrumental importance of great-power 
status which for reasons discussed above, provides a route to geopolitical security. As status 
aspirations and security imperatives become intertwined, leaders may expect state power to 
act as status symbols that could perpetuate the deterrent effect of its use. For the sake of 
simplicity, this study considers only interactions among three players, which is the 
threshold condition for status competition to unfold. Thus, it operationalizes competitive 
status-seeking strategy in terms of state efforts to display an aspect of power against a 
materially weaker state aligned with a powerful one, which poses a geopolitical threat. This 
approach to simplification is warranted as it is sufficient to illuminate a crucial logic of 
deterrence: if a state can demonstrate its capacity for extraordinary actions of which its 
adversaries are incapable, it would be able to deter the adversary—either by strength or by 
attracting a larger audience—in the future.34 Effort at simplification, though, should not 
confine our attention to just three players in international hierarchies. Its purpose is simply 
to capture a central strategic logic of competitive status-seeking acts.  
To ascertain when leaders expect to advance geopolitical security by asserting 
great-power status for their nation, I propose a hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The aspect of state power leaders would display to assert great-power status has to do 
with the strategic role of a third party in a geopolitical contest between the major powers.  
(Leaders may pursue competitive status-seeking strategy with a view to promoting geopolitical 
security. The third party’s role in great power competitions reveals the linkage of status ambitions 
and geopolitical security. When that state locates in a major power’s vicinity, or on its route to critical 
strategic area, or acts as a key ally, its strategic role gains salience. Its entry into the fray of great 
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power politics, moreover, tends to confirm the hierarchical nature of the ongoing great power 
competition. To compete for status, a major power may either find the third party—a materially 
weaker state—as a crucial audience to bestow status, or as a foil against which they can display status 
symbols to the major geopolitical adversary. Hence that lesser state is of both symbolic and strategic 
value.)  
    
Distinctiveness of Competitive Status-Seeking Strategy  
Competitive status-seeking strategy features distinctive features vis-à-vis some security 
strategies commonly practiced. Competitive status-seeking strategy is distinct from the 
conventional practice of diplomacy conceived as “a business of adjustment.” 35  In 
undertaking competitive status-seeking acts, leaders want to dictate the terms of the 
dialogue at hand. In this regard, they prioritize confrontational over accommodative stance. 
Further, conventional diplomacy is an art of employing non-violent means to achieve foreign 
policy objectives.36 As such, diplomats must be willing to pursue “joint gains through the 
exchange of information and arguments.”37 Broadly speaking, though, diplomacy features 
various symbolic acts to communicate state intentions.38 Nevertheless, to the extent that the 
acting state tries to force the target state into an inferior status, its practice of competitive 
status-seeking strategy departs critically from the conventional practice of diplomacy. 
Competitive status-seeking strategy is distinct from balancing strategies in terms of its 
emphasis on performative acts. In conceptualizing competitive status-seeking strategy, I 
argue that the image of power is no less important than the substance of power. In this 
regard, I do not take issue with the widely shared view that state power is resource-based 
and exists as deployable assets.39 Rather, competitive status-seeking strategy refers to 
strategies of using power; as such, the quantity and quality of resources that constitute state 
power fall outside of its purview. Of course, state power is unavailable without certain 
material and institutional resources. Nonetheless, the way leaders bring state assets to bear 
upon a challenge deserves no less attention than the resources at their disposal.  
Balancing, by definition, refers to “a state’s effort to amass military might so as to deter 
another’s aggression or prevail in a conflict should deterrence fail [emphasis added],” and 
this can be done through alliance building, doctrinal or technical innovations, and military 
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buildups.40 Yet, the power resources that enable competitive status-seeking strategies are 
not limited to military forces. Rather, they could include any type of power resources that 
leaders can mobilize to impress the adversaries with the state’s international competence. 
Since a great power is distinguished not only by military power but also by diplomatic 
assets (such as alliance network) and the ideological appeal of its legitimating principles, the 
nonmilitary aspects of state power could serve as crucial vehicles for status assertions. 
Hence, this study emphasizes that besides military power, diplomatic assets (notably allied 
partners) and the regime’s ideological appeal could also act provide resources to symbolize 
a state’s distinctiveness and enable leaders to assert great-power status.  
Finally, competitive status-seeking strategy overlaps with coercive diplomacy to some 
extent: both require the demonstration of power to deter or compel the adversary. But these 
two strategies are not identical. Coercive diplomacy by definition combines coercion and 
reassurance; its ultimate purpose is to induce the target state to behave in the desired way.41 
Coercive diplomacy features an exercise of coercion as well as restraint. In practicing coercive 
diplomacy, leaders need to reassure the target state that the compliance with the demand 
would not lead to further punishment.42 The reassurance element is missing in the practice 
of competitive status-seeking strategy. In undertaking competitive status-seeking acts, 
leaders tend to view the issue at hand as a matter of status superiority. It is not desirable for 
them to publicly reassure the target state that their objective is limited, because doing so 
would undermine the resolve (as perceived by other players) to assert the nation’s status 
and leaders’ prestige.  
 
Varieties of Competitive Status-seeking strategy 
Competitive status-seeking strategy features displays of state power, which enable leaders 
to assert great-power status. For heuristic purposes this study specifies three varieties of 
competitive status-seeking strategy: offensive alliance, delegitimation strategy, and display 
of military force. Types of competitive status-seeking strategy as specified here are not 
exhaustive. They nevertheless represent demonstrable aspects of state power that could 
differentiate great powers from others.43   																																																																		
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Offensive Alliance 
Offensive alliance is a cooperative arrangement between the allied partners committed to 
attacking a third party.44 Competent allied partners can facilitate a state’s projecting its 
power capabilities abroad. Through an offensive alliance, leaders could display the 
diplomatic asset of their state. By showing that the state is superior in its diplomatic aspect 
of power, they assert great-power status in the international arena.  
International relations scholars have only made modest effort to theorize about 
offensive alliances.45 But the symbolic value of offensive alliance has readily featured in this 
limited literature. Thomas J. Christensen argues that communist alliance in the Cold War 
was revisionist and revolutionary in nature, as the communist ideology committed its 
members to undermine the western camp led by the United States. For members in such 
alliances, “the creation, preservation, or bolstering of the member’s reputation as a loyal and 
pure supporter of revolution against the status quo” is a central commitment.46 In the case 
of communist states, allied partners assumed symbolic value in demonstrating their strength 
vis-à-vis their capitalist adversaries.  
The symbolic value of alliance partner is manifest not just in offensive alliances, to be 
sure. The resilience of contemporary liberal international order hinges not only on the 
materially preponderant power of the US government, argues John Ikenberry, but also on 
the cohesion of an alliance system composed of liberal democracies which achieved 
remarkable success in socioeconomic development.47 In this case, allied partners constitute 
crucial elements of American power. That noted, offensive alliance provides a vehicle for 
displaying state power. By encouraging them to take offensive action, leaders in effect assert 
great-power status by showing that their state is powerful by virtue of its diplomatic asset. 
As to be shown in Chapter 4, in forging offensive alliance with the Hanoi regime, Beijing 
was intent not merely on undermining the American influence in Indochina; it also sought 
to demonstrate the value of Hanoi as a diplomatic asset vis-à-vis the impotent Saigon 
regime.  
 
Delegitimation Strategy  
Delegitimation strategy is another variant of competitive status-seeking strategy. It aims to 
publicize the inconsistency of the target state’s actions with its proclaimed values. 
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Delegitimation strategy may work to impose costs upon the target state. If the target state is 
revealed as being hypocritical and self-serving in its international conduct, it is more likely 
to be feared than admired, and other states would then be less inclined to support its 
initiatives abroad. Eventually, the target state’s international influences would be 
undermined.48  
The ideological aspect of state power features centrally in the pursuit of delegitimation 
strategy.49 It enables a state to demonstrate the superiority of its ideological precepts. All 
stable regimes need to derive legitimacy to rule from an ideological paradigm. Ideological 
precepts can act as a component of state power if they appeal to foreign audiences—this is 
loosely labeled as “soft power.”50  
The ideological appeal of a political regime provides an important vehicle for leaders to 
compete with another state’s for great-power status. Thus leaders can display the ideological 
aspect of their state power to signal status claims. And yet, competing and ambiguous 
norms are pervasive in international political life. It is often possible to invoke a set of norms 
to justify one’s behaviors that are unjustified in light of an alternative set of norms.51 As 
such, delegitimating rhetoric may not suffice to convince international audiences. 
Delegitimating rhetoric must be coupled with the deeds to act out the normatively 
appropriate conduct. Both elements are requisite for the practice of delegitimation strategy. 
This variety of competitive status-seeking strategy features displays of the ideological aspect 
of state power. 
As to be shown in chapter 5, China intensified its effort to delegitimize the Soviet 
leadership in the communist hierarchy by increasing material and diplomatic support for 
the Hanoi regime. As Hanoi was engaged in armed struggles against the US-backed Saigon 
and American military presence in Vietnam, Beijing’s support for Hanoi was designed to 
enhance its credentials for leadership of international communist movement. Leaders in 
Beijing wanted to demonstrate to the communist audiences worldwide that it was more 
committed than Moscow to challenging the U.S.-led capitalist order. At a minimum, by 
coupling anti-Soviet rhetoric with a costly effort to support Hanoi, their delegitimation 
strategy aimed to undercut Moscow’s influences on the course of the Vietnam War.  																																																																		
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Display of Military Power 
Displays of military power could deter or compel an adversary through the image of 
powerfulness having been established. It works through a different logic than imposing 
brute force. Thomas Schelling’s explanation is worth citing.   
[B]rute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most 
successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, 
that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence 
someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted, or that a victim 
believes can be withheld or inflicted. The threat of pain tries to structure someone’s 
motives, while brute force tries to overcome his strength. Unhappily, the power to 
hurt is often communicated by some performance of it.52  
Following this logic, competitive status-seeking strategy aims to reshape the image held 
by the target state with respect to the status seeker. The display of military power—a variety 
of such behavior—is designed to convey an impression of the state’s powerfulness. When 
the display of military power does create such an impression, it would help deter potential 
challenges. The symbolic display of military force can serve this strategic end. In this variety 
of competitive status-seeking strategy, military power acts as a status symbol not a brute 
force; its function is to convince rather than suppress the adversaries.  
Competitive status-seeking strategy can be distinguished from coercive diplomacy by 
its emphasis on a different function of military power. Whereas coercive diplomacy employs 
military power as a bargaining instrument, military power serves as a vehicle for status 
assertion in competitive status-seeking strategy. In undertaking competitive status-seeking 
acts, state leaders do not normally take on the dominant adversary; rather, they tend to 
employ military power against a lesser state aligned with it. Taking on a weaker power 
affords them a better chance to assert great-power status, as they can avoid being frustrated 
by superior material forces. Moreover, when competitive status-seeking acts feature displays 
of military power, such acts are normally decoupled from the reassurance message that is 
critical for the prudent conduct of coercive diplomacy.53 For instance, China fought a 
limited war with Vietnam in 1979 with a view to deterring the Soviet Union from continuing 
to provide military supplies to Hanoi. China’s military act qualifies as competitive 
status-seeking strategy against the Soviets, as it was employed directly against an allied 
partner of the Soviets. Without the Soviet threat, China would not have chosen to use 
military power against Vietnam. Moreover, the Chinese act fell short of specifying the 																																																																		
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concrete demands for Vietnam. This makes it difficult to reassure Hanoi of the limits of 
military operations prosecuted by the Chinese, despite their unilateral efforts to limit the 
scope of war. These traits indicate that Beijing’s leaders were intent on asserting great-power 
status through a punitive military act against Vietnam. 
    
Critique of Existing Theories: Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, Authoritarian 
Politics, and Diversionary Conflict  
Contemporary theorists have made various arguments about why states are prone to use 
coercive power in advancing their security interests. They provide critical insights into the 
pattern of state behaviors that can be associated with competitive status-seeking 
strategy—namely, the display of state power to press one’s claim. However, these theories 
have in large part disregarded the role of great-power status in enhancing a state’s 
geopolitical security and the importance of personal prestige for leaders’ political survival. 
And the way they theorize about domestic politics is inadequate for addressing how leaders’ 
concerns for great-power status and by extension, personal prestige inform foreign policy 
statecraft. By examining these theories, I seek clearer definition of research puzzles over 
which my conceptualization of competitive status-seeking strategy could offer explanatory 
leverage.  
 
Offensive Realism 
Competitive status-seeking strategy typically involves displays of state power to assert 
great-power status over target states. This is not foreign to offensive realist scholars, who are 
inclined to view coercive strategies as the norm of great power politics. Competitive 
status-seeking strategy amounts to “blackmail” in the offensive realist handbook. In 
undertaking it, a state pressures its opponent into compliance by threatening use of coercive 
forces. It is “coercive threats and intimidation, not the actual use of force, [that] produce the 
desired outcome.”54 
This is precisely how competitive status-seeking acts work strategically. That is, if a 
state’s power is proven superior to another’s (and ideally, that state thereby establishes 
prestige), it can make the target state submit. For offensive realists, this strategy promises to 
increase the prospects for state survival in the anarchical international environment. Absent 
an overarching authority to enforce order in international politics, the argument goes, 
demonstrating a state’s strength helps to enhance its security. And inasmuch as great 
powers are those with capacity to coerce other states, it is necessary for them to demonstrate 
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their coercive capacities.55  
The offensive realist argument is not essentially wrong but incomplete. It does not 
address why coercive strategies must be the optimal strategy to enhance state security 
interests. It is not logically compelling to argue that to defend their country state leaders 
have no choice but to threaten other states with coercive power. After all, coercive strategies 
tend to be costly and pursuing them risks escalation of international tensions. They act as 
the dominant strategy for security only when armed conflict is the norm of international 
politics, as offensive realists tend to assume.56 But this may not always be the case in 
international political life. The empirical records of China’s international behaviors, for 
instance, suggest that China was reluctant to escalate territorial disputes and even became 
accommodative to other states’ territorial claims after it established a strong hold over the 
territory in dispute.57 Such kind of evidence could falsify offensive realism and there are a 
lot.58 As such, offensive realism is inadequate for explaining why coercive strategies did not 
occur in many circumstances. 
 
Defensive Realism 
Contra offensive realism, defensive realists view a state’s preference for coercive means as 
an anomaly in its pursuit of geopolitical security. According to defensive realists, 
non-coercive strategies, such as defensive alliance, diplomatic reciprocations, and peripheral 
concessions, are often available to state leaders.59 Hence, security-seeking states should try 
hard to avoid international rivalries through prudent policies.60 In the cases whereby 
leaders rejected prudence in favor of competitive status-seeking strategy, defensive realists 
tend to fault domestic political pathologies for their imprudent use of power.61  
Jack Snyder, in particular, argues that state leaders may logroll their interests with 
imperialist groups aspiring to overseas resources, such as access to military bases, colonies, 
raw materials, and markets. A domestic ruling coalition thus formed would pursue 
competitive policies. Couched in terms of national glory, moreover, the competitive 
status-seeking measures as undertaken by leaders are likely to gain legitimacy among the 																																																																		
55 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 3.  
56 See John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994); 
Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," ibid., no. 2 (Fall 1994).  
57 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
58  Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data," The 
China Quarterly 153 (1998).   
59 See, for instance, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 02 (1978); Stephen 
Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Charles L Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: 
Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994/95). 
60 Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (London: Springer, 2010). 
61 Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 
(Summer 1984); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
	 46	
general public and may even delude leaders themselves into the myths of expansion.62 
Opponents of Snyder’s argument, however, suggest that logrolling among domestic interest 
groups is not always possible and state leaders could be paralyzed by intense elite 
competitions. As various individuals and elite groups vied for shaping state policy, leaders 
would be handicapped in their ability to mobilize domestic support for any coherent 
policy. 63  Hence, defensive realism is indeterminate as to when state leaders opt for 
imprudent coercive strategies, including competitive status-seeking strategy. To conclude, 
defensive realism provides a baseline expectation regarding when state leaders tend not to 
undertake competitive status-seeking strategy. Yet, it needs do more to specify domestic 
political mechanisms that help make competitive status-seeking strategy a preferable 
security strategy for leaders.  
 
Thesis of Authoritarian Politics  
Both offensive realism and defensive realism are “third-image” theories, as they accord 
analytic priority to systemic pressures and incentives. The thesis of authoritarian politics 
reverses this logic. It stresses that the logic of political survival in authoritarian regimes are 
the principal driver of foreign policy. This thesis is composed of a disparate set of arguments 
about the propensity of authoritarian leaders for conflict escalations in the international 
arena.64 There is no need here to review these arguments individually. For theory-testing 
purposes, I focus instead on a common theme as regards when authoritarian leaders are 
prone to conflict with their international rivals. In this way, competitive status-seeking 
strategy falls under the purview of the authoritarian politics thesis.  
Bruce de Mesquita and others argue that authoritarian leaders have stronger propensity 
for military conflict than democratic leaders in dealing with foreign adversaries. The reason 
is that authoritarian leaders do not face a high probability of domestic punishment even as 
they suffer international defeat.65 Critics of this argument contend that the leaders of 
authoritarian regimes do confront domestic constraints no less severe than those in 
democracies. In their view, authoritarian rulers also need voluntary support from a fraction 
of domestic elites; as such, these leaders cannot afford to squander valuable national assets 
on foreign adventures. Scholars in turn give particular emphasis to the distribution of power 																																																																		
62 Snyder, Myths of Empire.  
63 Jeffrey Taliaferro, Norrin Ripsman, and Steven Lobell, eds., The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the 
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64 See, for instance, Jeff Colgan and Jessica Weeks, "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict," 
International Organization 69, no. 1 (Winter 2015); Jessica Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
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65 "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War." 
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within authoritarian regimes,66 personal idiosyncrasies of individual leaders,67 and the 
vulnerability of authoritarian regimes to domestic challenges.68 These factors are considered 
likely to inform the risk-taking propensity of authoritarian leaders in international disputes.  
Still, the thesis of authoritarian politics is not precise enough to capture the more subtle 
dynamics in authoritarian politics. While it fares well in addressing the average effects of 
regime dynamics across regimes, there are limits to its approach in explaining within the 
same authoritarian regime. For instance, it cannot address why the same Chinese leaders 
espoused dramatically different strategies in a relatively short period from 1962 to 1982. 
These years witnessed vagaries in all aspects of Chinese communist regime except that 
China remained an authoritarian power throughout—in this period, the ruling power did 
not reach beyond the Politburo composed of around two dozens of people. In sum, while 
the thesis of authoritarian regime performs relatively well in explaining the propensity for 
conflict of authoritarian leaders, it is inadequate for addressing when the same leaders of an 
authoritarian regime adopt practice competitive status-seeking strategy and when not.  
 
Diversionary Conflict  
The thesis of diversionary conflict expects leaders to resort to conflict strategies—including 
competitive status-seeking strategy—at the time of regime crisis. The embattled leaders, 
according to this thesis, “pursue conflict abroad to increase public support at home by 
diverting attention from domestic troubles through rallying around the flag or by 
demonstrating their competence as statesmen.”69 At its core, it rests on the competence logic 
and the rally-around-flag logic in explaining why domestic regime crisis induces leaders to 
engage in external conflict.  
The competence logic assumes that leaders can establish public confidence in their 
leadership by achieving successes on the international stage. Yet, it fails to consider that 
international conflict incurs uncertain and tremendous risks for leaders. If they lose in a war 
or brinkmanship with other states, they would only demonstrate incompetence. So there is 
no solid reason why leaders are willing to risk war to gain domestic legitimacy. On the other 
hand, the rally-around-flag logic rests on the presumed positive correlation between 
intergroup tension and in-group cohesion.70 As state leaders officially act as a nationalist 																																																																		
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symbol, they are well placed to use national security affairs to elicit loyalty from the 
domestic audiences. Personifying the state means they could associate national loyalty with 
the deference to their personal authority. In the face of an external adversary, leaders are 
able to garner additional support at home.  
Intuitively appealing as the thesis of diversionary conflict is, there is not much evidence 
to suggest that the two mechanisms discussed above have operated strongly in the real 
world.71 There are, after all, multiple alternative measures for state leaders to resolve crisis 
at home. They can, for instance, promote nationalist education and campaigns, tighten social 
control, enhance institutional capacity, or simply intensify crackdowns.72 All these measures 
incur much less risks.  
In sum, competitive status-seeking strategy incurs risks too high to be considered a 
desirable option. If leaders employ it simply to enhance their domestic authority, this 
practice is dangerous for both leaders and nations. The failure to deal with the geopolitical 
threat via competitive status-seeking strategy invites domestic backlash perilous to state 
leaders’ power positions at home. Even if competitive status-seeking strategy proves 
sufficient to deal with the geopolitical threat, the display of state power—a behavior typical 
of it—may conceivably aggravate the security dilemma and worsen the external security 
environment for the state. This in turn would drain considerable resources and energy from 
the leadership’s drive for domestic consolidations.73 For all these reasons, the diversionary 
conflict thesis contains serious flaws in theoretical and empirical terms.  
 
Summary 
This chapter investigates the security rationale behind competitive status-seeking strategy. It 
then elaborates on three varieties of it, and finally critically discusses the existing theories 
that provide some analytic leverage on this type of security strategy. Competitive 
status-seeking strategy involves symbolic acts of displaying state power, and the very aspect 
of state power being displayed serves as a vehicle for asserting a state’s great-power status. 
For heuristic purposes, I specify three varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy: 
offensive alliance, delegitimation strategy, and the use of military force. Respectively they 																																																																		
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display diplomatic assets, ideological appeal, and military strengths as distinct aspects of 
state power. Existing theories do provide certain insights into likely causes for leaders’ 
pursuit of competitive status-seeking strategy. Yet, as they give short shrift to prestige 
motives underlying competitive status-seeking strategy, they ultimately fall short in 
specifying the conditions under which this type of strategy may be pursued. By clarifying 
the meaning of competitive status-seeking strategy and critically examining the theories 
pertinent to it, this chapter lays the groundwork for advancing my theoretical argument. 
Whereas this chapter addresses the relevance of competitive status-seeking strategy for 
national security interests, the next will combine this insight with an elaboration of the 
instrumental importance of personal prestige for individual leaders. I will also address 
methodological issues such as case selection, congruence and process-tracing methods. 
Taken together, these two chapters seek to address the origins of leaders’ concerns for social 
preeminence and how such concerns motivate leaders are prone to pursue great-power 
status vis-à-vis other states via competitive policies. 
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Chapter 2  
The Political Logic of Status Competition:  
Leaders and Pragmatic Concerns for Social Preeminence 
 
 
No serious policymaker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of “prestige,” or 
“honor” or “credibility.” 
Henry Kissinger1 
 
If status were only important because of its value in terms of wealth and security, then it could be 
bought and sold without much difficulty……It is the emotional and domestic political significance of 
status that makes this difficult and that makes status distinct from other kinds of resources.  
Steven Ward2 
 
 
Whereas the preceding chapter investigates the security logic of competitive status-seeking 
strategy and laid out its varieties, this chapter probes the instrumental purposes such 
behavior could serve for individual leaders. It tackles two issues. Why is prestige important 
for leaders in political arenas? And when do concerns for “social preeminence” (with 
great-power status and personal prestige as two key varieties) arise and motivate leaders to 
adopt competitive policies in pursuit of great-power status?  
Conventional wisdom suggests that individuals’ quest for social preeminence among 
the peers is hardwired into human nature. This study, by contrast, sheds light on the 
pragmatic considerations that leaders harbor in promoting two varieties of this aspiration. 
That is, among foreign leaders the goods of social preeminence concerns great-power status, 
and among domestic political elites it is about personal prestige. For pragmatic reasons state 
leaders pursue both varieties of social preeminence. Peculiar challenges to leaders’ positions 
in geopolitical and domestic political arenas provide stimuli for such concerns, and they 
intensify the tradeoffs among great-power status, geopolitical security, and domestic 
political survival that leaders face. These assumptions bolster my central assertion that 
leaders undertake competitive status-seeking acts for instrumental purposes.  
Typically, competitive status-seeking strategy entails symbolic acts of displaying an 
aspect of state power—be it diplomatic, ideological, or military—toward geopolitical 
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2 Steven Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Power, 38. 
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rivals—such acts serve to assert leaders’ claim to great-power status for the nation. In 
undertaking competitive status-seeking acts, leaders treat state power resources at their 
disposal as status symbols, rather than a means for international bargaining. That is, by 
displaying an aspect of state power to signal status claims, leaders seek a favorable 
recognition of the nation’s status in the field of status competition. Once this recognition is 
secured, the great-power status would have certain deterrent effects on the geopolitical 
competitors. Conversely, recognizing the limits of state power being displayed would mean 
giving up the status claim issued. It is wrenching and at times politically difficult for leaders 
to back down in such circumstances; but carrying through the demand may cause a 
deterioration of a state’s geopolitical environment. For this reason, leaders need to take 
calculated risks in deciding to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy. In the final 
analysis, the pursuit of competitive status-seeking strategy involves a significant tradeoff 
between immediate risks and security in a long run. It is then worth asking: what purposes 
does competitive status-seeking strategy serve for individual leaders? And what factors can 
affect their political decisions as regards competitive status-seeking strategy vis-à-vis other 
security strategies?  
To address these issues, this chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with a set of 
assumptions about the role of leaders in national security strategy and the role of personal 
prestige for leaders in legitimating authority in domestic elite politics. With an emphasis on 
leaders’ position in the nexus of geopolitics and domestic politics, ultimately I seek to 
address the rationales behind leaders’ pursuit of competitive status-seeking strategy. The 
second section underscores two stimuli to leaders’ pragmatic concerns for great-power 
status and personal prestige, which are expressions of social preeminence in the 
international and domestic arenas respectively. In particular, geopolitical threat could 
sensitize leaders to the importance of great-power status as a route to geopolitical security, 
and institutional change dynamics could heighten leaders’ reliance upon personal prestige 
for domestic political survival. In underscoring these two stimuli, I do not mean to dismiss 
alternative events that could fuel pragmatic concerns for social preeminence on the part of 
individual leaders. My purpose, rather, is to underscore ways in which human aspirations 
for social preeminence among the peers could take on instrumental importance for leaders 
and lead them to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy. This chapter concludes 
with a note on methodology. 
  
Social Preeminence and Power Politics 
In power politics a preeminent standing is of instrumental importance for leaders. It allows 
leaders to legitimate personal authority at home and in the international arena, further a 
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state’s geopolitical autonomy. Whereas the preceding chapter suggests that great-power 
status may enable the state to gain an upper hand in security competitions, this chapter 
investigates the instrumental role of personal prestige for individual leaders at home, as well 
as in the nexus of great-power status and personal prestige. Taken together, they elaborate 
on the central argument of this work—namely, leaders seek to further their interests in both 
geopolitical and domestic political arenas by undertaking competitive status-seeking 
strategy, a policy that may help to advance great-power status and personal prestige. 
Competitive status-seeking strategy enables state leaders to signal capability and resolve for 
safeguarding the great-power status being challenged by geopolitical rivals; at the same 
time, leaders can exploit such symbolic acts to assert personal authority in domestic elite 
politics. Through competitive status-seeking strategy leaders thus seek to address 
geopolitical and domestic political challenges all together. They are likely to opt for this 
strategy when their pragmatic concerns for social preeminence have to do with both 
great-power status and personal prestige.  
This argument builds on three assumptions. First, it assumes that power is pervasive to 
political activities in which state leaders are engaged. Second, personal prestige could act as 
a vehicle for leaders to legitimize their authority in domestic elite politics. Finally, 
competitive status-seeking strategy involves symbolic acts as undertaken by leaders in the 
two-level game of geopolitics and domestic politics.3 This section shall elaborate these 
assumptions. 
 
Leaders, Strategy, and Power Politics  
State leaders are central agents of national security strategy as they embody sovereign 
authority. My analytic focus is on the daily practice of national security strategy, as opposed 
to “grand strategy.” Grand strategy suggests broad patterns of state policy directed toward 
security objectives. It entails planning for the longer future and often involves a multiplicity 
of actors for its implementation. State leaders sit atop of the process of grand strategy, but 
are not in control of all aspects of it.4 Strategy, broadly conceived, could simply mean “a 
constant adaption to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, 
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complex interplays of multiple political environments. All this suggests that leaders often need to fight in one arena while 
keeping a watchful eye on what happens in another. See George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative 
Politics (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991); Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern 
Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 
99-100.  
4 Luttwak, The Logic of Strategy; Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: 
Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). It remains a matter of debate, though, regarding 
whether grand strategy by definition entails deliberate planning. See Kevin Narizni, The Political Economy of Grand 
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uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.”5 While leaders arguably can exert more decisive 
influences in the daily practice of strategy than in making grand strategy, a universal logic 
of strategy informs their political acts—that is, they may often find themselves having to 
signal to multiple audiences, who tend to interpret their acts in different ways.6 This study 
emphasizes that competitive status-seeking strategy is characterized by symbolic acts and 
involves two major audiences—the international and the domestic. Competitive 
status-seeking strategy, I argue, arises out of leaders’ attempt to achieve social preeminence 
in both geopolitical and domestic arenas—and it is pragmatic by nature.  
While state leaders are disparate in personalities, belief systems, and political 
experiences, they can nevertheless share some generic features. This study assumes that 
leaders are preoccupied with power in their engagement with politics. This is not to say that 
power—the ability to dominate minds or actions of others—is the sole objective for leaders. 
Leaders might not be keen on their power positions at all times. My point, rather, is that 
power is necessary—though not sufficient—for attaining almost every important value in 
politics and statesmen therefore cannot afford to ignore it.7 This assumption is quite 
sweeping, but it helps instill analytical rigor into discussions of how leaders craft state 
policy. As Hans Morgenthau famously argued, “we assume that statesmen think and act in 
terms of interest defined as power,” and “that assumption allows us to retrace and 
anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman—past, present, or future—has taken or will take 
on the political scene.”8  
State leaders are supposed to act as statesmen in furthering the general welfare of the 
body politic—namely, the national interest in general and geopolitical security in their 
conduct of foreign affairs. But they also have to act as politicians in managing the ruling 
coalition composed of heterogeneous interests and preferences.9 Political power is necessary 
for leaders to safeguard against external interference and internal challenges. As such, the 
pursuit of power by leaders could be manifest in their policy to advance geopolitical 
security and in their effort to legitimate domestic advantages. Geopolitical security and 
domestic political survival are dominant ends political power could serve.  
It is worth emphasizing that security imperatives provide a compelling justification for 																																																																		
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leaders to pursue power on the state’s behalf in the geopolitical arena. Where an 
overarching authority is unavailable to provide protections for states, the pursuit of power 
resources is critical to a state’s security interests.10 For sure, it is advisable for security 
seekers to observe prudence in order to prevent potential adversaries from forming a 
counterbalancing coalition. And in certain circumstances, leaders may find in strategies of 
self-restraint the best route to security.11 Yet this does not obviate the need for power, which 
serves as the last resort for geopolitical security. In the final analysis, the anarchical 
conditions in geopolitical arenas do provide incentives for states to accumulate and assert 
state power. Leaders in turn often need to show their readiness to employ state power one 
way or another.  
While students of status politics (including the preceding chapter) already stress that 
great-power status may help to advance a state’s geopolitical autonomy by eliciting 
voluntary deference from other states, they neglect to point out that some symbolic acts as 
undertaken by individual leaders can blur the distinction between geopolitical and domestic 
arenas. Hence, it is imperative to focus on the instrumental roles of great-power status and 
personal prestige for leaders operating in the nexus of geopolitics and domestic politics. This 
is essential to understanding the ways in which leaders’ concerns for social preeminence can 
inform their strategies to attain geopolitical ends. 
 
A Vehicle for Power Legitimation: Prestige and Political Survival 
Leaders are entitled to formidable power because they symbolically represent state 
sovereign authority. Prestige mediates the exercise of power by leaders. It allows them to see 
their power being demonstrated as legitimate. Prestige also allows leaders to draw upon the 
personalistic sources of power by highlighting their centrality in the political arena. For 
these reasons, prestige could serve as a crucial vehicle for leaders to legitimize power into 
authority—not least in domestic politics.  
In the first place, prestige mediates the exercise of power. The state, by definition, suggests a 
collection of political institutions holding a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.12 
Essential to the state is a totality of formal, regularized practices of political power.13 By 																																																																		
10 For the argument that power positions are a key component to national security interests, see Barry Posen, Restraint: A 
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definition, power refers to the ability of persons or institutions to get others to do what they 
want.14 And yet, “the human mind in its day-to-day operations cannot bear to look the truth 
of politics straight in the face……it must disguise, distort, belittle, and embellish the truth.”15 
As such, human beings tend to rely upon some socially acceptable symbols to accept power 
as a relation of dominance—and in this way, they legitimize power as a form of authority. 
Prestige provides just that vehicle. “The basis of every authority, and correspondingly every 
kind of willingness to obey,” according to Max Weber, “is a belief, a belief by virtue of 
which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”16 According to Barry O’Neill, prestige 
obtains when: 1) the members must “believe that the person is generally admired in the 
group”; 2) “the admiration must be seen as having some grounds, such as the individual’s 
deeds or possessions”; and 3) “the members expect the person to gain influence in the group 
from the admiration.” 17  Taken together, prestige manifests itself in public messages 
symbolizing leadership qualities; it lets people see power as morally justified and legitimate. 
There is no denying that prestige motives are fundamental to human beings. As such, 
they may take precedence over other human aspirations such as power and wealth.18 And 
yet, the ontological priority of prestige motives does not necessarily undercut its practical 
relevance in politics understood as the struggle for power. That is, it is precisely because the 
need for prestige is fundamental to human psyche that prestige is a necessary ingredient of 
power politics. Since, on the one hand, prestige endows the exercise of power with moral 
significance, political actors may tend to think that their contests for power serve larger 
purposes than simply dominating their opponents. Following the faith in the moral purpose 
of power could make add to the prestige of leaders. Prestigious leaders are admirable and as 
such, they can attract more followers. On the other hand, prestige enables leaders to 
experience the feeling of being powerful. Like all rational people, leaders tend to use 
emotional feelings as evidence of their belief.19 And because prestige can inspire emotional 
feelings of pride, they provide clues for leaders in sensing the social relationships 
concerning dominance and subordination. As Morgenthau put it,  
The individual seeks confirmation, on the part of his fellows, of the evaluation he 
puts upon himself. It is only in the tribute others pay to his goodness, intelligence, 																																																																		
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and power that he becomes fully aware of, and can fully enjoy, what he deems to be 
his superior qualities. It is only through his reputation for excellence that he can gain 
the measure of security, wealth, and power he regards to be his due.20 
In brief, leaders seek recognition from the followers for their power to be exercised. 
They have the courage to wield power only if they feel like being powerful. Prestige enables 
them to have such feelings. Prestige indicates the relations between the leaders and the led 
through the symbols of legitimate power (e.g. authority). It thus allows power holders to see 
that they are powerful.21 Democratic leaders are prone to be interested in public opinion 
polls, which demonstrate the amount of prestige they enjoy among the constituents. 
Authoritarian leaders stage ritualistic performances to see that they be politically popular. 
China’s Party Congress, for instance, serves as an important stage on which the top leaders 
can see their prestige if the audience—which is usually composed of sociopolitical 
elites—responds favorably to their ritualistic acts.22 Of course, while prestige may indicate 
who holds legitimate power, it is no guarantor of political survival. A democratic leader 
who manages to derive prestige from charming characters or policy success does not 
necessarily win election. A prestigious authoritarian leader could be overthrown when the 
challengers succeed in coordinating their efforts in secret for a coup. The feeling of being 
powerful gained through prestige may be deceptive, but it is tempting and might be of 
political necessity. It enables people to feel about their agency. Without such feelings, 
political actors would not have the psychological strength to act.23 Prestige gives them such 
feeling. 
It is important to note that prestige is not just a trapping of institutional authority. 
Rather, as this study emphasizes, prestige helps leaders legitimate political power and 
perpetuate political survival when institutions could not perform this function. Leaders can 
generate prestige via symbolic acts; they can project images in ways that could elicit 
admiration and deference from the target audience.  
Hence, prestige allows leaders to draw on the personalistic sources of power. Political 
institutions depersonalize power; prestige highlights the personal face of power. Inasmuch 
as individual leaders could draw upon their prestige to gain power, prestige enables the 
leaders to operate independent of their institutional base. We can thus expect that leaders 
																																																																		
20 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 87.  
21 This view is derived from the notion of “ontological security,” namely, the tendency of individuals to find stable roles in 
relation to one another. In this sense, being powerful is an identity and feeling this identity is secure is the precondition for 
the practice of power. See Brent Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the Ir State 
(London: Routledge, 2008); Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006). 
22 See, for instance, Guoguang Wu, China's Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
23 Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs." 
	 57	
operating in the weakly institutionalized regimes are sensitive to prestige. That is, if 
institutions do not serve as a secure source of power, the leaders have to rely upon their 
prestige—derivative of a personalistic aspect of power—to extract domestic support.  
Leaders signal claim to prestige via acts that “condense into one symbolic event, sign, or 
act patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promise of 
future greatness.”24 Such acts are symbolic. Their meanings depend on particular ways in 
which the leaders manage to inspire the audiences. As such, symbolic acts are subject to 
performative manipulations through which leaders could highlight positive personal traits. 
Once the audience favorably views their traits being demonstrated, they gain prestige. And 
once prestige enables a leader to become the focal point of a group, it generates political 
influences by allowing group members to coordinate their actions around that leader.25 
Through symbolic acts, a leader could generate prestige that promises political influence.  
Undeniably, leaders vary widely in terms of the personal traits from which they could 
derive power and influence. But prestige is essential to demonstrate their positive traits and 
legitimize their political authority. It is thus instrumental for leaders in the domestic politics 
of political survival. Prestige helps transformative leaders employ their charisma to convey 
the message of change of sociopolitical orders. For leaders to demonstrate their unique traits 
associated with charisma, they must be recognized as leaders in the first place. Prestige can 
give charismatic personality public salience. By showing symbols of prestige through public 
messages, charismatic leaders could demonstrate personal appeals to an audience who then 
becomes willing to recognize their authority. While prestige is no substitute for charisma, it 
brings charisma to public attention.  
Prestige may be necessary for transactional leaders too. Such leaders flourish by virtue 
of skills of mediation. They derive power from the give-and-take relations they forge with a 
coalition of supporters. 26  To bring their skills of mediation to bear upon coalition 
management, however, leaders need to assume centrality in the political arena in the first 
place. Prestige is thus essential to transactional leaders who need to take a position well 
connected to various factions. When formal institutions do not provide a reliable base of 
power, it is not institutions that bring prestige—rather, it is prestige that helps forge political 
linkages across formal institutions. In such circumstances, transactional leaders would need 
prestige to hold their coalition together. In short, when leaders decide to draw on the 
personalistic sources of power, they tend to rely on prestige as a crucial political capital. This 
holds true for various leadership styles ranging from charismatic to transactional leadership. 																																																																		
24 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 6. 
25 Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 34-37. 
26 For discussion of transformative and transactional leadership styles, see James M. Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1978). 
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Competitive status-seeking strategy: An Art of Killing Two Birds with One Stone 
In undertaking competitive status-seeking acts, leaders seek to outperform a higher-ranked 
state in its area of superiority. By demonstrating symbols indicative of state power, they can 
signal (albeit not necessarily gain) claims to great-power status in geopolitics and personal 
prestige in domestic elite politics. Competitive status-seeking strategy may feature such 
moves as the declaration of commitment to offensive alliance, demonstration of military 
force, and efforts to outperform other states in fulfilling an ideological commitment. These 
acts are designed to demonstrate state power in material and ideational forms.27  By 
undertaking such acts, state leaders hope to project an image of powerfulness to 
international audiences on which their claim to great-power status rests, while at the same 
time, their very displays of resolve to defend the national interest make themselves entitled 
to a significant degree of prestige at home.28 As such, competitive status-seeking strategy is 
an art of asserting claims to great-power status and personal prestige as perceived by 
international and domestic audiences respectively.  
A critical issue deserves particular emphasis here. For an actor to establish prestige, he 
or she must demonstrate the symbols that the target audience may associate with 
prestige—that is, the actor must signal claim to prestige.29 But it is pointless for an actor to do 
so without knowledge about how audience would confer them prestige. The actor’s prestige 
by definition rests on the audience’s favorable recognition of his/her characters being 
displayed. It is therefore essential that we specify how the symbolic acts undertaken by 
leaders can appeal to the audience.  
Typically, leaders can expect to establish social preeminence among the peers (in the 
international and domestic arenas) by norms or outcomes. Inasmuch as in the normative 
structures in international politics are often fuzzy and incoherent, social preeminence tends 
to be outcome-based—it stems from the successful employment of state power capabilities. 
That outcome can contribute to the establishment of a “reputation for unchallengeable 
																																																																		
27 “Since military strength is the obvious measure of a nation’s power,” according to Morgenthau, “its demonstration serves 
to impress the others with that nation’s power.” Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 92.  
28 Following Erving Goffman, I emphasize that the leaders are consciously manipulating the symbols in the hope of others 
could treat their acts as symptomatic of their characters. When an actor tries to give off an expression, Goffman argued, 
he/she may in effect engage in “a wide range of action that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor, the expectation 
being that the action was performed for reasons other than the information conveyed in this way.” See Erving Goffman, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London: Penguin, 1990).  
29 In practice, the question of how leaders project images about their state and themselves are inseparable with the question 
of how the relevant audiences perceive their acts. It is based on their speculation about how their acts will be received that 
leaders engage in a certain symbolic act. For the sake of analytical clarity, however, it is necessary here to make a conceptual 
distinction between the actor’s strategy and the audience’s perceptual tendency. For this clarification, see Robert Jervis, 
"Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," in Political Psychology, ed. Kristen R. Monroe 
(Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002).  
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power,” which in turn could serve to deter potential adversaries. 30  In undertaking 
competitive status-seeking strategy, however, state leaders may not only expect to gain 
outcome-based social preeminence from a success in outperforming a higher-ranked state; 
they may be driven by a desire for norm-based preeminence as well. This rests on a normative 
understanding of the symbolic act a leader takes at a given moment, and leaders can earn it 
by evoking an emotional attachment among the audience via his/her performances on the 
political stage.31 Ideally, competitive status-seeking acts could allow both the leader and the 
audience to share a collective feeling of acting as the state.32 As the audience is more likely to 
identify with the leaders who generate such emotional feelings, leaders can expect an 
increase of trust from their audience who are normatively committed to their acts.33  
Since, however, competitive status-seeking strategy features symbolic acts displaying 
state power, it may intensify the security dilemma and worsen the geopolitical environment 
in which leaders operate. It is thus worth asking: why do leaders opt for competitive 
status-seeking strategy at the risk of deteriorating their geopolitical environment? To 
address this puzzle, it is critical to highlight that a time lag always exists between the 
outcome-based and norm-based social preeminence—and this grants leaders room for 
political maneuver. That is, leaders can decidedly achieve norm-based social preeminence 
well before they are able to derive prestige from any desirable outcome of their acts. 
Whereas this is a result of emotional resonance among the audience inspired by the leaders’ 
act, outcome-based social preeminence would not come into being until the audience 
observes a clear effect. And since it takes time for an act to generate effect and for that effect 
to be seen, leaders may prioritize norm-based social preeminence—if they desperately need 
prestige to legitimate their authority in domestic elite politics. Once they strengthen their 
hold on power at home, they can wait and see if their acts of competitive status-seeking 
strategy do help to establish a reputation for superior power—an outcome that contributes 
to great-power status and personal prestige of the leaders. If, on the other hand, competitive 
status-seeking strategy does not work as well as they expect, leaders are free to abandon it 
without fearing a loss of prestige at home. To the extent that competitive status-seeking acts 
already help them solidify personal authority at home, they are supposed to enjoy 
considerable latitude in interpreting their international acts.  																																																																		
30 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 96; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 31. 
31 Here, I draw critically on the insight from Mercer that norms can be emotionally driven—that is, what are seen by social 
actors as regulating their behaviors or even constituting their identity are a function of their emotional attachment. See 
Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs.” 
32 See Jonathan Mercer, "Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity," International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014). 
33 For the empirical research on this issue, see Anthony Pescosolido, "Emergent Leaders as Managers of Group Emotion," 
The Leadership Quarterly 13, no. 5 (2002); Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, Primal Leadership: 
Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Press, 2013). For its application to 
international relations, see Todd H. Hall and Andrew A. G. Ross, "Affective Politics after 9/11," International Organization 
69, no. 4 (May 2015). 
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How does competitive status-seeking strategy help leaders establish norm-based social 
preeminence? Why is the audience willing to confer prestige upon leaders who are to put 
the national wellbeing at stake by engaging in competitive status-seeking strategy? The 
answer can be found in what is called “coalitional psychology.” It suggests that member 
players are quick to respond to a leader’s symbolic acts that “broadcast” an issue as the 
shared problem for the whole group.34 In-group members, by implication, tend to identify 
with the leader showing readiness to defend group interests, not least security and 
self-esteem.35 Typically, as competitive status-seeking acts features a display of the leaders’ 
commitment to promoting great-power status, such acts could inspire an “emotional belief” 
from domestic audiences (especially among a small number of the ruling elite) that such 
leaders personify an identity they share and value—such as communists, liberal democrats, 
or a national identity on which state legitimacy rests.36 This very belief could lead the 
audiences to see the leaders as being prestigious. Put differently, by undertaking 
competitive status-seeking acts—notably, displays of state power—leaders frame the 
geopolitical challenge as a identity issue and show their readiness to promote group security 
and self-esteem. As such, they establish a focal point around which to mobilize their 
followers, and their very centrality in the group thus inspired could yield personal 
prestige.37 By contrast, the opponents of competitive status-seeking strategy would not be 
able to gain personal prestige that is norm-based in the domestic realm, even if their 
proposed strategy may work better in furthering the national interest. Even in the United 
States—a liberal democracy encouraging free and open debate on national policy—the 
emotional reaction to the external security threat could be overwhelming, and such an 
atmosphere could leave the opponents of assertive foreign policy vulnerable to charges of 
being unpatriotic.38 																																																																		
34 Anthony Lopez, Rose McDermott, and Michael Bang Petersen, "States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and 
International Politics," International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 72-73. 
35 Mark Van Vugt, Robert Hogan, and Robert Kaiser, "Leadership, Followership, and Evolution: Some Lessons from the 
Past," American Psychologist 63, no. 3 (2008). Also see Joey Cheng, Jessica Tracy, and Joseph Henrich, "Pride, Personality, 
and the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Social Status," Evolution and Human Behavior 31, no. 5 (2010). 
36 See Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs”; “Feeling like the State”; Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities; 
Gries, “Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Relations”; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 2006).   
37 The logic of coalitional psychology is consistent with SIT’s argument that in-group conformity heightens the 
psychological need for favorable comparison with outsiders. Because leaders officially represent the state, they are well 
placed to assert personal prestige associated with state sovereignty. Seen in this light, competitive status-seeking strategy, by 
showing readiness for competition with outsiders, enables leaders to assert great-power status in a way that generates 
pressures for in-group conformity. The domestic audience then may regard state leaders as the focal point of group identity. 
Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995); Henri Tajfel, "Social Psychology of 
Intergroup Relations," Annual Review of Psychology 33, no. 1 (1982); Michael Hogg, "A Social Identity Theory of 
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In a nutshell, competitive status-seeking strategy allows leaders to achieve social 
preeminence via norms as well as outcomes. A favorable outcome that benefits the nation at 
large—such as outperformance over a higher-ranked state in geopolitical contests—allows 
leaders to boost great-power status by good outcomes over time. The competitive 
status-seeking acts as undertaken by leaders, on the other hand, may evoke emotional 
attachment from an audience who can confer them personal prestige immediately—hence 
social preeminence among political elites at home. To recapitulate, through competitive 
status-seeking acts in the international arena, state leaders can expect to garner domestic 
support and enhance their grip on power while anticipating the benefits to the nation to 
accrue over time. 
It is an unconvincing argument that in promoting great-power status by competitive 
policies, state leaders are purely motivated by the self-serving desire for domestic political 
survival. After all, if leaders could run tremendous risks abroad just for domestic gains, why 
could not they make concessions abroad and minimize risks in return for some domestic 
benefits? “Efforts to gain......prestige, or to save face may fail, be unnecessary, or involve 
inordinate risks,” argued Robert Jervis, “but they cannot be dismissed merely as efforts that 
sacrifice valuable resources to win domestic votes…... For if they succeed they can bring 
rewards all out of proportion to their costs by influencing the psychological environments 
and policies of other decision-makers.” 39 Precisely because great-power status can be 
instrumental in advancing security for the body politic, it could also help leaders promote 
personal prestige. When status-seeking policies promise little chance to enhance national 
security, leaders may prefer to insulate domestic political contest from the realm of security 
strategy—this allows them to focus exclusively on the domestic front to secure their power 
position. In the final analysis, the geostrategic relevance of competitive status-seeking acts 
should not be discounted, notwithstanding leaders’ incentive to derive personal prestige 
from them. Competitive status-seeking strategy is thus an art of killing two birds with one 
stone.   
Hence my central argument: Competitive status-seeking strategy by state leaders involves 
acts of displaying state power to assert great-power status vis-à-vis the target states, and by such acts 
leaders seek to simultaneously advance geopolitical security and strengthen their power positions at 
home. For individual leaders, the quest for great-power status could reflect their desire for 
social preeminence vis-à-vis foreign leaders. The pursuit of personal prestige is motivated 
by a similar desire, but the chief audience is on the home front. Hence, the pragmatic 
concerns for social preeminence may have to do with great-power status in the international 
arena and personal prestige in the domestic arena. And when fueled by both geopolitical 																																																																		
39 Jervis, The Logic of Images, 8. 
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and domestic political challenges, concerns for great-power status and personal prestige can 
combine to motivate leaders to engage in competitive status-seeking strategy.  
 
Hypotheses on Competitive Status-Seeking Strategy:  
Political Challenges, Value Tradeoffs, and Pragmatic Concerns for Social Preeminence  
Leaders serve as guardians of national security, and they need to derive political power 
from persistent elite support under a stable regime. Therefore, in pursuing either personal 
prestige or great-power status, they cannot afford to ignore challenges to the state’s 
geopolitical security and their own political survival at home.  
Leaders would confront a tradeoff between status aspirations and geopolitical security 
when a great power threat emerges in their proximate region or the region of vital geostrategic 
concern. They may also have to reconcile the imperative of domestic legitimation with status 
aspirations in the midst of institutional change dynamics. These geopolitical and domestic 
challenges, on the other hand, could fuel leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social preeminence. 
Confronting a threatening power in its own region, leaders may consider great-power status 
a route to geopolitical security. Likewise, leader may have to rely upon personal prestige as 
a vehicle to political survival when institutional change dynamics intensify elite 
competitions. Among others, geopolitical threat and institutional change dynamics 
represent peculiar political challenges: they could 1) fuel leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social 
preeminence, and 2) impose value tradeoffs upon the leaders.  
 
Stimulus for Concerns for Great-Power Status:  
Does a Threatening Great Power Extend Its Influence to a Third Party? 
A geopolitical threat features three elements: geographical proximity, power superiority, 
and offensive posture.40 Empirically, state leaders could sense a geopolitical threat when a 
great power extends its geopolitical influence to the proximate region, or a region of their vital 
concern. This trend signals that great power’s offensive intent, and enhances its capacity to 
restrain the geopolitical autonomy of other states.  
Geopolitical threat can fuel leaders’ pragmatic concern for great-power status when the 
expansion of geopolitical influences of a threatening state involves a third party, which is 
normally a materially weaker state. As Hypothesis 1 suggests (as introduced in Chapter 1), 
the nature of the threat posed by the great power’s alignment with a smaller one could 
define the field of status competition. A geopolitical threat can be military or ideological. 
Militarily, a critical empirical criterion for judging geopolitical threat is a major power 
																																																																		
40 See Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). Here, I treat the perception of 
threat as contingent on diplomatic interactions and therefore do not include it as a stable indicator of threat.  
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deploying military forces near another power’s border. In the process, it may seek to use the smaller 
state as a stronghold. Geopolitical threat can also arise from doctrinal change of an adversary that 
signals shift from defense- to offense-oriented strategy. 41  Offensive posture signals hostile 
intention, and leaders tend to assume worst-case scenarios in an international system 
dominated by self-regarding states. An offensive posture threatens to put leaders at a 
disadvantage in psychological and geostrategic terms, as they perceive the adversary’s 
doctrinal change would encourage its aligned smaller power to act opportunistically to 
challenging their claims. Needless to say, being challenged by a lesser power could undercut 
their status claims. 
Besides military threat, rival ideology can pose consequential challenges to a state’s 
geopolitical security. “The ability to undermine a foreign government through propaganda 
or subversion can be an especially potent form of offensive power,” according to Stephen 
Walt, “because it allows one state to ‘conquer’ others at little or no cost to itself.”42 Leaders 
may worry that a third party’s diplomatic commitment would be shaken by its internal 
ideological change. Throughout history, great powers engaged frequently in forcible regime 
change to prevent strategically important regions from falling under the sway of rival 
ideologies. These interventions were not motivated purely by ideological passions; rather, 
leaders could be rational in acting preemptively to prevent ideological rivals from 
controlling the nearby states.43 Leaders, in turn, may want to assert great-power status by 
holding onto an ideology.  
In short, great-power status could act as a vehicle for leaders to advance geopolitical 
security. As such, leaders’ status concerns arguably intensify when a dominant rival 
extending its geopolitical influences to their neighborhood.  
 
Stimulus for Concerns for Personal Prestige: Institutional Change Dynamics 
Typically, institutional changes are triggered by crisis events with nationwide consequences 
that threaten the daily functioning of a political regime. 44  The events may include 
transnational ideological drives, 45  economic crisis, 46  the removal of a dictator having 
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governed for decades,47 and so forth.48 When pressures for institutional change polarize the 
elite, individual leaders may use personal prestige as a vehicle to domestic legitimation, 
which could enhance the prospects for their political survival. Then, prestige politics on the 
home front may become manifest in the competing ideological cues issued by leaders. 
“Competition of ideas and struggle for power to make rules are often at the heart of 
institutional change,” as noted by a leading social scientists.49 In the midst of institutional 
changes, institutional authority is not able to serve as a reliable source of power for 
individual leaders—instead it becomes the subject of contestation.50 The power struggle 
occurring in the midst of an institutional change is distinct from policy disputes or 
personality clashes that happen in normal politics. Disputes in normal politics do not 
involve any significant change of the rules of political game. Institutional changes, however, 
mean that the existing rules cease to work effectively in regulating elite activities as leaders 
debate how political orders should be reorganized. In the process, they tend to mobilize 
supporters across the regime via ideological cues. Ideological doctrines could appeal to the 
shared values of a community. By invoking such doctrines leaders seek to personify the 
state as a political community. This allows them to assume centrality in the networks of 
ruling elites and gains prestige accordingly.  
Prestigious leaders then provide focal points around which to coordinate activities of 
the followers while exerting pressures on the uncommitted. As a majority of elite members 
flock to the side of a “prestigious” leader, that leader would be able to sideline the 
opponents in pursuit of his/her favored policy. In this way, prestige provides a sort of 
political capital, whereas institutional change dynamics could heighten leaders’ reliance 
upon it for political survival. Here, an observable implication is that leaders openly identify 
with disparate ideological lines. In this endeavor they commit personal prestige. Once 
attached to an ideological line, a leader in effect publicizes his/her preferences for the 
political order. There would be reputational costs if he/she acts to refute the images being 
advocated, as few politicians want themselves to be viewed as being opportunistic. While 
leaders may be able to adjust policy without flouting the ideological lines they are 
committed to, they still need ideological cues as a vehicle for political mobilization. This is 																																																																		
47 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," 
Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014).  
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49 Shiping Tang, A General Theory of Institutional Change (London: Routledge, 2010), 2. 
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testified by the fact that they are fond of invoking ideological cues to their followers. In short, 
ideologies serve as blueprint for actions to reorganize political orders; they are rallying 
points for collective political actions; and leaders commit prestige in the process. Thus, if 
leaders decide to engage in prestige politics in the midst of institutional changes, we should 
expect to see them appeal to ideological doctrines in order to legitimize their political 
authority—and this serves to indicate their reliance upon prestige as a sort of political 
capital.51 
To be sure, institutional change dynamics may be more likely to induce prestige politics 
in authoritarian and hybrid regimes than in liberal democracies: the former lacks robust 
legal procedures to prevent the struggles for institutional change from becoming too 
personalized.52 Still, in liberal democracies leaders’ reformist ambitions may provide strong 
incentives for prestige politics. When democratic leaders find the current institutions 
obstructive, they may still resort to prestige politics in order to pursue their policy agenda. 
 
Four Hypotheses on Leaders’ Choice 
Thanks to the instrumental role of national status and personal prestige, competitive 
status-seeking policies promise to further leaders’ interests in geopolitical security and 
domestic political survival simultaneously. Hence my Prime Hypothesis: pragmatic concerns 
for social preeminence—notably great-power status and personal prestige—can motivate leaders to 
undertake competitive status-seeking measures. Empirically, state leaders are most likely to 
engage in competitive status-seeking strategy when they rely upon personal prestige as a 
dominant vehicle for political survival in domestic elite politics while regarding great-power 
status as a route to geopolitical security. By implication, state leaders undertake competitive 
status-seeking acts in hopes of transcending the tradeoffs among status ambitions, 
geopolitical security, and domestic political survival.  
As noted in Chapter 1, leaders’ concerns for great-power status are instrumentally 
related to geopolitical security—hence Hypothesis 1: The aspect of state power leaders would 
display to assert great-power status has to do with the strategic role of a third party in a geopolitical 
contest between the major powers.  																																																																		
51 Henry Kissinger made an incisive remark on ideological principles. In his view, the frequency with which ideological 
principles are invoked could serve as an indicator for the stability and legitimacy of a political order. “The characteristic of a 
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(The lesser state’s strategic role may in large part be determined by the great power competition. 
Yet, the aspect of state capacity as displayed by a major power is closely linked to the nature of the 
field in which status competition arises. In this regard, the lesser state acts as a key intermediary in 
status politics between the major powers. By displaying its competence in some actions, a major 
power can expect to elicit cooperation from a lesser state, or deter it from cooperating with its 
geopolitical rival. For instance, in the circumstance whereby the major power A acts to strengthen its 
regional partner at the expense of B’s, B may support its ally to fight back aggressively. In this case, 
allied partners act as a vehicle for geopolitical competitions, and B could display allied partnership as 
a status symbol—that is, an asset on which its status claims rests—to its adversaries. Likewise, when 
A promotes a rival ideology in a lesser state of geostrategic concern to B, leaders of B may worry 
about A exerting certain control over that lesser state by mind. They, in turn, may employ an 
ideological rhetoric—coupled with the provision of geopolitical aid to that lesser state—to 
delegitimize the ideological authority of A. While doing so, B intends to enhance its ideological 
appeal to the lesser state which if wooed to its side, can provide a buffer against the geopolitical 
expansion of A. Finally, when A takes measures to enhance military cooperation with a lesser state 
which is located close to B, leaders of B may perceive this as A’s attempt to turn the lesser state into a 
material base for projecting military power against them. In this circumstance, leaders of B may find it 
necessary to display military power against the lesser state with a view to deterring A from 
continuing to deploy military power in its backyard. Here, military power provides a vehicle for 
signaling status claims.) 
Yet, leaders face significant tradeoffs among geopolitical security and great-power 
status as a geopolitical threat arises. As guardians of national security, state leaders may 
prefer security strategies that are relatively risk-averse if their dominant concern is with 
security imperatives only. Hence,  
Hypothesis 2 Leaders’ concern for great-power status—fueled by the need to cope with geopolitical 
threats—is permissive but not sufficient for their choice of competitive status-seeking strategy because 
such kind of policy is too risky.  
(Inasmuch as competitive status-seeking strategy provides a means to geopolitical security, 
leaders would not opt for this policy when they feel that the single-minded pursuit of great-power 
status abroad would cost their security tremendously. Instead, they may pursue other 
security-seeking policies that can be justified in terms of status enhancements. For instance, they can 
try to equip the troops with high-technology weapons. In so doing, leaders could enhance the state’s 
military power while basing their claim to great-power status upon cutting-edge technology. Leaders 
can also seek to engage diplomatically with a great power adversary. By showing their equal 
standing with a great power in peace promotion, leaders can expect to boost their status abroad. 
Finally, even if leaders have no choice but to undertake coercive diplomacy in order to deter a great 
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power rival from challenging their core claims in the geopolitical arena, they can conduct themselves 
in a prudent manner in order to prevent an escalation of the conflict.) 
Although institutional change dynamics provide structural incentives for leaders to 
engage in prestige politics in the situation of institutional change, the agency of individual 
leaders matters significantly. Individual leaders could decide whether to use personal 
prestige as a vehicle for power struggle. If they do, there will be a tradeoff between status 
ambitions (as leaders identify personal prestige with national aspirations for status) and the 
imperatives of domestic legitimation. Given the considerable risk and uncertainty of 
diversionary conflict, they would not opt for the diversionary strategy of seeking to achieve 
status ambitions abroad for domestic political gains. Hence,  
Hypothesis 3 Concerns for personal prestige could make leaders averse to international conflict that 
may undercut their reputation for advancing national wellbeing.  
(Leaders are normally expected to advance national wellbeing of which peace is a fundamental 
element. If they unnecessarily provoke an international conflict that could spiral out of control, such 
acts could invite domestic skepticism about their leadership competence. 53  Whether leaders’ 
engagement in international conflict is deemed necessary is a function of the gravity of the 
geopolitical threat they face. Without a great power posing immediate challenges to the state’s 
geopolitical autonomy, leaders’ initiative to escalate international tensions would cost their prestige 
domestically. Inasmuch as leaders can derive prestige from domestic achievements, they would 
prefer to concentrate on the home front. Thus, if they rely upon prestige as a principal vehicle for 
domestic political survival, they would be averse to escalation of international tensions and not prefer 
competitive status-seeking measures.)  
To recapitulate, great-power status and personal prestige are important varieties of 
“social preeminence,” and leaders may concern themselves with such goods for pragmatic 
reasons related to geopolitics or domestic politics. Yet, when fueled by either geopolitical 
threat or domestic institutional change alone, pragmatic concerns for social preeminence on 
the part of individual leaders are unlikely to cause competitive assertions of status. This is a 
risky policy after all, and so leaders are arguably inclined to pursue great-power status by 
risk-averse strategies or put status aspirations on the back burner. State leaders, however, 
are most likely to opt for competitive status-seeking measures when their concerns for social 
preeminence are instrumentally related to both geopolitical threat and domestic institutional 
change. In such circumstances, they face no significant tradeoff among great-power status, 
geopolitical security, and domestic political survival—rather, competitive status-seeking 
strategy may enable them to transcend such tradeoffs. 																																																																		
53 What matters here is whether a leader is viewed as culpable for conflict initiation/escalation or not. In the former case, a 
leader may be perceived as incompetent in advancing the national interest. On this matter, see Sarah E. Croco and Jessica L. 
P. Weeks, "War Outcomes and Leader Tenure," World Politics 68, no. 4 (October 2016). 
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Falsifying the Argument 
My argument can be falsified if it is shown that pragmatic concerns for both great-power 
status and personal prestige can motivate leaders to make concessions with the 
adversary—through either secrete diplomacy or open negotiation. In such cases, leaders try 
to transcend the tradeoffs among geopolitical security, domestic legitimation, and status 
ambitions through a conciliatory rather than competitive policy. Certainly, leaders can reap 
maximum benefits at home and abroad from a cost-efficient strategy of diplomatic 
accommodation. If they succeed, the direct threat to their state’s geopolitical security will be 
degraded as the higher-ranked power extends recognition of great-power status. Meanwhile, 
the peace dividends thus obtained could please the majority of the political audiences, who 
would be willing to bestow prestige upon the leaders embracing moderate foreign policy 
line.  
It has been hypothesized that the leader with a hawkish reputation can afford to pursue 
conciliatory policy toward the adversary without a loss of personal prestige at home.54 
There is, moreover, evidence that leaders were able to protect personal prestige in the 
conduct of secret diplomacy and in some circumstances, they could even turn domestic 
vulnerability into an advantage in establishing the credibility of their offer of concessions.55 
Future studies along this direction have the potential to falsify my theoretical argument. The 
core issue is how much latitude individual leaders could enjoy in conducting secret 
diplomacy with the adversaries.  
Moreover, it is important to note that in such cases the risks are no smaller than 
pursuing competitive status-seeking policies. Inasmuch as the leader may have to become 
implicated in the conduct of secrete diplomacy with the adversary, he/she would commit 
personal prestige to the conciliatory policy vulnerable to domestic criticisms. Thus, it is 
worth asking: why are leaders willing to incur significant risks of political survival in 
pursuit of conciliatory policy? And how their concerns for national status and personal 
prestige lead to prudence? Beyond the potential to falsify my argument, these questions are 
theoretically interesting and practically significant.  
  
Case Selection Issue: Why China 
China’s Cold War experience is well suited for illustrating the nature of great-power status 																																																																		
54 Kenneth A. Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" International 
Organization 59, no.1 (Winter 2005). 
55 See Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance," Security 
Studies 22, no.3 (2013). 
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and personal prestige as perceived by state leaders, thus promising valuable insights as to 
why leaders become risk-acceptant in pursuit of great-power status. There has been an 
abiding aspiration for generations of Chinese elites to lift China from colonial inferiority to 
great power preeminence in the modern era.56 Arguably, China’s status-enhancing drive 
reached a climax after the founding of the People’s Republic, a regime that has managed to 
accumulate unprecedented material power through national reunification, social integration, 
and industrialization. 57  The Chinese drive for status enhancement, however, was 
complicated by their exclusion from the western-dominated international society and 
frictions with the Soviet-led socialist bloc.58 On the other hand, the Chinese communist 
regime typically enshrined elite solidarity around the “leadership core” (lingdao hexin), a 
term that carries tremendous prestige for individual leaders. As such, personal prestige 
seems to be a crucial vehicle for power legitimation in Chinese elite politics.59 Arguably, 
Chinese leaders’ quest for great-power status can generate implications for their personal 
prestige at home. Moreover, given that these leaders operated in volatile geopolitical and 
domestic political environments during the Cold War, for their part great-power status and 
personal prestige were not only symbolically significant, but also instrumentally relevant for 
the imperatives of geopolitical security and domestic political survival.  
My case studies are mainly focused on the evolution of China’s foreign and security 
policy from 1962 to 1979 (Chapters 3-5). Selecting cases from this short period is ideal for 
demonstrating the distinctiveness of my argument for two reasons. First, this period is rich 
with two types of events as posited by my theoretical argument as “stimuli” for leaders’ 
pragmatic concerns for social preeminence—namely, geopolitical threat and institutional 
change dynamics. In the geopolitical arena, China’s relationship with the two superpowers 
varied dramatically, and this provides good opportunities to observe the nature and degree 
of leaders’ concerns for great-power status. On the domestic front, Beijing’s leadership 
encountered a series of profound crises that unleashed pressures for institutional change, 
from the Great Leap Forward fiasco to the Cultural Revolution and to the supreme leader’s 
demise. This in turn allows us to observe multiple times the nature and degree of leaders’ 
concerns for personal prestige.  																																																																		
56 See, for instance, Yongjin Zhang, China in the International System, 1918–20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery 
(London: Springer, 1991); "China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization’," Review of 
International Studies 17, no. 01 (1991); Guoqi Xu, China and the Great War: China's Pursuit of a New National Identity 
and Internationalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
57 Gilbert Rozman, ed. The Modernization of China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 
58 Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond (London: Palgrave, 1998); Austin 
Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); 
Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998); James David 
Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley, Calif.: University 
of California Press, 1977). 
59 Guoguang Wu, China's Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional Manipulation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
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A scrutiny of Chinese security policy in this period, therefore, promises insights into 
how pragmatic considerations have informed Chinese statecraft in managing the tradeoffs 
among status ambitions, geopolitical security, and domestic political survival. Ultimately, I 
seek to shed novel light on how pragmatic considerations of great-power status and 
personal prestige could inform foreign and security policy in general, a topic that remains 
understudied. This work aims not at a comprehensive account of Chinese security policy in 
the Cold War. Rather, my account of China’s diplomatic and political history in 1962-1979 
provides theory-generating cases to contribute to a typological theory of why and when 
leaders adopt competitive policies in pursuit of great-power status.60 
A second reason for selecting the Chinese case for theory development is that some 
salient geopolitical and domestic political factors in the 1962-1979 period could militate 
against the causal mechanisms my argument underscores—as such, my cases qualify as 
“hard” ones.61 Domestically, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping (albeit to a lesser extent) 
arguably stand as unchallengeable leaders in Chinese politics after 1949. As such, prestige 
must have followed from their predominant authority rather than vice versa. If, however, 
my empirical evidence shows that in the daily practice of politics even such leaders need to 
use personal prestige to legitimize their power positions, this could enhance the 
applicability of my theoretical insight to a number of cases beyond the Chinese context, 
where leaders rely upon personal prestige more than institutions as a central vehicle for 
political survival. This insight could arguably apply with particular force to democratizing 
and hybrid regimes, where political institutions are not robust enough to guarantee 
leadership authority.  
Equally important, my case studies challenge the authoritarian politics thesis that holds 
constant the preferences of individual leaders. The authoritarian politics thesis assumes that 
the personality trait of a single dictator either dictates foreign policy agenda or is 
constrained by other leaders holding conflicting preferences. This assumption, however, 
overlooks the possibility that some leaders may manage to shape the preferences of other. 
My case studies will show that despite intra-leadership differences over domestic agenda 
and the fact that not all leaders value great-power status as worth pursuing, both Mao and 
Deng were capable of gaining support from other leaders for their risky of status 
competition that for the time being, puts alternative political visions on the back burner. 
Their ability to reshape national visions constitutes empirical novelties vis-à-vis the 
authoritarian thesis, thus demonstrating the distinctiveness of my theoretical argument.  
Geopolitically, the intensity of China’s confrontation with both superpowers at various 																																																																		
60 For a discussion of typological theory, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005), chap. 11. 
61 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 75, 115-23.  
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junctures from 1962 to 1979 suggests that security imperatives should have trumped other 
concerns. My argument, though, stresses the role of great-power status in enhancing 
long-term security for a state. Yet, the security imperatives imposed by the superpowers’ 
involvement in China’s vicinity arguably left the leaders with little luxury to engage in such 
kind of forward thinking. Hence, status aspirations are not supposed to have been a central 
driver in China’s security policy in a period of intense security competitions. My 
argument—whereby status aspirations operate as a central variable—should have great 
difficulty in explaining China’s international conduct in the 1962-1979 period.  
By contrast, Chinese security policy from 1962 to 1979 is an easy case for the structural 
realist theories, which are focused exclusively on security imperatives leaders face. 
Offensive realism asserts that under the anarchical condition of international politics, states 
should act opportunistically to undermine one another. China apparently is an easy case for 
bolstering this prediction, as it engaged in intense conflicts with both superpowers at 
various junctures from 1962 to 1979 in defense of its core security interests. And yet, if the 
empirical evidence shows that China’s impulse to engage in geopolitical competition with 
the superpowers was motivated by the leaders’ concerns for great-power status as well as 
personal prestige, offensive realism’s assertion about anarchy-induced security imperatives 
is problematic. By contrast, defensive realism counsels prudence in foreign policy statecraft. 
It does not expect state leaders to take high risks in security competition until they exhaust 
all relatively risk-averse strategies.62 Hence, it would expect the Chinese leaders not to risk 
escalation of conflict with the superpowers before all other strategies such as balancing, 
conventional diplomacy, and prudent exercises of coercive diplomacy are attempted and fail. 
Yet, if my empirical evidence shows that in certain circumstances, the Chinese leaders 
exhibited a strong propensity for risk-taking in pursuit of status, it proves able to reveal the 
explanatory limits of defensive realism.  
In the final analysis, if the empirical evidence on the leaders’ concerns for social 
preeminence fares relatively well in explaining variation in Chinese security strategy, it 
would gain plausibility and distinctiveness vis-à-vis the authoritarian politics thesis and 
offensive/defensive realism—theories that give short shrift to great-power status and 
personal prestige as motivating forces of foreign policy. It then would be reasonable to 
argue that in international politics, leaders may pursue great-power status by competitive 
policies with a view to advancing geopolitical security for the state while seeking to 
consolidate their authority in elite politics via personal prestige. To recapitulate, the Chinese 
case not only illustrates how great-power status and personal prestige can take on 
																																																																		
62 For this tenet in defensive realism, see Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism 
(London: Springer, 2010).  
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instrument importance for leaders and how concerns for these varieties of social 
preeminence lead policymakers to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy; it also 
lends itself to explanations grounded in several mainstream theories in the field of security 
studies. If my case fares well in confirming the theoretical argument on why leaders adopt 
competitive policies in pursuit of great-power status, then it promise to fill the analytic gaps 
in offensive realism, defensive realism, and the authoritarian politics thesis (as identified in 
the preceding chapter). For all these reasons, China’s security strategy from 1962 to 1979 
qualifies as a hard case and accordingly, deserves careful scrutiny.  
To recapitulate, the cases selected from China in the 1962-1979 period features 
considerable variation in the intensity of Chinese leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social 
preeminence. Changes in this independent variable are correlated with the rise and fall of 
particular varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy in Chinese security strategy. I 
therefore can identify the regularity with which two varieties of leaders’ concerns for social 
preeminence—namely, great-power status and personal prestige—are correlated with 
competitive status-seeking strategies, the dependent variable. China’s involvement in the 
Cold War thus provides a crucial source of insights for theory development. Further, the 
cases in the 1962-1979 period of China features rich empirical details that allow for 
illustration of the causal mechanisms posited in my argument. The documentary and 
secondary sources have been accumulative since the 1990s. They are sufficient now to 
provide evidence as regards the motives underlying the Chinese practice of the varied types 
of security strategy, including balancing, conventional diplomacy, prudent conduct of 
coercive diplomacy, and varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy. The growing 
bodies of Chinese language sources—especially the released documents, official biographies, 
and memoirs concerning the top Chinese leaders—have revealed how Beijing’s leaders 
viewed their nation’s status in the face of geopolitical challenges, how the prestige politics 
among them played out on the home front, and what motivated them to pursue different 
types of security policy. They are crucial to revealing why leaders become anxious for social 
preeminence in geopolitical or domestic political arenas and how they manage tradeoffs 
between status ambitions and other political imperatives—hence a wonderful testing 
ground for the theoretical arguments of this study.   
Needless to say, the Chinese case is interesting in its own right. To understand the 
meaning and logic of the perceived “assertiveness” in Chinese security policy practices since 
2010, it is necessary to explore if a similar pattern of behavior has occurred in the past. 
China’s rise to international prominence is characterized by the quest for great-power status 
vis-à-vis the established superpowers. Its status aspirations were arguably strong in the 
years 1962 to 1979 given that China suffered from intense alienation by the international 
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society during this period.63 On the other hand, pressures for institutional change are no 
less intense nowadays than they were in the 1962-1979 period. Hence, we should expect that 
pragmatic concerns for social preeminence remain a central variable for explaining China’s 
recent turn to assertiveness in the conduct of foreign and security policy—a trend that is to 
have far-reaching consequences for international order.   
 
The Case Study Methods:  
Cross-Case Comparison, Within-Case Variation, and Process-Tracing Tests 
This thesis adopts comparative and process-tracing methods for case studies. These methods 
are well suited for my purposes of 1) investigating leaders’ motives for competitive 
status-seeking strategy, and 2) establishing a building block of a typological theory of status 
competition by highlighting the distinctive causal mechanisms that have to do with the 
instrumental relevance of great-power status.64 As a first step, I categorize the events under 
study into three cases, and trace the variation on the posited motives and the outcome 
within each case. If there is a recognizable pattern of correlation with the outcomes in each 
case, then the process-tracing task shall be undertaken to verify the causal mechanisms 
underlying the pattern of correlation. This task entails identifying crucial pieces of evidence 
for the links of particular events to leadership motivations and eventually, to the anticipated 
outcomes. The evidence gathered should serve to test the hypotheses derived from my 
theoretical arguments.65 In sum, this work features multiple cases, within-case congruence 
method, and process-tracing tests. 
 
Multiple Cases  
This work divides a longitudinal period of 1962-1979 into several cases which correspond to 
three varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy. As those three varieties feature distinct 
aspects of state power by which leaders could assert their nation’s status, they constitute 
distinctive strategies for status competition in their own right. Status symbols are by 
definition context-dependent, or field-specific. “A focus on the social fields provides a way 
of theorizing how processes of social construction create strategic context through which 
actors pursue power politics.”66 As the geopolitical context in which leaders considered 
state power a symbol for status varies across fields, we should expect to see leaders use 
different material and ideological assets to assert great-power status. This study divides 																																																																		
63 Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond (London: Palgrave, 1998). 
64 For a discussion of the configuration of these two methods on research practice, see George and Bennett, Case Studies 
and Theory Development; John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
65 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development; Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing 
Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2013). 
66 Musgrave and Nexon, “Defending Hierarchy from Moon to the Indian Ocean,” 593. 
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cases according to the emergent fields in which status competition occurred. 
Selecting on the dependent variable is nevertheless a flawed research strategy: it is 
prone to misidentify causal variables or exaggerate the causal importance of particular 
variables. As a remedy, I focus on within-case variation on the independent and dependent 
variables, and seek process-tracing evidence for the underlying causal mechanisms.  
 
Within-Case Congruence67 
Each empirical chapter will discuss the international context in which state leaders entered 
into status competition with other states. Here, I undertake what is called “descriptive 
inference” by detailing how the great-power status assumed instrumental importance for 
leaders in coping with challenges to the state’s geopolitical security. This helps to 
substantiate H1. If, as H1 suggests, the aspect of state power leaders choose to display in 
their competitive status-seeking acts is determined by the strategic role of the lesser state in 
the great power rivalry, then it is important to observe how the great power rivalry arises 
and involves that lesser state as a critical audience. For H1 to withstand the test, the 
evidence must show that the “status symbol”—namely, particular material or ideological 
assets on which states rest their status claims—did emerge out of the deepening great-power 
rivalry which involves the role of a lesser power.  
By descriptive inference I will also address how politics of personal prestige intensified 
and attenuated on the home front. Here, the process-tracing observations must draw 
attention to the instrumental importance of personal prestige for leaders’ political survival. 
We should then expect to see individual leaders concern themselves with personal prestige 
when the ruling elite becomes divided in the shadow of a crisis event that threatens the 
daily functioning of the political regime—a hallmark of institutional change dynamics.  
Against the geopolitical and domestic political background introduced, I shall employ 
the congruence method to test H2-3 by examining within-case variations. The 
process-tracing evidence must show that in the absence of either geopolitical or domestic 
political challenge, leaders tend to prioritize geopolitical security and domestic political 
survival over status seeking in risk-acceptant manners. Although the evidence might show 
that the preferred policy is compatible with non-competitive policies for status 
enhancements, such kind of evidence remains supportive of my claim that leaders can put 
ambitions for great-power status on the back burner. In such circumstances, status 
aspirations are not strong enough to motivate leaders to stake other important interests on 
the pursuit of status.  
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Process-Tracing Tests68  
Extensive scrutiny of the empirical details that reflect within-case variation can put the 
Prime Hypothesis to a test. Process-tracing tests not only complement the congruence 
method, but also serve to decisively confirm the PH and rule out alternative explanations. If 
the PM in this study holds true, we should be able to see the following phenomena. They 
provide observable implications of the causal mechanisms operating between pragmatic 
concerns for social preeminence (independent variable) and competitive status-seeking acts 
(dependent variable). 
Aligning geopolitical and domestic challenges. If my central claim holds true—namely, 
pragmatic concerns for social preeminence as related to both great-power status and 
personal prestige can motivate state leaders to engage in competitive status-seeking strategy, 
we should expect to see that some individual decision makers align external threats and 
internal perils in the policy deliberations. This could be a deliberate signaling act, as it 
suggests to the rest of the leadership that failure to follow a hard line would incur fatal 
geopolitical and domestic political costs. Alternatively, the alignment of geopolitical and 
domestic political challenges in leaders’ discourses may genuinely reflect their concern.69 
On both counts, policymakers seem anxious for the political implications of a loss of 
personal prestige and great-power status. This could lead them to evoke a particular identity 
that blurs the distinction of the two variants of social preeminence, namely great-power 
status and personal prestige.  
Sensitivity to domestic reputation costs. After a leader takes the initiative to bridge 
great-power status and personal prestige via symbolic acts of competitive status-seeking 
strategy, other leaders can choose either to bandwagon with or oppose that leader. Arguably, 
if personal prestige becomes instrumental in enhancing the chance for domestic political 
survival, individual leaders would be very sensitive to personal reputation costs associated 
with their advocated policy option. Evidence pertaining to this can be found in biographies 
or private recollections by the leaders and their associates. It should display leaders’ 
sensitivity to the political costs of being soft on the geopolitical rival(s).  
Bandwagoning for prestige. If fears of losing personal prestige are a key motivating force 
for the support by the whole leadership for competitive status-seeking strategy, we should 
expect to see a radical shift of attitude toward the hard line signaled by the leader who acted 
first. That is, the uncommitted tend to bandwagon for prestige by espousing competitive 
status-seeking strategy. Organized in small groups, state leaders tend to share a 																																																																		
68 For practical guide, see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, chap. 10; Stephen van Evera, Guide 
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homogeneous identity and can easily monitor the performance of one another in living up to 
it. By engaging in competitive status-seeking acts, the leaders heighten the inside-outside 
differentiation, thereby strengthening the in-group identity around which to mobilize their 
supporters. If the leaders initially embracing moderate lines are aware of the political cost of 
challenging the in-group identity, they will soon shift to the hard line. Those who fail to 
abandon moderate positions would leave themselves vulnerable to charges of 
compromising the national interest. They thereby risk losses of prestige—a crucial vehicle 
for political survival—and being sidelined in the leadership.  
Proclaiming victory. International political outcomes, especially those related to war and 
peace, are often subject to competing interpretations.70 If leaders engage in competitive 
status-seeking strategy in part out of concern for personal prestige as related to domestic 
political contests, they would endeavor to prevent the geopolitical risks from undercutting 
their prestige at home. Hence, they would take every opportunity to claim credit for their 
competitive status-seeking acts in the geopolitical arena, and we should expect to see they 
proclaim victory when the consequence of their conflict strategy remains unclear. And yet, 
proclaiming international victory is also crucial to shaping the actor’s image as perceived by 
the adversaries. This can serve important strategic purposes. “The actor will often want his 
opponent to think that he thinks he won because the opponent is then more apt to believe 
the actor will behave similarly in the future,” notes Jervis. “This impression will deter the 
adversary if the actor’s actions had exacted a high price from him in the previous 
interaction.”71 Hence, by proclaiming victory of the competitive strategy for asserting 
great-power status, leaders seek to advance their interests in geopolitical security and 
domestic legitimation simultaneously. 
The former two “observable implications” constitute what is vividly called “hoop test” 
evidence. Their presence is necessary for bolstering the PH, and their absence is sufficient to 
disconfirm alternative arguments. The hoop test evidence is not sufficient to decisively 
confirm the PH but it boosts our confidence that further tests are warrants. The latter two 
“observable implications” offer such tests, counting as “smoking gun” evidence. They are 
not necessarily able to rule out alternative explanations, but can lend essential support to my 
PH. The most significant value of smoking gun evidence lies in demonstrating that the PH 
has strong explanatory leverage over some given facts.  
 
Caveats 
Four caveats are in order. First, this study is more concerned with the motives behind 																																																																		
70 On this matter, see Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in 
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competitive status-seeking measures than with the effects of such policies. I argue that 
leaders are driven by pragmatic concerns for great-power status and personal prestige to 
engage in competition with the geopolitical adversaries for status preeminence. The latter 
could act as a political vehicle to legitimize their power at home, whereas the former could 
serve as a shortcut to geopolitical security. Leaders, however, could only hope to attain these 
ends with a single stroke. At the moment of taking acts, they are not in a position to 
command solid information of how their opponents—both internally and 
externally—would react. Thus, while I posit a prestige motive behind state leaders trying to 
obtain status via competition, there is no guarantee that leaders are often able to enhance 
personal, as well as national, prestige, by undertaking competitive status-seeking acts. 
Conceivably, they may miscalculate the outcome of their acts.  
Second and relatedly, I do not suggest that competitive status-seeking strategy be the 
most efficient way for leaders to cope with geopolitical and domestic challenges. It is a risky 
policy after all. It threatens war, which may cost state leaders politically. At the very least, it 
could escalate international tensions, which could divert the energy and resources of leaders 
away from the imperative of consolidating their domestic authority. I therefore suggest that 
competitive status-seeking strategy is no normal statecraft and leaders opt for it only when 
leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social preeminence—that is, for great-power status and 
personal prestige—intensify to an extreme degree. This circumstance arises when leaders 
tend to view great-power status as a route to geopolitical security while being anxious for 
personal prestige in domestic elite politics; hence they would opt to engage in competition 
with foreign adversaries for status preeminence. In undertaking competitive status-seeking 
acts leaders seek to attain both great-power status and personal prestige—in large part for 
instrumental purposes of geopolitical security and domestic political survival. 
Third, I do not take issue with the view that the quest for social preeminence is a 
universal human drive.72  Quite the contrary, I fully accept that prestige motives are 
hardwired into human psychology. Precisely because the quest for personal prestige is so 
fundamental a driver of human actions, state leaders have to rely upon it in judging their 
power advantage relative to their competitors. On the other hand, prestige helps legitimize 
power because the audience tends to view leaders with prestige symbols as unchallengeable 
and even morally superior. In the final analysis, prestige can be instrumental precisely 
because human aspirations for it are innate.  
Finally, geopolitical threat and institutional change dynamics—two peculiar stimuli to 
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leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social preeminence—must be understood as being specific 
to the cases under investigation. Though the cases under study could represent 
generalizable types of events, alternative types of stimuli certainly exist and are worth 
exploring. An increase of the number of cases under investigation would entail identifying 
additional types of events that could impose value tradeoffs and sensitize leaders to 
great-power status and personal prestige for pragmatic reasons.  
That noted, geopolitical threat and institutional change dynamics are arguably relevant 
to a large number of cases. Typically, they have co-emerged in great powers undergoing 
sweeping changes at home. Great powers since the age of industry have derived their 
strength from the sweeping domestic transformations—known as the “revolution of 
modernity.” In the process, the transformative dynamics of industrialization, rational 
state-building, and ideological revolutions strengthened state capacity to turn material 
assets in the society into power capabilities in international politics. These dynamics, in turn, 
radically refashioned power balances and intensified security competitions among states 
that espoused them.73 And yet, while acting as an indispensable source of strength for the 
state, they also provide much pressure for institutional change. As such, geopolitical threat 
and institutional change dynamics could emerge in pairs, and leaders may perceive this 
dual challenge through the lens of great-power status and personal prestige. In historian T. 
G. Otte’s account, on the eve of the WWI leaders of the belligerents all preoccupied 
themselves with great-power status and personal prestige (albeit to varying degrees), as 
they were cross-pressured by external adversaries and domestic challengers.74 Nowadays, 
the Chinese leaders conceivably face similar challenges. Rapid economic growth has 
brought about sweeping societal changes that weakened their legitimacy basis, whereas the 
enhanced state power also tends to intensify the regional security dilemma. Notably, various 
pieces of evidence suggest that handling the cross-pressures of regime legitimacy crisis and 
international tensions constitutes a significant challenge to contemporary Chinese leaders.75  
  
																																																																		
73 Buzan and Lawson, The Global Transformation.  
74 T. G. Otte, "War, Revolution, and the Uncertain Primacy of Domestic Politics," in The Next Great War? The Roots of 
World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict, ed. Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 2015). 
75 See Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006); Peter Gries, China's New 
Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2005); Jessica Chen Weiss, 
Powerful Patriots: Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic Logic of Anti-foreign Protests (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
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Summary 
 
Guiding Questions 
Why do state leaders adopt competitive policies in pursuit of status preeminence 
internationally? Why do leaders value status aspirations as worth pursuing in a competitive 
geopolitical environment?   
 
Arguments 
1) Leaders take great-power status to be instrumental in advancing geopolitical security of 
the state. Great-power status could act as a vehicle for leaders to advance geopolitical 
security (H1; observable implication: third-party concerns). As such, leaders’ concerns 
for great-power status arguably intensify when a dominant rival extending its 
geopolitical influences to their neighborhood.    
H1: The strategic role of a third party (normally a lesser power) in a geopolitical competition between 
the major powers could inform which aspect of state power leaders would display to signal status 
claims. 
2) Leaders often need to manage tradeoffs among geopolitical security, domestic 
legitimation, and status aspirations. 
H2: When inspired by the quest for geopolitical autonomy, status concerns are permissive but not 
sufficient for leaders to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy.  
H3: When their personal prestige is under severe challenge at home (observable implication: 
pressures for institutional change, normally unleashed by crisis events), leaders would be 
averse to the escalation of international conflict that could undermine their ability to advance national 
wellbeing.  
3) Pragmatic concerns for social preeminence—notably great-power status and personal 
prestige—can motivate leaders to undertake competitive status-seeking measures. 
Empirically, competitive status-seeking strategy is a preferable policy for leaders who 
rely upon personal prestige as a dominant vehicle for political survival at home while 
regarding great-power status as a route to geopolitical security (PH).  
The PH suggests that pragmatic concerns for both great-power status and personal prestige 
can motivate leaders to adopt competitive status-seeking policies in order to transcend the 
value tradeoffs. Here, the observable implications include: aligning geopolitical and domestic 
challenges; sensitivity to domestic political costs of pursuing non-competitive policies; bandwagoning 
for prestige; and proclaiming victory.
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Research Design Table 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pragmatic 
Concern for 
Social 
Preeminence 
 
Geopolitical 
Dimension  
Domestic  
Dimension 
Value Tradeoff Outcome Case 
Yes 
(intensified 
concern for 
great-power 
status) 
Yes 
(intensified 
concern for 
personal 
prestige) 
Transcend Competitive status-seeking 
strategy (PM); the aspect of 
state power being displayed is 
a function of the lesser state’s 
geostrategic value (H1) 
Offensive alliance with Hanoi (Chap. 1); 
delegitimation strategy against the Soviet 
Union (Chap. 2); limited use of force against 
Vietnam (Chap. 3) 
Yes No Prioritize 
geopolitical 
security but not 
necessarily forgo 
status ambitions 
Defensive alliance, diplomatic 
engagement, or prudent 
conduct of coercive 
diplomacy (H2) 
China’s diplomatic and military support for 
Hanoi in the 1950s; the Taiwan Strait crises 
(1954, 1958); the Sino-Soviet alliance up to 
early 1963 (Chap. 1); the US-China 
rapprochement and normalization; the 1969 
Zhenbao Island conflict (Chap. 3) 
No Yes Prioritize 
personal 
authority but not 
necessarily forgo 
status ambitions 
Diplomatic engagement, 
delegitimation rhetoric 
without risk-prone acts (H3) 
China’s diplomacy in Africa; the Sino-Soviet 
split to 1965 (Chap. 2) 
No No Moderate Conventional viewpoint  
Within case variation on the independent variable; cross-case variation on the dependent variable (for testing H1) 
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Chapter 3  
The “Left Turn” in China’s Security Strategy: Beijing’s Pursuit of Offensive 
Alliance in the Vietnam War, 1962-1965 
 
 
A Chinese military delegation led by Marshal Ye Jianying visited Hanoi in December 1961 to suggest 
that our southern comrades should only attack at section or company level, never at battalion 
strength. That, the Chinese said, was the way to defeat the American-backed regime in the South. 
Peking’s main worry……was that if we provoked the Americans into counter-attacks close to the 
Chinese border, they would have to intervene as had happened in Korea. 
Memoirs by a Senior Vietnamese official1  
 
We believe that even if the war does expand into China we will still aid the Vietnamese people, as 
long as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Movement in the south 
make the request. There is no clear line indicating the expansion of war, and war will spread like fire. 
America wants to play with fire and take the chance. China wants to quench the fire. [But] America 
does not stop and continue to flare up the fire. It is the Americans who are expanding the war, not us.  
Zhou Enlai’s conversation with the Pakistan President (April 1965)2 
 
 
Chinese security policy in the 1960s took a “left turn,” which was evidenced by Beijing’s 
active support for Hanoi’s conduct of guerilla warfare against the Saigon regime.3 After late 
1962 the Sino-Vietnamese security cooperation took on features of an offensive alliance. 
Beijing used Hanoi as a geopolitical ally to implement an offensive strategy against the 
US-sponsored Saigon regime. In particular, the leaders in Beijing constantly urged their 
counterparts in Hanoi to step up guerilla insurgencies in South Vietnam, a region governed 
by the American-backed Saigon regime. Inasmuch as allied partners represent a crucial 
aspect of state power, Hanoi served as a vehicle for China to display state power on which 
its claim to great-power status rests. In this regard, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) acted as a symbol for China to assert status superiority over America.4 China’s 																																																																		
1 Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel, trans. Judy Stowe and Do Van (London: 
Hurst, 1995), 45. 
2 Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian, 1992), 441.  
3 Jun Niu, "1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy," Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) 
Working Paper no. 48 (October 2005).  
4 “The spread of revolution to the South in the 1960s was not the same type of goal for China as was the eviction of the 
French from the North in the early 1950s,” as Thomas Christensen argues, therefore “it can hardly be seen as a defensive 
measure or as one purely related to China’s parochial national interest.” Thomas J. Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith: 
Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), 168.  
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strategy had the potential to promote its status as well as security vis-à-vis the United States 
in Southeast Asia.  
China’s policy as such departed significantly from Beijing’s erstwhile effort to maintain 
the balance of power in Southeast Asia. It also marked a shift of the leadership’s priority 
away from domestic recovery in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF). 
Unquestionably, the weakening or elimination of US influence in the Saigon regime could 
elevate China’s status in Southeast Asia. While in this way competitive status-seeking 
strategy could advance Chinese security in the long run, such kind of policy arguably 
incurred short-term risks of escalating conflicts with the U.S. It is worth asking: why did the 
Chinese leadership take such risks to engage in competitive status-seeking acts vis-à-vis the 
United States?  
This chapter addresses this puzzle by focusing on China’s geopolitical rivalry with the 
United States in Asia and the evolution of the split between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, 
two dominant leaders in the Chinese Communist regime. Pragmatic concerns for 
great-power status and for personal prestige, it argues, combined to cause the leaders in 
Beijing to espouse competitive status-seeking strategy as an approach to US-China 
confrontation in Vietnam.  
This chapter begins by discussing China’s perception and strategies toward the 
American threat since 1950. As the US threat was largely predicated on Washington’s 
network of allies in East Asia, allied partners acted as a crucial vehicle for the US-China 
geopolitical competition. This chapter also shows that while in the 1950s the Chinese leaders, 
notably Mao Zedong, sought to enhance China’s great-power status in his dealings with the 
United States, they nevertheless managed to abstain from undertaking competitive 
status-seeking measures. Chinese security policy took a radical turn after 1962, as the 
Chinese leaders came to urge the Hanoi regime to intensify the guerilla insurgents in South 
Vietnam. This policy shift had to do with a crucial domestic development. The Seven 
Thousand Cadres Conference in that year triggered an open split between Mao and Liu, 
which in the following years was further exacerbated by disputes over how to conduct the 
Socialist Education Movement. The chapter then investigates in detail how the elite conflict 
in the post-GLF period inspired the pragmatic concern for social preeminence on the part of 
individual leaders. It points out that the failure of the GLF failure generated intense 
pressures for institutional change, which in turn caused ideological polarization between 
Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi. The ideological polarization indicated that the Chinese leaders 
had come to rely on personal prestige as the principal vehicle for legitimizing their 
authority in elite politics. Such concerns for personal prestige combined with the 
instrumental importance of great-power status for geopolitical security to motivate 
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competitive status-seeking acts. This was evident in Beijing’s Vietnam policy, where the 
Chinese abandoned the less risk-prone strategies pursued in the 1950s in favor of a 
risk-acceptant policy of status competition against America.  
 
The International Context:  
Geopolitical Threats from America and China’s Status Aspirations 
Since the early Cold War, the US-China geopolitical rivalry had become so intense that from 
the Chinese standpoint, status aspirations and security imperatives were inextricably linked. 
Washington’s unequivocal support for the Kuomintang regime, the formidable presence of 
American military force in East Asia, and the ideological animosity of Americans toward 
communism all hindered China from asserting its influences beyond its borders. They in 
turn made the US an existential threat to the People’s Republic of China. The new regime 
then became preoccupied with the United States’ allied partners, which provided crucial 
vehicles for the US to project military force. In particular, the Chinese leadership anticipated 
an imminent aggression from America against their regime as coming from three fronts: 
Vietnam, North Korea, and Taiwan.5 Their heightened perception of threat persisted into 
the 1960s, and played a pivotal role in shaping China’s international behavior.6  
The Chinese threat perception grew out of the intensifying superpower competitions in 
the early Cold War. In the wake of WWII, with the US-Soviet confrontation unfolding in 
Eastern Europe, Berlin, and the Middle East, the US-Soviet leaders turned increasing 
attention to East Asia, and in particular, to China.7 The superpower antagonism informed 
the Chinese Civil War from 1946 to 1949 and posed a significant challenge to the communist 
survival. The Chinese communists were acutely aware of this. Early in 1946, on the eve of 
the civil war with the KMT regime, Mao put forward the concept of “intermediate zone” 
(zhongjian didai). This concept referred to the geopolitical area that lay between the US and 
the Soviet Union, including “many capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries in 
Europe, Asia, and Africa.” Before consolidating control over this vast area, Mao argued, the 
imperialist America would not attack the socialist Soviet Union—the “guardian of world 
peace.”8 Yet, located in this “intermediate zone” China was to bear the full brunt of 																																																																		
5 For the threat assessment of the PRC elites in the early years of the regime’s establishment, see Michael Hunt, The 
Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jian Chen, China's Road to 
the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).  
6 For the strategic interaction between the United States and China that produced the irreconcilable tension in the early Cold 
War, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 
1947-1958 (Princeton University Press, 1996), chaps. 4-5; Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: A History of 
Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), chap. 6; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the 
Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983). 
7 See Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 127-130, 246-251; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold 
War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 60-62. 
8 Mao Zedong xuanji 4 (Selected works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin, 1991), 1193-1194. 
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America’s aggression. 9 Washington therefore appeared as the dominant threat to the 
newborn communist regime in Beijing. On the eve of the founding of the PRC, Mao 
explicitly claimed that the imperative for the CCP was to “prepare to fight” against 
America.10  
The alliance networks America had forged in postwar years were of much relevance to 
the US-China rivalry after 1949. The US occupation of Japan, the extension of security 
commitments to Taiwan and South Korea following the Korean War, and the US-led 
formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954 all contributed to the projection 
of American geopolitical influences to Asia. Allied partners thus served as America’s 
diplomatic assets and crucial components of American power.11 Accordingly, they featured 
centrally in China’s threat perception. As the premier and the first foreign minister of the 
PRC, Zhou Enlai remarked that, “America is not an Asian country, and its security is not 
being threatened by any Asian countries……But the US government has been planning to 
establish a series of so-called defensive blocs in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, 
and the Near East……Needless to say, the US seeks to establish aggressive blocs (qinlue 
jituan).”12 Here, Zhou suggested that by virtue of its extensive alliance networks across the 
globe, the US was able to project military forces and imperil the security interests of various 
countries including China. 
Hence, the Chinese communist foreign policy from its inception was driven by a 
heightened perception of the America threat. It was, though, mediated by concerns for 
great-power status. The idea of the “intermediate zone” reflected a remarkable mixture of 
security imperatives and status ambitions. It connoted China’s aspiration for assuming 
international leadership in a vast area lying beyond superpower confrontation. This area 
would assume symbolic significance to China’s great-power status and had a strategic value 
for holding off superpower intervention. Mao conveyed this aspiration to Joseph Stalin 
during his first visit to the Soviet Union in late 1949. The Soviet leader showed willingness 
to accommodate Mao’s status aspiration, which motivated his regime to contest with the US 
for status preeminence in Asia.13 All being said, the geopolitical threats from the American 
side were unquestionably intense, which could fuel the pragmatic consideration of Beijing’s 
leaders who were committed to advancing great-power status.  
 
China’s Security Strategy prior to 1962:  																																																																		
9 Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 13-33. 
10 See Mao Zedong xuanji 4, 1483.  
11 See Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2016). 
12 Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [selected works of Zhou Enlai on foreign affairs] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian, 1992), 69. 
13 Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 72-73. 
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Alliance Building, Conventional Diplomacy, and Coercive Diplomacy 
In practice, China did not try to advance its security through status competition with the 
United States until the early 1960s. Some scholars contend the quest for favorable 
recognition in international society acted as an invariant motive of Chinese diplomacy.14 
Yet, the evidence shows that the Chinese leadership prior to the 1960s was not so 
determined to pursue great-power status at the risk of conflict escalation with the United 
States. Thus it is reasonable to argue that status ambitions on the part of Chinese leaders 
varied in intensity, which determined Chinese strategy toward geopolitical rivals. 
Undeniably, the Chinese leaders had repeatedly evoked terms such as international 
duty and national pride as justifications of critical foreign policy decisions, notably the 
Chinese interventions in Korean and Vietnamese conflicts in the 1950s.15 But China’s 
international behaviors in the 1950s in large part confirm the defensive realist hypothesis 
that security-seeking states are averse to risks of conflict escalation and war. When security 
imperatives clashed with the status aspiration, Chinese leaders often preferred risk-averse 
strategies to competitive status-seeking measures. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. 
In general, the Chinese leaders pursued three broad strategies throughout the 1950s, 
including conventional diplomacy, alliance building, and coercive diplomacy. In the 
aftermath of a violent and prolonged conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese leaders 
tried to reach out to their American counterparts via the ambassadorial-level talks in 
Warsaw. Due to the ideological conflict and strategic distrust, China’s diplomatic 
engagement with the US had deadlocked by the early 1960s.16 Yet, the Chinese nevertheless 
went to considerable lengths to engage their dominant geopolitical, as well as ideological, 
adversary in diplomatic talks. The quest for a regular and productive pattern of interaction 
with the adversary is a defining feature of Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s. In this regard, 
the Chinese took full advantage of multilateral diplomacy at the Geneva Conference to 
defuse geopolitical tensions with the Americans. Also on that occasion, under Mao’s 
instructions Chinese diplomats launched a peace offensive to earn trust and popularity 
among the post-colonial countries in Southeast Asia. Beneath their high-pitched rhetoric 
asserting national dignity lay a clear sense of security imperatives to reduce the opportunity 
for the US intervention.17 “Mao’s conciliatory attitude,” historian Yang Kuisong argues, 
“was neither driven by the logical result of his ideological beliefs or the product of his 																																																																		
14 Zhang, China in International Society since 1949.  
15 See, for instance, Gregg Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), chap. 2. 
16 Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington, In.: Indiana 
University Press, 2006), 106. 
17 See Yin Qingfei, “Lun zhongguo dui laowo, jianpuzhai zhonglihua zhengce de xingcheng” [the origins of China’s 
neutralization policy toward Laos and Cambodia] MA Thesis, Peking University, 2011; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam 
Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), chap. 2. 
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revolutionary experiences, but rather a diplomatic tactic determined by realistic policy 
needs.” 18  Quite evidently, leaders of a revolutionary communist regime had left 
competitive status-seeking strategy off the agenda when status aspirations clashed with 
security imperatives. The dictates of geopolitical security conditioned their preference for 
status preeminence. 
Besides conventional diplomacy China also undertook alliance building and coercive 
diplomacy in coping with the geopolitical threat posed by US military presence in Asia. In 
those cases, the Chinese practices are consistent with the defensive realist hypothesis that 
security imperatives could motivate the leaders to stabilize its security relations with other 
states, including the adversaries. The leaders in Beijing aligned China with one of the 
superpowers, the Soviet Union, to balance against the US. The Sino-Soviet alliance also 
allowed China to benefit from extensive cooperative programs with the socialist 
superpower. The technological and financial assistance lent by the Soviets proved essential 
for China’s industrialization in the 1950s. This in turn contributed to the growth of China’s 
national power and enhanced its capacity to deter the US incursion into its territory.19  
It is also worth noting that China conducted coercive diplomacy with a remarkable 
degree of prudence. In 1954 and 1958 China launched large-scale shelling on the Quemoy 
Islands to deter Washington from enhancing its security cooperation with Taipei. China’s 
purported objective, in Mao’s words, was to use “the policy of brinkmanship to counter 
against [John] Dulles’s [policy of brinkmanship].”20 In conducting the military operations, 
Mao took pains to avoid war with the United States. By signaling self-restraint and 
adjusting China’s conflict behavior to America’s diplomatic signals, the Chinese leaders 
sought to dampen the escalatory potentials of military force.21 Meanwhile, Beijing intended 
the employment of coercive power to facilitate diplomatic dialogues with Washington. And 
Beijing did manage this intention to signal to the US through the bilateral ambassadorial 
meetings in Warsaw.22 In the conduct of coercive diplomacy, China clearly did not let its 
employment of military force compromise the chance for diplomatic engagement. 
There are cases of Chinese intervention into the neighboring areas by coercive forces; but 
these cases are exceptions that prove the rule. That is, when force was employed to promote 
regimes favored by the Chinese, the ultimate objective was to promote a balance of power, 																																																																		
18 Yang Kuisong, “Mao Zedong and the Indochina Wars,” in Priscilla Roberts ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, 
Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 66.  
19 Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, After Leaning to One Side : China and Its Allies in the Cold War (Washington D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011); Austin Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2014). 
20 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao. 3 (The manuscripts of Mao Zedong on military affairs since the People’s 
Republic of China) (Beijing: Junshi kexue, zhongyang wenxian, 2009), 11.  
21 Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture. Allen Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan," International 
Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001). 
22 For detailed evidence, see Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, 81-89, 98-99. 
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rather than undo the US practice of hegemonic leadership in East Asia. China fought a 
limited war in Korea in the early 1950s to safeguard the newly founded Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a buffer state between its Northeastern border and the pro-US 
Republic of Korea. To a lesser degree, China intervened in its southern vicinity supporting 
the Ho Chi Minh-led armed struggle against the French colonial authority. The Chinese 
interventions were seemingly driven by an impulse to reclaim the status preeminence 
associated with the Sino-centric tributary system in ancient times.23 Undeniably, however, 
the security interests involved were also significant enough to warrant military 
interventions. As such, security imperatives were arguably a principal cause for China’s 
interventions; status aspirations in these cases did not operate alone to motivate the Chinese 
to risk war with the US. Given, moreover, that the ultimate purpose was to attain a balance 
of power rather than create an image of superior power its vicinity, the Chinese acts hardly 
fit with the category of competitive status-seeking strategy.  
In short, China’s employed military forces against the Americas on the Korean 
peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait in prudent manner. In Indochina, by contrast, both 
the US and China mobilized allied partners for geopolitical competitions. In the context of 
the growing US involvement with Indochina to fill the geopolitical vacuum left by the 
French after 1954, Beijing took great pains to help institute a stable regime in Hanoi that 
could serve as a Chinese ally. And yet, while mobilizing an allied partner, the Chinese were 
not keen on showing a superior strength. The overriding concern of Chinese leaders was to 
forestall the repetition of the Korean situation in 1950 whereby Washington’s intervention in 
a regional conflict effectively threatened Chinese security. The Hanoi regime was critical in 
staving off the American involvement in Indochina. Although the Chinese tended to justify 
their support for the Ho Chi Minh-led revolutionary forces in Indochina in terms of socialist 
solidarity, they did not want Ho to attain more than what is required of a defensive alliance. 
In the early 1950s, Beijing provided Ho’s forces with tremendous material supplies and 
tactical guidance for fighting against the French authorities in Vietnam. Leaders in Beijing, 
however, did not give their allied partners a free rein. This became evident at the Geneva 
Conference in 1954. As the conference negotiated an end of the Indochina conflict, the 
Chinese denied Ho the chance to unify Vietnam by force by recognizing the legitimacy of 
the Saigon regime. China did so out of a geopolitical rationale. For one thing, Beijing was 
anxious about the possible US armed intervention if the DRV managed to overthrow Ngo 
Dinh Diem who established a regime under France’s support in Saigon, South Vietnam.24 
For another, the unchecked expansion of Vietnamese influence across Indochina clashed 																																																																		
23 Brazinsky, Winning the Third World, chap. 2; Chen, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American 
Confrontation. 
24 Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 138-141. 
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with Beijing’s quest for geopolitical predominance in Indochina. Zhou Enlai in tun criticized 
the Vietnamese leading delegate Pham Van Dong for advocating the “Indochina 
Federation.”25  
For all its ideological fervor in supporting the Vietnamese revolutionaries, the Chinese 
act of restraining Ho Chi Minh from unifying the country reflects Beijing’s immediate 
concern with geopolitical security. The Chinese leaders were not just concerned by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s ambition. They were also acutely aware that a drive to 
promote revolutionary regimes could exacerbate security dilemmas across Indochina.26 In a 
1957 meeting with Ho Chi Minh, Zhou cautioned his counterpart that encouraging 
communist forces to take power by force in Laos could invite the US intervention and the 
resulting consolidation of US positions in Indochina. 27  The rationale behind Chinese 
security policy thus meets the defensive realist expectation that state leaders could pursue 
geopolitical security by taking measures to enhance their state’s defensive capacity and 
signal their status quo oriented objectives. Indeed, strategies such as defensive alliance (e.g. 
external balancing), coercive diplomacy, and conventional diplomacy all took precedence in 
Chinese security policy statecraft up to the 1960s.  
Such a defensive realist strategy was put to a test in 1962 when the Kennedy 
administration was poised to enhance its political and military influence in Saigon. The new 
administration assigned the US forces an active role in conducting counterinsurgency 
operations within South Vietnam.28 By 1962 the Strategic Hamlet programs guided by the 
US military advisors had come to reduce guerilla forces’ access to South Vietnamese 
peasantry.29 Modest as it was, the programs’ success alarmed the leadership in Hanoi and 
stimulated them to seek external support. China was undoubtedly a crucial source of 
support. While the temporary success of the American-led counterinsurgency in defense of 
the Saigon regime presented no immediate threat to China, it nevertheless carried 
geopolitical implications: if China had shown itself incapable of supporting its ally, its 
perceived capacity to counter the American threat would have diminished.30 This point was 
driven home to the Chinese as Ho Chi Minh visited Beijing in the summer of 1962. During 
his visit, Mao met Ho’s request for military and economic resources that “would be used to 																																																																		
25 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 61. 
26 For a discussion of this geopolitical concern on the Chinese part, see Ying, “Lun zhongguo dui laowo, jianpuzhai 
zhonglihua zhengce de xingcheng.” 
27 Ilya Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 127. 
28 Saunders, Leaders at War, 119-28.  
29 Philip Catton, Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 141; William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 231; 
Pierre Asselin, Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War (Berkeley, Calif.: The University of California Press, 2013), 109-10. 
30 As the Foreign Ministry of China pointed out at the time, the US military presence in South Vietnam was a war that 
indirectly targeted China. See Zhongguo gongchandang lishi, 1949-1978 [History of the Chinese Communist Party, 
1949-1978] (Beijing: zhonggongdangshi chubanshe, 2010), 650.  
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support guerilla warfare in the south.”31 Crucially, this offer signified the beginning of 
China’s departure from its erstwhile prudent policy, which sought to utilize Hanoi as a 
buffer state while checking its drive for reunification. Thereafter, the Chinese Communist 
elite began to use Hanoi as a vehicle for spreading revolution in Indochina. In doing so, 
China virtually shifted to competitive status-seeking strategy.32  
The root cause for this policy shift can be found in concerns for personal prestige that 
were pervasive within the Chinese leadership after 1962. As noted, the US-led network of 
alliances designed to contain the PRC regime fueled the Chinese concerns for great-power 
status. After 1962, competitive status-seeking strategy not only provided a vehicle for 
advancing China’s geopolitical security but also allowed individual leaders to boost 
personal prestige in domestic elite competitions. As such, this policy became preferable for 
leaders in Beijing despite the fact that it incurred tremendous risks of conflict escalation. 
 
Failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Emergent Mao-Liu Split   
Early in 1959 Mao had ceded his de jure authority to Liu Shaoqi, who assumed the position 
as the chairman of state. Accordingly, Liu gained sufficient autonomy to interpret Mao’s 
words and implement policy on his own. This division of authority opened the way for an 
intensification of power struggles between Mao and Liu after 1962.33 The proximate cause 
for the split of the CCP leadership, however, was the failure of the Great Leap Forward 
programs. Beginning in 1957, the GLF was designed to achieve rapid industrialization of 
China and dramatically increase agricultural productivity across the country. By early 1962, 
however, nationwide famines had clearly shown that the GLF programs were 
unsustainable. 
The 1962 Seven Thousand Cadres Conference witnessed an open split between Mao and 
his presumptive successor Liu Shaoqi. It signified the beginning of the prestige contest 
between the two leaders which lead up to the Cultural Revolution. In the second half of the 
year, Mao began to assault the moderate foreign policy line associated with Wang Jiaxiang, 
a senior diplomat. In so doing, he reoriented Chinese security policy toward an assertive 
line. These events testify that individual leaders’ reliance upon prestige as a political vehicle 
could combine with geopolitical imperatives to motivate a strategy of competitive 
status-seeking strategy. The political logic of status competition is manifest here—that is, 
leaders may engage in competitive status-seeking strategy in the hope of enhancing a state’s 																																																																		
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32 Christensen, Worse than Monolith, 168.  
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Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
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geopolitical security as well as their domestic power positions. 
 
The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference  
From January 11th to February 7th 1962, the CCP Central Committee convened in Beijing 
over seven thousand party cadres to report on local socioeconomic situations during the 
GLF. The proximate cause was the enormous difficulty the provincial leaders had faced in 
meeting the grain levies set by the central authorities. Since 1960, the economic difficulties 
caused by the Great Leap Forward had come to threaten the daily functioning of the regime. 
By late 1961, provincial leaders began complaining that the grain levies imposed by the 
central leadership were unrealistic. As prospects for the collapse of state power loomed 
large, the grain levy problem became a serious concern for the central leadership. By 
convening local cadres in the capital, the central leadership wanted to collect their 
complaints and seek their advice for solution of the ongoing crisis.34  
The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference gained its name for the large number of 
participants. Over seven thousand party cadres attended the conference; in total more than 
ten thousand people arrived in Beijing overnight.35 The central leadership did not decide to 
convene a meeting on such a scale until the early winter of 1960, and its opening was not 
publicized.36 The conference was not intended for individual leaders to display their 
consensus symbolically. There were serious challenges to reckon with. Mao was 
nevertheless optimistic about the ability of party elites to forge consensus through this 
conference. He left Beijing for vocation in Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang province in 
late November, and did not return to the capital until December 19.37 The period of his 
absence proved to have been fatal to his prestige and authority. As the State Chairman and 
presumably Mao’s successor, Liu Shaoqi came to take command as the de facto supreme 
leader in daily affairs during this period. But he did not meet Mao’s expectation in 
acknowledging the merits of the Great Leap Forward. Rather, Liu urged the drafters to 
emphasize the mistakes committed by the central leadership. This instruction later on 
aroused Mao’s dissatisfaction.38 And yet, Liu’s defiance testified to a decline of Mao’s 
authority as well as the deep divide within the central leadership with respect to his 
competence. By the time the draft was sent to Mao, the small number of central leaders who 																																																																		
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had read it already had “much heated discussions” (yilun shenduo).39 Peng Zhen, a 
politburo member, openly demanded that Mao take responsibility for the massive failures 
of the Great Leap Forward. According to the memoirs of Bo Yibo, a Politburo member at the 
time, Peng argued that it is crucial that Chairman Mao acknowledge his mistakes during the 
Great Leap Forward; otherwise “it would be odious to our party”40   
Clearly Mao’s prestige was in decline. The Chairman suffered a serious setback during 
the conference at which Mao reluctantly made a self-criticism and took responsibility for the 
failure of the GLF. The Chairman also admitted that his expertise on economic 
reconstruction was inferior to other leaders, including Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng 
Xiaoping, and Chen Yun.41 Chen Yun, however, declined Mao’s invitation to give a speech 
on the GLP ostensibly because “there are disagreements about the severity of the current 
[economic] difficulty and the time needed to surmount it.”42 The real but unspeakable 
reason for Chen’s silence, as he admitted years after, is that he “did not want to embarrass 
Chairman Mao.” 43  By implication, Chen sensed that the GLF had brought about a 
significant decline of Mao’s prestige among the party elites. 
Liu Shaoqi’s performance at the conference substantiated this—indeed, Liu took the 
initiative to boost his authority at Mao’s expense. In his speech Liu blatantly rejected Mao’s 
optimistic assessment of the immediate economic situation. He argued that the GLF brought 
about grave and devastating consequences for the economy. His appraisal that GLF 
programs were “manmade” fiascos was remarkable. Liu’s very courage of speaking out 
against the GLF’s excesses was greeted by loud applauses from the audience—and this 
signified a rise of his prestige that promised to enhance his decision-making authority.44 
Chairman Mao made no comment on the speech.45  
Retrospectively Bo Yibo remarked that Liu’s remarks on the GLF “sounds quite 
reasonable today; but at that time they were too provocative, thereby foreshadowing the 
intensification of inner-party struggle in the years to come.”46 Yet, there is no denying that 
Liu’s speech gained him considerable popularity. The conference’s major achievement—the 
reexamination of the GLF’s failures and the reestablishment of policy lines for economic 
recovery and domestic reconstruction—were attributed to Liu rather than Mao. Deng Liqun, 
who attended Mao’s speech at the conference, recalled that he did not find Mao’s speech 
inspirational (bu guo yin) at the time.47 Another participant of the conference remarked in 																																																																		
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hindsight that “the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference was audacious in breaking through 
the existing framework, [but] this was [made possible] not by the Chairman [Mao] but by 
[Liu] Shaoqi.”48 Whereas Mao was no longer viewed among party elites as an infallible icon, 
Liu had established himself as a competent leader in managing state affairs. In the wake of 
the conference, a revised version of Liu’s 1939 essay “How to be a Good Communist” (lun 
gongchandangyuan de xiuyang) was republished in the authoritative official media outlet 
People’s Daily on the forty-first anniversary of the founding of the CCP. In the same year the 
first volume of his selected works was also released. In the public rhetoric, some CCP 
leaders came to make more references to Liu than before in their public speeches.49 These 
signs of prestige indicated Liu’s emergence as a dominant leader who was comparable to 
Mao in decision-making authority.  
Mao’s response testifies to the significance of prestige as a sort of political capital. In the 
wake of the conference, the Chairman turned furious even over minor policy changes such 
as the rehabilitation of the intellectuals and the cadres.50 Any indication of growth of Liu’s 
prestige could irritate him. Although the Chairman was still recognized as the great 
revolutionary, a relative decline of his prestige vis-à-vis Liu threatened to undermine his 
control over the overall policy line. According to Li Zhisui, Mao was in bad mood during 
the conference, being convinced that Liu was no longer loyal to him.51 Prestige had long 
been a crucial sign of his charismatic authority; as such, signs of his declining prestige as 
China’s supreme leader in early 1962 indicated the weakening of the Chairman’s authority. 
His authority was no longer unchallengeable.  
Yet, as the GLF disaster cast Mao’s authority into doubt, the supreme leader relied upon 
prestige more than ever as a dominant vehicle to enhance personal authority. Prestige 
signifies who gains an upper hand in the political arena. The ascending prestige of Liu 
increased his salience as the State Chairman in charge of daily policymaking. Institutionally, 
Liu’s official position had given him certain latitude in implementing directives taken from 
Mao. Yet more important, an enhancement of Liu’s prestige in the wake of the Seven 
Thousand Cadre Conference helped strengthen his authority over the party elites. Mao 
perceived Liu’s rise in prestige as an ominous departure from the revolutionary path to 
communism he himself embodied. He thereby needed prestige more than ever to strengthen 
his grip on authority. Consequently, the Mao-Liu split involved more than normal policy 
disputes; it was to spiral into an authority contest that set the stage for the Cultural 																																																																		
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Revolution.52 
Inevitably, the Mao-Liu split led to a polarization of the central leadership. While as 
noted, some leaders challenged Mao’s authority, the Chairman still gained substantial 
support from his close lieutenant Lin Biao. At the conference, Lin openly denied the 
Chairman’s culpability for the GLF fiascos, asserting that economic failures and policy 
setbacks associated with the GLF were attributable to the local cadres’ defiance of Mao’s 
leadership. At the same time, Lin stressed the importance of inner-Party solidarity around 
Mao. As he argued,  
“In times of troubles, we must rely even more on the leadership of the center, on the 
leadership of Chairman Mao, and trust Chairman Mao’s leadership even more. If we 
just do that it will be even easier to overcome our troubles. The facts prove that these 
troubles spring precisely from our failure in many instances to act according to 
Chairman Mao’s directives.”53  
While arguing so, Lin helped to boost Mao’s prestige as China’s supreme leader. As he 
managed to attach Mao’s personal prestige to the central leadership, opponents of Mao’s 
leadership would likely suffer psychological pressure for questioning his/her own loyalty 
to the party. Lin’s speech thus convinced many participants of Mao’s unshakable 
authority.54 Mao also found Lin’s speech helped boost his prestige, as he asked the Central 
Secretariat to distribute Lin’s speech among the conference participants.55 Lin’s rapid rise in 
political influence after the conference represented Mao’s effort to mobilize supporters. To 
regain control over the central leadership, Mao desperately needed support from the party 
elites.  
Lin’s defense of Mao contrasted with Liu’s critique of the GLF. This revealed a 
profound split in the party leadership. With the material resources shrunk and ideological 
commitment to the regime shaken by the GLF, pressures for changing the Maoist 
institutions created an opening for authority contests among the political elite for which 
prestige became a critical vehicle. The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference set in motion this 
very dynamic, as the split between Mao and Liu had become a widely acknowledged fact. 
Their disputes over the Socialist Education Movement would aggravate the split across the 
party elites and deepen individual leaders’ concerns for prestige, which was instrumental in 
legitimizing their political power.     																																																																		
52 It is worth noting that this view has been explicitly confirmed by the official history of the CCP. See Mao Zedong zhuan 
[biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 2275. For the argument that the Seven 
Thousand Cadres Conference signifies an open split in the Chinese communist leadership, see Yang Jisheng and Stacy 
Mosher, Tombstone: the Untold Story of Mao’s Great Famine (New York: Penguin, 2013), chap. 15; Kenneth Lieberthal, 
"The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," in The Politics of China: Sixty Years of the 
People's Republic of China, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
53 Cited in MacFarquhar, The Origins vol. 3, 166-167. Also see Zhang, Bianju, 145; Deng, Deng Liqun zishu, 354. 
54 Zhang, Bianju, 147. 
55 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao vol. 10 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1996), 62-65.  
	94		
 
Authority Contests between Mao and Liu:  
Ideological Polarization during the Socialist Education Movement (SEM) 
Claiming that a genuine struggle for leadership preeminence occurred between Mao and 
Liu after the 1962 Seven Thousand Cadres Conference is not without controversy. To date, 
students of Chinese elite politics remain divided over the existence and nature of the 
Mao-Liu split. The adherents of the Mao-in-command model deny the existence of any 
substantial conflict—let alone split—between Mao and Liu in either ideological or policy 
realm.56 As a prominent historian Frederick Teiwes notes, Mao “was fully able to get his 
way once he reasserted his own idiosyncratic concerns on policy and personnel matters 
starting with August 1962 Beidaihe conference, but he proved unable to frame a clear, 
unambiguous program for other leaders to implement, thus leaving them uncertain as to his 
actual intent.”57 Insightful as it is, this observation begs a critical question: why did Mao 
frequently shift positions and appear “unable to frame a clear, unambiguous program?”  
An easy answer could be that the aging supreme leader was increasingly paranoid and 
unwilling to put trust in his lieutenants.58 And yet, it is well known that in the years from 
1962 to the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 Mao was actually willingness to trust 
some of his lieutenants such as Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan, and Jiang Qing, who 
were largely operating outside the state bureaucratic institutions under Liu’s supervision. In 
effect, Mao was reliant on these lieutenants in preparing to launch the Cultural Revolution.59 
Hence it could be argued that his disputes with Liu far exceeded personal antagonism. As 
other prominent scholars on Chinese politics pointed out, Liu’s opposition to Mao’s 
charismatic authority was profound, as Liu relied upon a bureaucratic approach to domestic 
governance. The model of top-down authority Liu upheld clashed with Mao’s charismatic 
authority that entailed constant grassroots mobilizations. Implicit as they were, Liu’s 
oppositions effectively pushed Mao into temporary retreats. As the supreme leader fought 
back, he managed to boost his authority for reversing the institutional change Liu had 
introduced. Eventually, the competitive dynamics of the Mao-Liu split led to the Cultural 
Revolution.60  
My study builds on this argument to bring power politics back in. It suggests that an 																																																																		
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open split did genuinely occur between Mao and Liu, as they competed for authority 
through prestige politics on the home front. Of course, this is not to suggest that Mao and 
Liu rigidly held onto two irreconcilable ideological lines. Rather, the ideological lines would 
better be considered prestige claims—that is, claims for preeminence in the political arena. 
That is, Mao and Liu exploited ideological lines as mobilizational devices to compete for 
authority. Admittedly, even in hindsight it is hard to ascertain intentions of individual 
leaders with much certainty. So the best we can do is to examine evidence that could show 
their reliance on prestige for political survival. The competing prestige claims first became 
manifest as Mao and Liu promoted divergent ideological lines. In so doing, they sought to 
mobilize support from the party elites across the regime. Once the leaders had harnessed 
personal prestige for political mobilization, policy disputes would assume implications for 
the balance of political power—and this became evident during the Socialist Education 
Movement.    
 
The Divergence of Ideological Commitments between Mao and Liu 
At the outset of the of Cultural Revolution, Mao asserted that, “at the Seven Thousand 
Cadres Conference I have already found that the revisionists were about to overthrow us.”61 
He told Edgar Snow in 1970 that he had made up his mind to purge Liu in early 1965, when 
the two leaders were having serious differences over the drafting of the third document of 
the SEM.62 These comments must be considered with caution, as they might suffer from a 
hindsight bias. That is, for Mao to rationalize his decision to purge Liu during the Cultural 
Revolution, he might have to exaggerate antagonisms his former comrade. But Liu’s 
challenge to Mao gained much credibility in light of the evidence presented here.  
Throughout the CCP history Mao had been averse to Liu’s leadership style.63 But it was 
the contest for prestige in the wake of the GLP fiascos that turned personal antagonisms into 
a profound split across the regime. It is worth noting that the leadership approaches of Mao 
and Liu appealed to differing sectors of party-state elites in China. Liu distinguished himself 
from Mao by his emphasis on the party disciplines and bureaucratic expertise. As indicated 
by his prestige among the bureaucratic elites, Liu’s very competence in managing state 
bureaucracies was a significant source of authority. As such, Liu’s commitment to top-down 
approach to mass mobilization appealed to the bureaucratic elites, who were expected to 
play major roles in organizing the mass for political movements. This approach deepened 
misgiving of the supreme leader who put a premium the bottom-up approach to mass 
mobilization. For Mao’s part, mass mobilization entailed popular responsiveness to a 																																																																		
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charismatic leader. It ought to be fueled by emotional dynamics that by nature are not 
amenable to rational management. Technical specialists are of no use here.64 Viewed in this 
light, it is unsurprising that the supreme leader considered Liu’s essay How to be a Good 
Communist [Lun gongchandangyuan de xiuyang] a significant proof of Liu’s betrayal of the 
communist cause in China.65 How to Be a Good Communist encapsulated the top-down 
mobilization approach Liu upheld throughout his political career. Originally published in 
1939, the essay represented an effort to strengthen disciplines within the CCP. It placed less 
emphasis on the class struggle in China’s grassroots society than enhancing the moral 
characters and ideological outlook of the party’s rank and file. This reflected the political 
exigencies of the time. Under the pressures of Japan’s invasion, the CCP faced the 
imperative to increase productivity and popularity in the base areas whereby it had to live 
with various groups and classes. It was thus necessary to deemphasize the relevance of class 
struggle and to uphold the virtues of the Chinese communists. This moderate approach to 
social transformation carried over into the revised version of 1962. In fact, Liu deliberately 
extended the length of the texts stressing the need for unity of various social groups in that 
new version.66 In contrast to the moderate tone of Liu in addressing the non-party elites in 
the essay, his rhetoric toward the party elites was quite harsh. This reflected his 
commitment to top-down mobilization approach. In this approach, modernizing China 
entails party elites becoming disciplined and politically sophisticated. Implicit in it was the 
notion that social revolution can be engineered by a vast group of well-trained and 
well-disciplined party elites. This notion stood in sharp contrast to the Maoist conception 
that revolution is spontaneous and does not require organizational coordination.67  
Liu’s ideological doctrine appealed to the bureaucratic elites whereas Mao’s appealed to 
an ad hoc group of his secretaries and sympathizers (among whom Lin Biao featured 
prominently). Given his ascending prestige vis-à-vis Mao’s after 1962, Liu might have 
intended the publication of his essay as a symbolic act designed to mobilize supporters 
among the bureaucratic elites. The timing by which Liu arranged the publication illustrates 
this point. It is important to note that by 1960, publication of Liu’s works had been under 
preparation—it was Mao who proposed this. Liu at that time was reluctant to devote time to 
selecting and editing his earlier works. 68  However, as the Seven Thousand Cadres 
Conference radically altered the intra-elite dynamics, Liu decided to publish How to be a 																																																																		
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Good Communist sooner rather than later.69 By implication, the essay’s publication signified 
Liu’s ascending prestige vis-à-vis Mao’s.  
In a nutshell, as Mao fought back to reassert his authority as the dominant leader in the 
summer of 1962, he was inclined to assert the ideological orthodoxy that embodied his 
prestige. For this purpose Mao reemphasized the necessity for class struggle. The Chairman 
himself was acutely aware of the instrumental role of ideological doctrines. He argued in 
early 1963 that “to overthrow a regime [one] should generate public opinion and do 
ideological work in the first place; for both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries 
ideological work takes priority.”70 Embedded in his ideological messages, personal prestige 
served as a key vehicle for Mao to legitimize authority at home. Hence, the contrasting 
approaches by Mao and Liu to engineering China’s social transformations gave rise to 
authority contests in the form of competing claims to prestige.  
 
The Socialist Education Movement 
As stated, the rise of Liu in prestige and authority within the party leadership demonstrated 
to Mao that the bureaucratic elites were gaining strength as a subversive force in China. To 
counter Liu’s prestige, Mao began to reemphasize the necessity for class struggle in August 
1962. He launched mass movements in the rural areas subsequently. “The Socialist 
Education Movement” he argued, “is the only way to prevent the emergence of 
‘revisionism’” in China, a term denoting the hostile elements within the party.71 Liu took 
the Chairman’s orders and appeared submissive to him personally. During the SEM 
whenever Mao signaled his intention to radicalize or moderate the campaign to fight 
against corruption, nepotism, and careerism among the rural cadres, Liu took pains to 
implement the instructions, often in a radical fashion. And yet, Liu’s performance 
challenged Mao’s authority. The way in which Liu implemented the SEM, in effect, allowed 
for promotion of his prestige among the vast bureaucratic elite. As noted, Liu’s reliance 
upon state bureaucracies for policy implementation clashed with Mao’s charismatic 
leadership; in practice, their distinct leadership styles appealed to differing sectors of 
political elites. As such, the split between Mao and Liu could only deepen as the SEM 
unfolded.   
The stages of the SEM were signified by three official documents issued by the central 
party leadership. The first document came from Mao’s personal initiative. It was issued in 
the wake of a conference in Hangzhou (the capital city of Zhejiang province) in May 1963 
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that Liu did not attend. This conference issued a document that committed the party cadres 
to promoting mass movements in China’s countryside. Those instructions were later known 
as the “Former Ten Points.” Mao closely supervised their drafting throughout; as such, 
Mao’s emphasis on the exigency of class struggle featured centrally in those points.72  
The second document (known as the “Later Ten Points” and drafted in the summer of 
1963) aimed to correct the radical trends that swept the countryside. It was issued under the 
suggestion of Peng Zhen, Liu’s close lieutenant and a Politburo member.73 It put more 
emphasis on “leadership,” demanding that the conduct of the SEM be supervised by the 
central party leadership. On this point, the “Later Ten Points” reversed the “Former Ten 
Points.” As such, the SEM was more compatible with Liu’s preference for strengthening 
bureaucratic leadership. This document was drafted under Liu’s guidance. Mao initially 
endorsed it. Soon thereafter, he grew unsatisfied and had Liu draft additional clauses.74  
The final version that came out was called the “twenty-three clauses”; it constituted the 
third document designed to guide the SEM. In the process of deliberations the Mao-Liu split 
further intensified. This final version managed to restrict the number of cadres in 
conducting the SEM and lessened penalties on the local officials in disgrace.75 During this 
phase Mao and Liu shifted positions, with Mao stressing the need for moderation and Liu 
upholding the class struggle doctrine. This was a dramatic episode. But it would not be 
puzzling if we focus on the authority contest that lay behind the leaders’ difference over 
how to implement the SEM.76  
In this period Liu assumed the leadership post of the “headquarter” of the SEM, which 
gave him formal authority over the movement.77 While Liu faithfully implemented Mao’s 
instruction that the “hostile elements” in local societies be identified and purged, the 
supreme leader was antagonized by Liu’s growing tendency to send bureaucratic elites 
from Beijing as “work teams” to conduct the SEM in the countryside across China. By 
counseling moderation, Mao in effect severely criticized Liu’s approach. He complained that 
Liu’s work teams had tended to view all grassroots cadres in negative terms and gathered in 
just a few places to conduct the SEM.78 At the Central Working Conference in December 
1964, the Chairman radicalize the issue.79 Subsequently, Mao undertook symbolic acts to 
highlight his charismatic authority. In his effort to escalate the grassroots movements, the 
supreme leader asserted that the SEM was by nature to struggle with the “capitalist roaders 																																																																		
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in power” (zichanjieji daolu dangquan pai).80 The gist of this message was to instigate 
rebellion from bottom up to undercut Liu’s institutional basis. Liu refused to echo the 
supreme leader, as he resisted Mao’s attempt to direct the SEM against the party elite.81 
Mao later complained before Liu and other party elite that he was denied the freedom of 
speech as a citizen.82 Although Liu later on made self-criticism in a private meeting with 
Mao, it was clear to the central party elite that the Mao-Liu dispute over the SEM spiraled 
into be a struggle for authority within the central leadership.83  
There is no denying that Liu took great pains not to antagonize Mao.84 Yet, perhaps 
what mattered more significantly were perceptions of the leaders and their audiences. The 
real matter might be that Mao and Liu viewed their interactions as having significant 
implications for the intra-elite authority structure, and other leaders perceived the issue as 
such. The Chairman indeed complained repeatedly that his instructions “had no effect” 
whereas Liu’s instructions were followed faithfully.85 Liu, on the other hand, did manage to 
expand personal authority during the SEM. According to Yang Shangkun, the director of 
the Central Office—the party apparatus answering directly to himself—in the early 1960s, 
during the SEM, Liu acted to expand authority to issue directly orders to the provincial 
authorities.86 Evidently, this move could undermine Mao’s authority. Another prominent 
case can be found in December 1965, as Liu proposed to circulate Mao’s famous speech “On 
Ten Relationships” made at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. The speech itself was a 
conciliatory move to accommodate the diversifying aspirations in Chinese society. 
Significantly, in the speech Mao committed himself to a position that class struggle was no 
longer an overriding issue in China’s sociopolitical developments. On the eve of the 
Cultural Revolution, Liu suggested to Mao that the speech be circulated among the party 
cadres above the county level.87 From the standpoint of power politics, this move might 
represent an attempt on Liu’s part to lure Mao to undo class struggle as the official line. 
Mao showed disaffection with Liu’s proposal; accordingly, texts of that speech were not 																																																																		
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circulated among the local officials.88  
To conclude, while Liu still appeared willing to follow Mao’s instructions, their 
differences over the method of conducting the SEM nevertheless made Mao hardened his 
mind to purge Liu, as was seen in the Cultural Revolution. His ideological difference with 
Liu loomed large behind the policy disputes. As Mao and Liu exploited competing 
ideologies to mobilize supporters, they increased reliance upon personal prestige to 
legitimize authority among domestic elites. As such, their ideological divergence was a 
manifestation of prestige contests that had implications for intra-elite authority structure. In 
the process, the leaders increasingly relied upon personal prestige as a vehicle to legitimize 
their claims to power. Combined with geopolitical challenges to China’s status in its 
proximate region, concerns for personal prestige motivated the whole leadership to opt for 
competitive status-seeking strategy as a means to geopolitical security. 
 
China’s Shift to Offensive Alliance with the Hanoi Regime, 1963-1965  
In the case of China’s pursuit of offensive alliance with North Vietnam, the US threat 
provided the geopolitical incentives for leaders to engage in competitive status-seeking 
strategy. Yet such a policy would have been undesirable if the Chinese leaders had not been 
anxious for personal prestige in the domestic arena. Having examined the US threat—which 
set the geopolitical context for Chinese leaders’ sensitivity to great-power status—as well as 
the prestige politics in Beijing that intensified their concerns for personal prestige, I move on 
to discuss the policy of status competition as practiced by the Chinese leaders in the 
Vietnam War.  
 
Wang Jiaxiang and the “Three Reconciliations and One Reduction” (sanhe yishao) 
The American-led network system in Asia created a grave threat environment for China. 
While this geopolitical situation sensitized the Chinese leaders to the instrumental value of 
great-power status, it also tended to turn national security strategy into an issue of prestige 
politics at home. In the case of Wang Jiaxiang, Mao expected that his demonstrated 
readiness to engage in status competition with the US could inspire emotional attachment 
from the domestic audience and put his domestic rival at a disadvantage. The overall effect 
was to reorient China’s security policy from the previous moderate line to competitive 
policies asserting China’s claim to great-power status. 
Wang Jiaxiang’s proposal for moderation in Chinese security policy took place in the 
context of Mao’s retreat from political centrality in the wake of the Seven Thousand Cadres 
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Conference. Mao left Beijing for a tour to southern provinces immediately after the 
conference, which signified his temporary agreement to temper the ideological fervor 
associated with the GLF.89 His retreat from centrality in daily politics in Beijing not only 
precipitated a shift in domestic focus to economic reconstruction after the GLF; it also 
provided an opening for the leadership to adjust foreign policy in response to a sudden 
decline of Chinese power. Domestic reconstruction entailed a stable and peaceful 
geopolitical environment. Wang captured this point when he issued a formal proposal to 
the top leaders for readjusting China’s foreign policy. Wang used to serve as the 
ambassador to the Soviet Union and had been the director of the CCP International Liaison 
Department since 1951.90 In the midst of nationwide famines caused by the GLF, Wang was 
anxious to scale down China’s commitments abroad. In his view, the weakened material 
capability could not longer sustain China’s current role in international affairs. After the 
Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, he (along with two veteran diplomats, Wu Xiuquan 
and Liu Ningyi) wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi to elaborate his 
view on the need for policy adjustment.91 In the letter, Wang argued for a constructive 
approach to international affairs consistent with the objective of “creating a long-term 
peaceful environment for socialist construction.” The priority was thus to “concentrate 
strength on attacking the major enemies and gain more time for improving the domestic 
economy.”92  
Wang’s proposal is commonly known as “three reconciliations and one reduction.” The 
“three reconciliations” suggested that China reconcile its relationship with the Soviet Union, 
India, and America. The “one reduction” urged the reduction of China’s foreign aid so as to 
make more fiscal resources available for domestic reconstruction after the GLF. This 
proposal squared with the party’s line established after the Seven Thousand Cadres 
Conference, which was committed to shift the focus of the Party’s work onto domestic 
reconstruction. In this respect, it confirms the defensive realist hypothesis that leaders who 
are focused exclusively on security imperatives would take a risk-averse approach to 
foreign policy. Wang’s proposal, in fact, crystalized the party consensus on a defensive 
realist policy, as it grew out of long conversations with Liu who shared his preference for a 
restrained foreign policy.93  
While foreign policy change endorsed by Liu did not challenge Mao’s leadership and 
prestige as blatantly as his domestic policy did, Mao seized on this issue to undermine Liu. 
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Wang’s proposal provided Mao an opening to reassert his authority when the semi-retired 
revolutionary leader was poised to dominate Beijing’s political arena. As the Mao-Liu split 
unfolded, both leaders began to concern themselves with prestige as a vehicle to enhance 
personal authority on the home front. In late 1962, Mao took the initiative to assert personal 
prestige in the arena of security policy by chastising the moderate line proposed by Wang. 
A symbolic act, such kind of criticism served to revive the Chairman’s charismatic authority 
that had been forged during the Chinese Communist revolution. During the work 
conference at Beidaihe in early August, Wang’s policy line suffered criticism. On September 
29th Mao made the assertion that, “revisionists from within and without the country were 
attempting to collaborate, we must be vigilant about this.”94 For the rest of the leadership it 
was now clear that the moderate line in foreign policy had lost its legitimate ground—its 
supporters would be vulnerable to being charged as a traitor to the nation.  
The vice premier and foreign minister Chen Yi took Mao’s hint immediately. A protégé 
of Zhou Enlai, Chen initially did not voice opposition to the moderate policy line proposed 
by Wang not long before. Once the Chairman committed himself to a hard line abroad, 
however, Chen was quick to bandwagon in order to save personal prestige. At the Tenth 
Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress in late September, Chen took the lead in criticizing 
Wang’s proposal as an “evil wind” (wai feng). He aggressively asserted that the difficult 
years of the GLF “significantly frightened those whose position on Marxism-Leninism was 
not staunch.” By stressing the need to secure China’s identity as a revolutionary power, 
Chen managed to put Wang’s moderate line on the defensive. As he suggested, Wang’s line 
was “to [negatively] affect not only the international struggles but the domestic situation as 
well.”95 These words were very much resonant with Mao’s harsh rhetoric on the soft-liners 
in foreign policy, which equated foreign policy moderation with a compromise of the 
national interest. 
The rest of the leadership soon followed suit as they learnt that any moderate line in 
foreign policy risked being labeled as compromising the national interest. As such, Mao 
managed to reverse the moderate policy. Later on, the Chairman explicitly endorsed Chen’s 
open criticism of Wang.96 In February 1963, Liu bandwagoned with Mao’s ideological line 
by stressing the imperative “to safeguard against the development of revisionist thought at 
home.”97 Shortly thereafter, Wang retreated into illness and was since then dismissed from 
all responsibility for foreign affairs.98 
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In hindsight, if Wang’s “three reconciliation and one reduction” had been faithfully 
implemented, Chinese security policy would have met the defensive realist 
expectation—that is, the Chinese leaders would have opted for a balancing strategy against 
the US. In particular, they would have continued the defensive alliance with Hanoi rather 
than encourage it to implement an offensive strategy toward the US-backed Saigon regime. 
Viewed in this light, Wang’s dismissal was a turning point for Chinese security policy. With 
the entire leadership coming to view the moderate line of foreign policy as politically risky, 
it was no longer conceivable to engage in conventional diplomacy that features skillful 
employment of negotiation tactics to engage with the adversary on peaceful terms. 
Unquestionably, the prerequisite for the whole leadership to discredit Wang’s policy line 
was the perception of America’s geopolitical threat as a profound challenge to Chinese 
claim to great-power status; but the proximate reason had more to do with individual 
leaders’ reliance upon personal prestige as a means for political survival. With the 
risk-averse strategies as practiced in the 1950s being delegitimized, the Chinese leadership 
was inclined to adopt a more competitive policy for coping with the American threat in its 
proximate geopolitical area. Such a policy allowed them to assert to both great-power status 
vis-à-vis the United States and personal prestige among the politburo leaders.  
 
China’s Pursuit of Offensive Alliance with North Vietnam  
Tensions in Southeast Asia paralleled the prestige politics in Beijing. Whereas the US threat 
in Indochina pressured China to pursue an assertive policy, concerns for personal prestige 
at home encouraged individual leaders to hew to a hard line abroad. Once Mao committed 
himself, other leaders rushed to undertake competitive status-seeking acts. In so doing, the 
Chinese leaders sought to address both geopolitical and domestic political challenges.  
Specifically, after Mao took the initiative to advocate a risk-prone approach to 
challenging America’s sphere of influence in South Vietnam, Liu (along with his faction) 
followed suit in order not to lose prestige. Such an interpersonal dynamic then precipitated 
a shift in China’s alignment strategy with North Vietnam. As noted, Ho Chi Minh’s visit to 
Beijing in the summer of 1962 provided the first opening for Mao to commit himself in 
supporting the Vietnamese struggle for unification. The Chairman’s purported commitment 
in turn precipitated a shift in the orientation of the Sino-Vietnamese security cooperation. 
Whereas that cooperative relationship in the pre-1962 period largely served a defensive 
purpose for China to safeguard its southwest rear against US interference, the following 
years witnessed China’s growing tendency to mobilize Hanoi as a status symbol in 
contesting the US geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of Mao’s 
repudiation of Wang’s line, other leaders threw themselves into fulfilling Mao’s 
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commitment to Hanoi’s guerilla warfare in the south. In March 1963 when Luo Ruiqing, 
China’s chief of staff, visited Hanoi to discuss the Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in the event 
of US attack of North Vietnam.99 Luo’s visit thus signified Beijing’s willingness to risk conflict 
escalation for supporting the DRV-led guerilla warfare in South Vietnam. Following Luo, 
Liu Shaoqi paid his first official visit to Hanoi as China’s head of state. During his meeting 
with the Hanoi leadership, Liu expressed his commitment to see the unification of Vietnam 
by the North, promising that the Vietnamese could “definitely count on China as the 
strategic rear” if the war expanded as a result of Hanoi’s attempt to liberate the south.100 
As demonstrated by Liu Shaoqi’s shifting position on security policy, prestige politics at 
home could contribute to the imperative of undertaking competitive status-seeking acts 
abroad. Inasmuch as domestic audiences are more willing to follow the leaders capable of 
showing resolve to defend corporate interests and identity, symbolic acts of taking on the 
geopolitical adversary serve to boost personal prestige on the home front. Thus, if concerns 
for personal prestige at home played any significant role in inducing leaders’ support for 
China’s shift to competitive status-seeking strategy, we should expect to see other leaders 
follow suit after Mao asserted his prestige based on his identity as a guardian of national 
interests. Indeed, other leaders who had previously upheld moderate policy lines also began 
to reverse their attitudes. In a meeting with the Communist leaders from Vietnam, Laos, and 
Indonesia in late September 1963, Zhou Enlai’s rhetoric somewhat revealed a combination 
of geopolitical and domestic political considerations driving the Chinese policy of status 
competition against the Americans. The meeting was also significant in itself, as it marked 
the Chinese effort to coordinate North Vietnam, and Laos in their struggles against the 
US-backed Saigon regime. Zhou proposed four approaches to expanding the insurgency in 
South Vietnam, including “mobilizing the mass and expanding the united front; going to 
the countryside to wage armed struggle and to establish base areas, strengthening party 
leadership over all fronts; and increasing contact between countries.”101 Crucially, Zhou 
invoked China’s domestic ideological rhetoric to characterize China’s competition with the 
US for status preeminence. The Chinese premier claimed that “the basic goals for revolution 
in Southeast Asia” were “anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, and anti-bureaucratic 
capitalism.” 102  This represented an attempt to securing China’s superior status as a 
revolutionary power. Equally important, this rhetoric strongly echoed the ideological 
rhetoric prevalent in China. Invoking what Mao had inspired, Zhou bandwagoned with the 
supreme leaders in foreign policy practices.  																																																																		
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The Chinese leadership consensus on supporting Hanoi’s offensive guerrilla warfare in 
the South encouraged the rise of the militant faction in the Vietnam Workers' Party 
(VWP).103 The four approaches to conducting insurgency as proposed by Zhou found an 
echo in the grand strategy of the VWP’s first secretary Le Duan. Upon his assumption of 
power in 1960, Le not only managed to resume the offensive in the south, but also 
centralized control over the guerilla activities there. The creation of the National Liberation 
Front in 1960 signified his first significant attempt to direct the spontaneous uprisings in the 
south.104 In September 1962, the Chinese officials threw their weight behind the NLF by 
publicly receiving its delegation in Beijing. Both Mao and Foreign Minister Chen Yi met 
with the delegation, and applauded their conduct of guerilla warfare in the south.105 The 
public statement issued thereafter underscored that the Sino-Vietnamese peoples were 
unified in the common struggle against the US until “the final victory.”106 Here, the 
statement singled out the US as the principal threat to Asian security and required that the 
US withdrew all its military forces from East Asia. As such, the term “final victory” 
understood within this context suggests that Beijing had abandoned self-restraint in its 
commitment to Hanoi’s armed struggle for overthrowing the Saigon regime, which 
symbolized America’s geopolitical influences in Indochina.107 
Suffice to say, the strategic preferences in Beijing and Hanoi converged in the middle of 
1963. This precipitated the formation of an offensive alliance between the two communist 
parties against the US-backed Saigon regime. In December, a Chinese delegation led by 
General Li Tianyou, the deputy chief of staff visited the DRV for two months and presented 
detailed plans as to China’s assistance in constructing defense works and naval bases in the 
north.108 Precisely at that time Hanoi was about to pass the Resolution 9, which turned its 
overall national strategy toward an offensive one that aimed to escalate insurgency in the 
south with a view to achieving decisive victory on the battlefield.109 Mao also encouraged 
Hanoi to expand the armed struggle deep into the South. “A moderate [military] strike [by 
Hanoi] could make no easy solution [to the military situation in the South],” he argued.110  
It is a plausible argument, though, that the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in late 1963 had 
emboldened Mao to go on offensive. The chaotic situation in South Vietnam did create a 
window of opportunity that Mao could exploit to further undermine US influences in 																																																																		
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Saigon; but the significance of the Diem’s fall to Beijing’s policy making should not be 
overstated. There is no clear evidence that the weakening of the Saigon regime by the 
anti-Diem coup had led to any significant reassessment of the Indochina situation by the 
Chinese leaders. As a matter of fact, prior to the fall of Diem in November 1963, there were 
signs of Mao having urged the Vietnamese leaders to take the offensive in persecuting 
guerilla warfare in South Vietnam. In the middle of 1963, Mao had gone to great lengths to 
provide guidance for Hanoi’s struggles in the south. “The American military is not the 
major force,” Mao instructed his Vietnamese comrades in Beijing, “[so] how to break down 
Diem’s army is the key question for the victory of the revolutionary war in South 
Vietnam.”111 Targeting South Vietnam’s security forces made it relatively easy for Hanoi to 
score victory. As such, this strategy served Mao’s ambition to demonstrate China’s superior 
diplomatic asset—the Hanoi regime—toward the United States.  
Undeniably though, there is a geostrategic rationale to the Chinese policy of status 
competition. Arguably, the Chinese leaders could not afford to engage in competitive 
status-seeking strategy just for domestic political purposes—for such a policy incurred 
tremendous security risks. The Chinese statement to the NLF delegation clearly 
demonstrated the security imperatives in Beijing’s policy of status competition. Zhou Enlai 
stressed that the Chinese-supported NLF struggles “have protected the security of the 
socialist camp and the peace of Asia.” Mao claimed that Beijing and Hanoi “relied on each 
other like tips and teeth.” These statements were a strong testimony to the security 
partnership between the two countries. But the Chinese leaders also emphasized the 
symbolic value of their partnership with Hanoi, as Mao hailed the NLF as “a glorious 
example of daring to fight and daring to win for the oppressed peoples and nations 
throughout the world.”112 In effect, the Chinese treated the Hanoi-backed NLF as a sign of 
superior diplomatic asset that would enable China to compete with the US for status 
preeminence. Out of concern for personal prestige, the Chinese leadership all came to 
espouse Mao’s hardline. The Chairman told Van Tien Dung in 1964—the DRV’s chief of 
staff who was also in charge of military operations in the south—that “the more you fear the 
Americans the more they will bully you……you should not fear, you should fight.” Liu 
Shaoqi reiterated that “the less you fear them, the more they respect you.”113 Similarly, 
Zhou Enlai later on argued that Chinese concessions would induce the US incursion. In this 
way, Zhou conjured up the image of falling dominos. “If the Vietnamese succumbed, then 
the US would invade (dong shou) Cambodia and Laos, and so the issue [of aiding the 																																																																		
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Vietnamese] bears on the overall situation of nationalist liberation movements in Southeast 
Asia, Asia, and beyond.”114 These statements by Chinese leaders show that the Chinese 
viewed their conflict with the US in zero-sum terms and committed not to back down in any 
circumstances. As such, the Chinese made it clear that they wanted to further their security 
interests through status competition. Status was of crucial importance to China’s geopolitical 
security. By eliciting deference from the adversary to a state’s power assets, the enhanced 
status could grant a state greater autonomy in the geopolitical arena, thereby serving its 
security interests in a long run.  
That noted, such kind of policy carried tremendous risks to China’s geopolitical 
security by inviting the US military intervention to bolster the Saigon regime. In the case of 
DRV-PRC alliance, a truly defensive realist strategy for China was to bolster the ally’s 
defense capacity but not to encourage it to provoke conflicts. As the Chinese leaders advised 
the VWP in 1958, the “’most urgent task’ was carrying out socialist reconstruction in the 
north.”115 In aiding Hanoi’s armed struggle for reunification, however, Beijing deviated 
from the policy it pursued in the 1950s. That policy meets the defensive realist expectation 
that state leaders on average are risk-averse—as such, they tend not to worsen their security 
environment via competitive policies. Yet, after 1962 Chinese leaders shifted to a risk-prone 
policy of status competition against the US-backed Saigon regime. This was motivated by a 
combination of geopolitical threats and the Mao-Liu split. The latter intensified prestige 
politics across the Chinese regime. It provided a critical variable to exacerbate China’s 
conflict with the US alliance system—Vietnam figured centrally in China’s policy of status 
competition.  
 
Proclaiming Victory: Optimistic Mao vs Prudent Mao 
The imperative of asserting personal prestige to the home audience—notably the Politburo 
elite—provided a critical cause for the leaders to accept risks of conflict escalation. Precisely 
for this reason, leaders may become keen on proclaiming victory before both international 
and home audiences. This was evident in the rhetoric and statements from Mao. The 
Chairman claimed on multiple occasions that America’s status on the world stage had been 
in decline. At a few public meetings with foreign guests in September 1963 and January and 
July 1964, Mao claimed that two “intermediate zones” already emerged between the US and 
the Soviet Union.116 His conception of the first “intermediate zone” was consistent with his 
earlier thought dating back to 1946, which included the post-colonial states in Asia, Africa, 
and South America. The second “intermediate zone,” in Mao’s assertion, was emerging in 																																																																		
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Europe. Here he took Charles De Gaulle’s assertion of the French leadership on the 
European continent to be the case of global resistance against the US hegemony. As a 
corollary, the US was not in control of the situation in Asia. As Mao argued in January 1964, 
“America was not able to squash the people [‘s revolt] in South Vietnam.”117  
Mao’s tendency to proclaim victory in the face of both foreign guests and other Chinese 
leaders is remarkable. It reveals the linkage of geopolitical and domestic political 
considerations in his mind. By proclaiming Chinese victory, Mao sought to foster optimism 
that the policy of status competition already worked, thereby boosting his prestige 
domestically. Although by this single act alone Mao could not prevail over Liu on the home 
front, it nevertheless was a necessary step for him to counter Liu’s ascending prestige.  
After 1963 the Chinese generosity in delivering material support for Hanoi’s conduct of 
guerilla activities in the south had become evident. Arguably, the risks of US expanding its 
involvement in the Vietnamese conflict could also grow. But Mao consistently downplayed 
the US resolve to keep the Saigon regime stable. Chinese official accounts reveal Mao’s lack 
of concern for the likelihood that the US might escalate its commitment to Vietnam in 
1964.118 It is well documented that the Tonkin Gulf incident took Mao by surprise.119 After 
the Tonkin Gulf incident, Mao still tried to openly downplay the gravity of the America 
threat. When the DRV military leader Le Duan visited Beijing, he told him that the incident 
“was not an intentional attack by the Americans,” rather, it was due to “the Americans’ 
mistaken judgment, based on wrong information.” Mao went on to argue that the 
probability of war was low, “it seems that the Americans do not want to fight a war, if you 
don’t want to fight a war, and we do not necessarily want to fight a war……[then] there will 
be no war.”120 In a talk with Pham Van Dong and Hoang Van Hoan on October 5, Mao 
reiterated his position that the US “is not even in a position to resolve the problem in South 
Vietnam. If it attacks the North, [it may need to] fight for one hundred years, and its legs 
will be trapped there.”121  
Apparently, Mao’s underestimation of Washington’s resolve underwent no perceptible 
change even after the Tonkin Gulf incident. But the optimism the Chairman displayed on 
public occasions did not prevent him taking precautionary measures. The Chairman 
exhibited a prudent character when he urged state agencies to accelerate the massive scale 
of defense programs. The programs, commonly known as the Third Line Defense (TLD), 																																																																		
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might genuinely reflect Mao’s security concerns, as they were designed to relocate and 
reconstruct heavy industries from the east coast to the mountainous Southwest China. The 
industries being relocated were largest in scale in the PRC history. Why was Mao so 
determined to prepare the whole country for war?  
The TDL programs could hardly provide a vehicle for Mao to discredit his political 
rivals at home. In this regard, the diversionary conflict thesis does not stand up to scrutiny. 
True, Mao’s instructions regarding the TLD were sometimes coupled with rhetorical 
assaults on the policy implementation by unwieldy bureaucracies.122 But he could hardly 
use this defense building as a vehicle to discredit Liu’s reliance on bureaucratic institutions 
in policy implementation. After all, the TLD projects entailed a great deal of expertise that 
only the technocratic elite under Liu’s leadership could provide. As such, imperatives of 
domestic power struggle could not have substantial impact on Mao’s decision to accelerate 
the TLD programs. In this respect, rationales behind the TLD were not identical with those 
behind Mao’s inclination for an offensive alliance with Hanoi. Mao was genuinely worried 
about China’s direct involvement in a large-scale war with the American military—and he 
wanted to avoid such a war. “[We must] base [our work] upon war, we should get prepared 
to fight a general war on the assumption that it will break out any time soon and be on a 
great, [or even] nuclear war.”123 Shortly after the Tonkin Gulf Incident he gave tacit support 
for efforts led by Zhou Enlai to convey to the US government China’s unwillingness to fight 
the Americans.124  
The dominant reason had to do with the pressing geopolitical threat.125 “The TLD by all 
indications was spurred by perceptions of a grave external threat from the United States,” 
historian Lorenz Lüthi argues.126 From late October 1964 on, Mao repeatedly stressed the 
importance of the TLD, as well as other local defense programs. 127  Yet, if security 
imperatives are the answer, how to explicate this apparent gap between Mao’s optimism as 
shown before the Vietnamese leaders and his emphasis on war preparedness? Why did Mao 
still give his support to Hanoi’s risky, aggressive guerilla warfare in the South when he was 
seriously concerned for the risk of war with the US? As noted, the supreme leader began to 
give serious thought about the military threat from the United States in Vietnam. Why did 
not he alert his Vietnamese comrades to the deepening involvement of US military power in 																																																																		
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the Vietnam War so that North Vietnam could better serve as a buffer state for Chinese 
security?  
My explanation is that Mao needed to fend off potential blames for his decision to 
support Hanoi’s offensive guerilla warfare. Of course, it was not in his interest to 
acknowledge the adversity in China’s geopolitical environment. He needed to feign 
optimism, accordingly. This may well explain Mao’s apparent attitude to the DRV leaders. 
And yet, Mao’s apparent optimism for Hanoi’s victory over Saigon was not only intended 
for the Vietnamese consumption—rather, he also included the communist elite in Beijing as 
his target audience. In his talks with the visitors from small countries in Asia, Africa, and 
Australia, he continued to promote China’s great-power status. In his assertion, by fighting 
against the US in Vietnam China was able to achieve preeminent status in world politics. 
“Our reputation is not good [though],” he remarked sardonically to foreign guests, 
“[because] we aid anyone in need, and thus became belligerent elements [in the eyes of 
imperialists].”128 Quite evidently, Mao was keen to glorify China’s promotion of revolutions 
abroad. And yet, those foreign audiences present at Mao’s talks were from states that 
played little role in issues of the Vietnam War, and many visitors were not senior officials in 
charge of foreign policy of their own countries. As such, Mao could hardly count on them to 
help promote China’s status around the world. Instead, it was among the domestic 
audience—notably those in the Politburo—that Mao was more likely to find an echo. As 
shown in this chapter, Politburo leaders had vied to bandwagon with Mao’s hard line on 
foreign policy whenever the Chairman signaled his position. Thus, by asserting China’s 
great-power status through the Vietnam War, Mao sought to promote personal prestige as a 
vehicle for political survival at home while fending off American involvement in the 
China’s southern vicinity.    
 
Evaluating Alternative Explanations 
There is a rich body of literature emphasizing various factors for Mao’s inclination to 
encourage Hanoi to intensify armed struggles in the South. These factors include Mao’s 
changing assessment of China’s security environment, Beijing’s competition with Moscow 
for leadership in the international communist movement, and the Chairman’s ideological 
commitment. Without dismissing their relevance, I seek to provide a more parsimonious 
argument that highlights the central causal mechanism accountable for Mao’s decision. My 
argument underscores how pragmatic concerns for great-power status and personal 
prestige combined to lead the Chinese leadership to pursue competitive status-seeking 
strategy against the Americans in Vietnam prior to 1965. Particularly, I argue that 																																																																		
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institutional change dynamics made prestige a crucial variable in the leaders’ calculation, 
whereas the geopolitical threat highlighted the instrumental role of competitive 
status-seeking strategy in furthering geopolitical security. Consequently, the Chinese 
leaders engaged in competitive status-seeking strategy via symbolic acts before both 
international and domestic audiences. This argument helps to fill some important gaps in 
the alternative explanations.   
 
Mao’s Changing Assessment of China’s Security Environment 
There is no doubt that Mao’s initial attempt to encourage Ho Chi Minh to go on the 
offensive in prosecuting the insurgency in South Vietnam occurred in a deteriorating 
security environment for China. In mid-1962, China was confronted with mounting tensions 
on its southwestern border with India, the growing signs of an imminent invasion of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s forces from Taiwan, and souring relations with Moscow.129 Based on this 
evidence, a preeminent historian argues that the deteriorating security environment 
convinced Mao to change China’s overall security strategy along a radical and 
offensive-oriented direction.130   
Yet, there is no sound rationale for a shift toward more assertive foreign policy. Quite 
the contrary, a perception of multiple threats along the Chinese borders could have advised 
prudence on the part of decision makers in Beijing. That is, the gravity of security challenges 
confronting China made it imprudent to expand China’s international commitments. In fact, 
a relatively prudent policy that featured an emphasis on diplomatic engagement with 
geopolitical adversaries did begin to bear fruit. In the second half of 1962, Beijing’s leaders 
had tried to ameliorate China’s security environments via moderate policies. One 
remarkable instance is that through diplomatic engagement with the US, the Chinese 
leaders managed to defuse the tension of war cross the Taiwan Strait.131   
The historical evidence that has become available suggests that China’s armed conflict 
with India in October 1962 was caused primarily by a sudden increase of India’s military 
presence in the border area since early 1962 coupled with Nehru’s failure to signal his 
conciliatory intention.132 While Mao had been keeping a watchful eye on the growing 
tensions on the Sino-Indian border, he did not seem to favor border conflict with India as 
the best option.133 It was after Beijing’s repeated failure to begin serious negotiation with 																																																																		
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New Delhi over the border dispute that Mao suggested a “counterattack” that resulted in 
the 1962 Chinese-Indian War.134 
Moreover, it is one thing to argue that Mao perceived a decline in China ability to 
defend its territorial claims in southwest; it is quite another to assert that this window of 
vulnerability could radically change Mao’s assessment of China’s overall security 
environment. On the latter issue, the available evidence is not solid enough to warrant any 
definitive conclusion. We know that Mao tried to justify his decision to use force by 
stressing the dire state of Sino-Indian border tensions. In March 1963, during a briefing on 
the military situation of the eastern Sino-Indian border, Mao argued that China was 
pressured by the Indian encroachment to fight back.135 While arguing so, he pointed at 
several leaders present at the meeting, including Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, portraying 
them as longstanding hardliners on India.136 But the Chairman’s remark was disingenuous. 
In fact, since 1959 Liu and Zhou were personally involved with the policy of conciliation 
with India and Mao endorsed it.137 It is thus unclear as to whether the hostilities with India 
were sufficient to lead Mao to believe China’s overall security environment was to worsen 
dramatically.  
What is closer to the mark might be that Mao used the Sino-Indian conflict to stigmatize 
Wang’s foreign policy line after the hostilities took place.138 Remarkably, Mao compared the 
Sino-Indian conflict with the Vietnamese conflict. He asserted that the Indian army 
equipped with the “modern” logistic system had been defeated by the Chinese army with a 
backward system, and given this, the modern US military was bound to be defeated by the 
backward Vietnamese guerilla forces.139 The fact that the Chairman linked Indian and the 
Vietnamese situations together, however, is not sufficient to substantiate the assertion that 
the Sino-Indian conflict had changed his approach to the Vietnamese conflict. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, during 1962 Mao had brought the Chinese leadership to make 
quite a few significant moves to step up Chinese support for the Hanoi-led insurgency in 
the south, which in turn set in momentum China’s offensive alliance with the DRV. These 
important initiatives took place prior to the Sino-Indian border war; as such, the Sino-Indian 
border war could not provide much momentum for the overall change of Chinese security 
policy. The conflict should be better understood as a reinforcing factor vis-à-vis the already 
existent drive on China’s part to undermine the US geopolitical influence in Indochina. 																																																																																																																																																																																																							
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The Sino-Soviet Split 
The Sino-Soviet split is an oft-cited factor in explanations of Chinese decision to assume a 
more active role in aiding local insurgencies in Vietnam and beyond.140 True, with the 
Sino-Soviet relationship turning down since the late 1950s, the Chinese were increasingly 
anxious for replacing the Soviets as the leader of the international communist movement.141 
As such, there was always a need on Beijing’s part to demonstrate its credentials as a 
revolutionary power sympathetic to national liberation movements. The way in which this 
ideological commitment reflected China’s security concerns is an issue to be explored in 
detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say here, the ideological passion for promoting 
revolutions abroad was evident in Chinese security policy throughout the 1960s, and it was 
caused in large part by the Sino-Soviet split. 
There is good reason to suggest that the Soviet factor was not significant enough 
vis-à-vis the US geopolitical threat to assume centrality in this chapter. In Southeast Asia, 
the Soviet presence posed little challenge to China’s status and security until late 1964, when 
Moscow began to focus its attention on the Vietnamese situation.142 Prior to that, the Soviets 
did not yet present itself as a real target for China to pursue competitive status-seeking 
strategy. The Sino-Soviet split could hardly act decisively as a geopolitical factor in Chinese 
geostrategic considerations with regard to Vietnam in 1962-1963. For one thing, the Chinese 
had already been unrivaled in its influence over the Vietnamese communists in the early 
1960s. From the outset of Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration, according to historian Ilya 
Galduk, “on all questions relating to political and military cooperation with the DRV, 
Moscow was prepared to act only through the Chinese allies.”143 From mid-1961 onward, 
the Soviet policy showed a strong tendency of disengagement from Indochina, which was 
accelerated by the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.144 All these developments eased 
the way for China to transform its alignment with the DRV from a defensive to an offensive 
one. Anecdotal evidence shows that some foreign diplomats were shocked to see the 
massive presence of Chinese personnel in the DRV, and that the Soviet assistance to the 
DRV in the area of defense was almost negligible compared to the Chinese role.145 During a 																																																																		
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conversation at the Soviet embassy in Hanoi involving Soviet and other Eastern European 
diplomats in September 1964, the Soviets remarked that, “friendly relations between the 
DRV and China are currently almost absolute.” And the Chinese influence on Hanoi even 
led them to believe that initiators of the Tonkin Gulf incident were the Chinese.146 Similarly, 
in December, when the Vietnamese conflict faced imminent escalation in the shadow of the 
Tonkin Gulf Incident, the DRV Defense Ministry the Soviet military attaché that their 
service was no longer needed.147  
Additionally, the Sino-Soviet split was relatively insignificant to the China’s Vietnam 
policy until 1964 because the Chinese were actually quite tolerant of Hanoi’s ambivalence in 
parting its way with Moscow. With a tacit tilt toward Beijing, Hanoi did not commit to an 
open split with Moscow.148 The Chinese exerted no pressure on Hanoi to change this 
posture. In October 1962, when Mao already took the lead in committing China to the 
Vietnamese anti-imperialist cause, Zhou Enlai emphasized that the Sino-Soviet cooperation 
was necessary for supporting the Vietnamese struggles against America—in his words, 
there must be “a division of labor” (fen gong).149 In May 1963, in a joint statement with Ho 
Chi Minh following his visit to Beijing, the Chinese reconfirmed the necessity of Sino-Soviet 
unity in promoting the international communist movement.150  
Evidently, the Soviets simply did not become the primary geopolitical competitor for the 
Chinese to compete in Indochina prior to 1965. For sure, we may still not able to rule out the 
possibility that the Chinese wanted to show before the entire Third World nationalists their 
sincerity in supporting the revolutionary movements by supporting the Hanoi-led armed 
struggle for reunification. That said, this consideration might probably pale into 
insignificance compared with the more tangible threat stemming from the formidable US 
military and diplomatic presence in Eat Asia at least until late 1964. It is more plausible to 
argue that the US threat was the dominant factor in the Chinese geostrategic considerations 
before 1965. It weighs more heavily than the Sino-Soviet split in explaining the Chinese 
determination to aid the DRV in its armed struggle to reunify the whole Vietnam. 
 
Mao’s Commitment to Continuous Revolution 
Historians tend to give pride of place to the idiosyncratic ideological commitment of 																																																																		
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China’s supreme leader Mao Zedong, who was the single most influential policymaker in 
foreign affairs. Mao’s abiding quest for great-power status coupled with a persistent 
impulse to keep revolutionary momentum domestically, they argue, acted as a profound 
driver behind Chinese communist foreign policy up to the late 1970s.151 There is evidence, 
indeed, showing that Mao had linked Vietnam with other revolutionary regimes such as 
Cuba well before 1962.152  
True, Mao’s commitment to continuous revolution was a critical motive underlying 
many of his ambitious initiatives, both domestically and internationally. But this statement 
is too sweeping to yield analytic precision. For Mao to realize his ambition, however, he 
arguably could not help but to act strategically. Thus, the issue here is how his deep-seated 
revolutionary commitment could render him anxious to employ personal prestige as a 
vehicle for power struggle. My argument gives more attention to the intra-elite dynamics 
than those emphasizing Mao’s idiosyncratic characters. It contends that the Politburo elite 
was a primary target for Mao when he engaged in competitive assertions of national status. 
There is no denying that in mobilizing the society for the prospects of war with the US, 
Mao’s ultimate purpose might be to keep the revolutionary momentum going on. This was 
critical in forestalling the degeneration of the party state into a mode of bureaucratic 
dominance, which the Chairman believed had come to prevail in the post-Stalin Soviet 
Union.153 But he did face the imperative to mobilize elite support, especially to gain an 
upper hand over Liu. This is testified by the fact that the ruling elite bore the blunt of many 
of his initiatives, such as the promotion of personality cult as well as the class struggle 
dogma. Both initiatives put Liu’s faction at a disadvantage, as their influence was deeply 
entrenched in the bureaucratic apparatus Mao sought to restructure.	Indeed, this period was 
characterized by a series of events indicative of Mao’s attempt to eliminate the senior 
officials whose loyalty to him was thought problematic.154 All these suggest that the 
instrumental role of personal prestige in Chinese elite struggles was no less significant than 
the purported revolutionary commitment of Mao.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argues that from 1962 to 1965 the American influence in Saigon sensitized 																																																																		
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Chinese leaders to the relevance of great-power status to geopolitical security while at the 
same time, institutional change dynamics in Beijing heightened their reliance on personal 
prestige for political survival; these incentives combined to cause Beijing’s leaders to throw 
their weight behind the Hanoi-led guerilla warfare against the US-backed Saigon regime. 
The deepening of American involvement in the region after 1962 reinforced the security 
rationale behind competitive status-seeking measures, as the Chinese leaders tended to 
view status as a route to geopolitical security. Yet, Beijing was fully committed to 
supporting Hanoi’s guerilla warfare in the south also because the leaders after 1962 were 
anxious about personal prestige, which could serve as political capital for their authority 
contests at home. As such, prestige politics foreclosed choice of more risk-averse strategies 
than competitive status-seeking measures. 
Two points deserve particular emphasis. First, it is important to note that concerns for 
either great-power status or personal prestige are insufficient to cause competitive 
status-seeking strategy. The PRC was locked in a geopolitical rivalry with the US alliance 
system upon its founding, but throughout the 1950s leaders in Beijing actually opted for 
more risk-averse strategies—such as balancing, diplomatic engagement, and at times, 
prudent conduct of coercive diplomacy to address the geopolitical challenge. It was not 
until Mao and other Chinese political elite became reliant on personal prestige as the 
dominant vehicle to enhance their political authority after the 1962 Seven Thousand Cadres 
Conference that they began to pursue competitive status-seeking strategy. Wang’s proposal 
of moderation in foreign policy simply provided an opening for Mao to assert his authority. 
Thereafter, security matters acted as a vehicle through which leaders could assert personal 
prestige, which had become a crucial source of political authority. Without Mao’s initiative 
to discredit Liu in the foreign policy realm, the US-China rivalry would not have 
precipitated a shift toward competitive status-seeking strategy in Chinese security policy 
practices.  
Second, although I argue that domestic political considerations are a powerful motive 
behind leaders’ choice on competitive status-seeking measures, this is not to suggest that 
leaders adopt such a risky policy just in order to consolidate domestic authority. Status 
goods by definition offer security benefits. Highly risky as it is, a competitive strategy for 
status assertion promises to enhance national security in a long run. We now know that 
Lyndon Johnson and his national security team—while solidifying American military 
commitment to South Vietnam—went to considerable lengths to avoid provoking China.155 
Although the Korean lesson of provoking China provided a crucial source of Johnson’s 
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prudence, it was Beijing’s strengthening of alliance with Hanoi that prompted Johnson and 
his advisors to draw an analogy between Korea and Vietnam.156 In the final analysis, a 
recognition that China was a great power with dominant influence in Indochina led the 
Johnson administration to observe prudence and try to manage the conflict situation with 
China.157 
In short, state leaders may concern themselves with great-power status and personal 
prestige for pragmatic reasons—specifically, great-power status promises to enhance a 
state’s geopolitical autonomy and leaders may rely upon personal prestige as a vehicle for 
domestic political survival. And as my case study suggests, when concerned with both 
great-power status and personal prestige, the Chinese leaders were inclined for status 
competition against the United States in Vietnam. In so doing, the leaders sought to advance 
their interests in both geopolitical security and domestic political survival. 
My argument promises to fill the voids left by some mainstream theories in security 
studies, notably defensive realism and the authoritarian politics thesis. According to 
defensive realism, geopolitical rivalry may not lead directly to competitive status-seeking 
strategy because competitive status-seeking strategy incurs enormous security risks to the 
state. For defensive realism to have sufficient analytic leverage over such a conflict-prone 
strategy, it is essential that domestic political dynamics be brought into perspective. The 
analyst may therefore turn to the authoritarian politics thesis to emphasize idiosyncratic 
preferences of leaders. These preferences could dominate foreign policy formulation as 
authoritarian leaders are unchecked by state constitution and ordinary citizens. Yet, 
authoritarian regimes do not always give a free rein to the dictator, if he founds himself in 
personality clashes with others. Personality clashes are a vehicle for constraining 
authoritarian leaders from running risks of war—for instance, a conflict-prone leader is very 
likely to be held back by those more sensitive to the costs of war. The authoritarian politics 
thesis, in particular, could lead us to see the domestically-oriented leader Liu Shaoqi 
restrain Mao from turning the Beijing-Hanoi security cooperation into an offensive alliance 
against US-backed Saigon. After all, Liu had managed to dampen Mao’s authority on 
substantive policy issues at home. As such, the authoritarian politics thesis would predict 
that Mao’s preference for an offensive strategy for the Vietnam War met substantial 
resistance from Liu, who preferred defensive strategy for stabilizing, rather than escalating, 
the conflict. This did not materialize. In contrast to his relative success in modifying Mao’s 
agenda during the SEM, Liu actually joined Mao in pursuing competitive status-seeking 																																																																		
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strategy against the US. The authoritarian politics thesis is at a loss in explaining this very 
elite uniformity around a conflict-prone security strategy. By stressing individual leaders’ 
concerns for great-power status and personal prestige, my argument is better placed to 
explain elite conformity over foreign policy line. It was the fear of being charged of 
compromising the national interest, the argument holds, that led the Chinese leaders to 
concur on the need to advance geopolitical security via competitive assertions of status. By 
rallying behind competitive status-seeking strategy they bandwagoned for personal prestige.
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Chapter 4  
China’s Delegitimation Strategy against the Soviet Union: 1965-1969 
 
 
[T]he importance attached by Communists to ideology means that there must always be a “general 
line” guiding the tactics and strategy of the movement. Setting the line was an easy matter when 
Stalin was alive. Today, it involves dealings among many parties and regimes, while the 
preoccupation of Communists with their alleged monopoly on the only “true” and “scientific” 
understanding of reality results in the quick transformation of differences into matters of principle, 
with mutual accusations of “dogmatism” or “revisionism” inevitably following.  
Zbigniew Brzezinski (1963)1  
 
From the mid-1960s on, our relationship deteriorated and at large, broke off. This is not [due to] the 
ideological disputes—we don’t even think nowadays that everything we said at that time was right. 
The real issue was inequality [in the Sino-Soviet relationship], which made the Chinese people feel 
humiliated. 
Deng Xiaoping in the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev (May 1989)2 
 
Beijing and Moscow each sought to convince Hanoi to implement its brand of warfare (Soviet 
predilection for large-scale urban attack versus Chinese inclination for protracted fighting in the 
countryside) and adopt its policy advice (to negotiate or not to negotiate). As the Sino-Soviet split 
increasingly became a zero-sum game, North Vietnam’s war effort became a primary battleground in 
Beijing and Moscow’s rivalry for leadership of the communist world.  
Lien-Hang T. Nguyen3  
 
 
In the context of the US escalation of the Vietnam War, why could not China and the Soviet 
Union join hands in supporting Hanoi against the growth of US military presence in 
Vietnam? This chapter argues that Beijing’s pursuit of delegitimation strategy against 
Moscow’s hegemonic influence in the communist world in large part hindered cooperation 
between the two communist powers over the issue of Vietnam.  
Whereas the Hanoi regime acted as a diplomatic asset for China’s effort to undermine 																																																																		
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the US-back regime and as a symbol for China’s status preeminence over the US, the Soviets’ 
deepening involvement in the Vietnam War after 1965 altered the context in which Beijing’s 
leaders tried to assert great-power status and advance geopolitical security. China then 
undertook delegitimation strategy in response to the emergent Soviet influence in Vietnam. 
From 1965 to 1968, Beijing sought to outperform Moscow in fighting the American 
“imperialists”; as such, the Chinese sought to better vindicate their commitment to the 
revolutionary movements abroad. To this end, Chinese leaders further increased military 
and political support for Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), while denouncing peace 
initiatives as signs of Soviet collaboration with imperialist forces.    
The Vietnam War thus provided a battleground whereby Beijing’s leaders asserted 
great-power status via two variants of competitive strategy—prior to 1965 they 
implemented a policy of offensive alliance, and shifted to a strategy of delegitimation 
thereafter. Both varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy are manifest in the Chinese 
support for the anti-US struggles in Vietnam. Yet, there is a marked difference. Unlike the 
pre-1965 strategy in which Beijing had encouraged Hanoi to fight not against the United 
States but its allied partner in Saigon, after 1965 Beijing’s leaders pushed Hanoi to confront 
Moscow head on—China’s major adversary. Furthermore, in an effort to vindicate their 
favored doctrine of revolutionary warfare, the Chinese leaders went beyond suggesting that 
the North Vietnamese continue the military fighting. They instead sought to dictate how the 
Vietnamese should fight the Americans. In so doing, Beijing’s leaders hoped to delegitimize 
the ideological authority of the Soviets, portraying their old comrades as a renegade of the 
communist revolutionary cause. Through both words and deeds, therefore, Beijing took great 
pains to undercut Moscow’s credentials for assuming leadership in the communist world.4  
However, after the Tet Offensive in 1968, Beijing altered its approach to Hanoi. Chinese 
leaders then gradually abandoned its delegitimation strategy against the Soviets in favor of 
an alignment with America. This policy shift was motivated by two developments: the 
establishment of Mao’s absolute authority in the Cultural Revolution and the decline of 
Chinese influence on Hanoi. 
 
The International Context: Ideological Threat from Moscow and the Sino-Soviet Split 
By the time Washington took over the major fighting role in the Vietnam War in 1965, 
Beijing already perceived Moscow as its primary geopolitical threat. Unlike the American 
threat, which was unambiguous upon the PRC’s founding, it took more than a decade for 
the Chinese to form the judgment that Moscow’s geopolitical influences in Asia constituted 
																																																																		
4 Delegitimation strategy, by definition, entails both a hostile ideology and cost-imposing strategy toward the target state. 
See Schweller and Pu, “After Unipolarity,” 47-49; Walt, Taming American Power, 160-78.  
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a dominant threat to Chinese security. The Chinese hardened their view of the Soviet Union 
as a geopolitical threat after Moscow repeatedly frustrated China’s status aspiration.5 In the 
process, competing claims to the Leninist revolutionary doctrine became the vehicle for both 
sides to advance their security interests.6  
Undoubtedly, the Soviet hegemony in Asia could impinge on Chinese security. This 
misgiving on the Chinese part was aggravated by Mao’s perception that Nikita Khrushchev 
had abandoned the Marxism-Leninism revolutionary orthodox in launching the 
de-Stalinization drive. Taken together, the Soviet domestic and foreign policies under 
Khrushchev threatened to put Mao’s China at a disadvantage in the international arena. As 
Mao began to question the reliability of the Soviets as an alliance partner, a perception took 
shape that the SU could undermine regime legitimacy in China—as such, the Soviet threat 
was ideological.  
The Sino-Soviet rift originated from Khrushchev’s rejection of Stalin’s ideological legacy. 
The Soviet leader delivered his de-Stalinization speech in February 1956 in the presence of 
communist leaders from all around the world. The speech dealt a blow to Mao’s status 
aspiration. From the CCP’s revolutionary struggles against the KMT regime up to the 1958, 
Mao had endeavored to elevate China to a great-power status by emulating a wide variety 
of political and economic practices of Joseph Stalin’s regime in the 1920s. 7  The 
Khrushchev-led iconoclasm against Stalin had negative repercussions for Mao’s domestic 
prestige—albeit to a degree incomparable to the GLF disaster. An implicit response to 
Khrushchev’s charge of Stalin’s tyrannical style, the supreme leaders in China ceded some of 
his decision-making authority by promoting “collective leadership” at home.8  
Khrushchev’s move tended to exacerbate Mao’s threat perception by virtue of its 
demonstration effect. If the Soviet successors could overthrow Stalin’s ideological authority, 
could similar things happen after Mao retired from the front leadership or passed away? 																																																																		
5 For the comprehensive examination of the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship from the split to rivalry and 
eventually, hostility, see Shen Zhihua ed., Zhongsuguanxi shigang: 1917-1991 nian zhongsuguanxi ruogan wenti zai tantao 
[History of Sino-Soviet relations, 1917-1991] (Beijing: Xinhua, 2007); Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split; Sergey Radchenko, Two 
Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
For the literature that concentrates on the Sino-Soviet split up to 1963, see Odd Arne Westad, ed. Brothers in Arms: The Rise 
and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).  
6 Stephen Walt notes that an ideology prescribing hierarchical intra-alliance relationships is more likely to be a divisive 
force in alliance politics because it legitimizes unequal relations and threatens to compromise the autonomy of the inferior 
party within an alliance. See Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 35-36. The research by Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui has born 
this point out. See Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, “Jiegou shiheng: zhongsu tongmeng polie de shencengci yuanyin” [the 
structure off balance: the profound cause of the Sino-Soviet split], Tansuo yu zhengming [explorations and contestations], no. 
10 (2012), 3-11. 
7 As a study reveals, “Mao was a faithful follower of Stalin who took pains to reassure the Boss of his loyalty and who 
dared to deviate from the Soviet model only after Stalin’s death.” See Alexander Pantov and Steven Levine, Mao: The Real 
Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 4. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, chap. 2; Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance.  
8 Also see Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong yu mosike de enenyuanyuan [feelings of gratitude and enmity between Mao Zedong 
and Moscow] (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1999), chap. 13; Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural 
Revolution: Contradictions among the People 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).  
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The aged supreme leader was haunted by this question from then on. Although this 
misgiving did not suffice to turn the bilateral relationship into geopolitical rivalry overnight, 
it nevertheless induced Mao to question Moscow’s leadership role in the hierarchy of the 
international communist movement. The Chairman viewed his firm commitment to Leninist 
revolutionary orthodox as a vehicle to promote China’s status internationally. Accordingly, 
he took the lead at the Moscow Conference in the winter of 1957 to challenge Khrushchev’s 
proposal to abandon war as the principal means for Cold War competition. Mao called upon 
the socialist camp to reject any hope for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states.9 The 
Chinese vision for Cold War competition was to exploit international tension for promoting 
revolutions in the non-western world.10 This presented a powerful ideological alternative to 
the Soviet vision. 
Undoubtedly, Khrushchev’s proposal of US-Soviet peaceful coexistence could have 
negative implications for Chinese security. The prospects of US-Soviet rapprochement on 
nuclear nonproliferation worried Mao that the Soviets were bound to relegate China to a 
secondary status in the international community—and such an inferior status would 
significantly circumscribe Chinese autonomy in the geopolitical arena. Meanwhile, the 
Soviets successfully launched its own satellite Sputnik in 1957—and this would reduce the 
value of China as a strategic partner. The Chinese sense of strategic vulnerability was 
genuine as well as legitimate. As political scientist Thomas Christensen notes, “in Beijing’s 
view, the Soviet acquisition of a secure, second-strike capability and the relative decline of 
Chinese power within the alliance carried a dual danger: the Soviets were less likely to 
support China and more likely to treat China like a weak satellite.”11 The Soviets’ delay in 
supplying China a prototype of the atomic bomb seemed to substantiate Chinese security 
concerns.12 Frustrated by this lack of autonomy in uplifting China’s defense capacity, Mao 
made up his mind to develop an independent nuclear force.13 At private meetings with 
military officials, he “amplified on the point of not imitating other countries.”14  
It was in this context that the Chairman steeled himself for an open defiance of the 
Soviets. When the Soviet leader proposed to construct a military communication station on 
Chinese territory and floated the idea of a Sino-Soviet joint submarine fleet, Mao seized this 
opportunity to hurl outrage at what he regarded as the Soviet great-power chauvinism. To 																																																																		
9 Shen, “Tongzhi jia xiongdi,” in Zhongsu guanxi shigang, 204-205. 
10 Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015), chap 1.   
11 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 
1947-1958 (Princeton University Press, 1996), 196.  
12 Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [memoiors of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986), 804; John Lewis and Litai Xue, 
China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 60-62. 
13 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 70-71.  
14 Ibid., 71.  
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the Soviet ambassador, he conveyed the grievance that the integrated Sino-Soviet military 
systems were to relegate China to an inferior status permanently.15 Here, the Chinese leader 
framed Sino-Soviet bargaining over the terms of security cooperation as a matter of status 
conflict. This led to a dramatic downturn of the bilateral relationship. Mao’s outburst 
startled Khrushchev who rushed to clarify the issue in person; yet Mao was reluctant to 
mend fences with the Soviets. Upon Khrushchev’s departure from China, Mao launched the 
Great Leap Forward to accelerate China’s industrialization. In an effort to mobilize the 
public morale, the Chairman also engineered the shelling of the Kuomintang strongholds on 
the islands close to the Fujian Province on the mainland.16  
In planning this military act, Mao did not consult Khrushchev beforehand. The Soviet 
leader worried that the Taiwan Strait crisis Mao instigated in 1958 could derail the US-Soviet 
détente to which he was committed. Shortly thereafter, visible cracks emerged in the 
Sino-Soviet relationship. The 1959 summit meeting between Mao and Khrushchev in Beijing 
was riddled with exchanges of acrimonious charges. Several senior Politburo members 
strongly criticized the Soviet leadership. The Chinese, in particular, accused their Soviet 
counterparts of lacking sympathy for their commitment to defending its sovereignty claims 
over Taiwan and Tibet by force.17 As such, the Sino-Soviet differences over security matters 
came to a fore.    
This meeting turned out to be the last one between Mao and the Soviet leader. Mao’s 
defiance of the Soviets marked the beginning of the end of the fraternal relationship between 
Beijing and Moscow. For Mao’s part, geopolitical concerns were entangled with his status 
aspiration. Mao believed that the US-Soviet détente as proposed by Khrushchev would 
frustrate the Chinese effort to attain a great-power status. This, in turn, contributed to his 
perception of Khrushchev’s perfidy in alliance politics. 18  Mao’s misgiving had sound 
geopolitical rationales. A Soviet-American rapprochement could impose additional 
geopolitical pressures on China, as China would have to face the American threat without 
substantial Soviet support.19  																																																																		
15 For details of the frictions revolving around Sino-Soviet military cooperation in 1958, see Shen Zhihua, “tongzhi jia 
xiongdi, 1949-1960” [Comrades and Brothers, 1949-1960], in Zhongsuguanxi shigang: 1917-1991 nian zhongsuguanxi 
ruogan wenti zai tantao [History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1991], Shen Zhihua ed., (Beijing: shehuikexue wenxian, 
2007), 224-34.  
16 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, chap. 6.  
17 See Li Xuefeng trans., “Heluxiaofu yu Mao Zedong huitan jilu” [records of the meeting between Khrushchev and Mao], 
in Zhonggong zhongda lishi shijian qinliji [personal accounts of the significant events in the history of the Chinese 
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Suffice to say, the emergent tensions between Beijing and Moscow is a function of the 
entanglement of status aspirations and security imperatives. As the magnitude of security 
matters could induce leaders to rely upon their feelings of pride or humiliation to judge the 
interlocutors’ intentions, leaders’ frustrated status aspiration could lead to further distrust 
and worsen security relations between states. As such, we should expect to see the clash 
between the Chinese and Soviet leaders in 1959 exacerbate the conflict of interests between 
China and the USSR in the years to come. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the Soviets turned to America in pursuit of the common interest in preventing West 
Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed in July 1963 
reflected the US-Soviet consensus on peace in Europe.20 This appeared to Beijing as a 
US-Soviet conspiracy of denying China the right to a nuclear deterrent capability.21 The 
treaty thus reinforced Beijing’s perception that both superpowers were posing existential 
threats. Chinese officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, concluded that the 
test ban agreements reflected the Soviet leadership’s collaboration with other capitalist 
powers to “isolate us.”22 
The leadership in Beijing, though, did try to mend fences with the Soviets when they 
were preoccupied with the imperative to save Chinese economy from the Great Leap 
Forward fiascos. In this context, Mao made the claim that the Soviet authorities remained “a 
country with whom to seek solidarity” and China should “not criticize it explicitly.”23 
Although this spirit of restraint was sometimes interrupted by the Chinese claim to the truth 
of Marxism-Leninism, it in effect persisted well into 1962.24 Deng Xiaoping described the 
Sino-Soviet relationship from 1960 to 1961 as “overall not bad.”25 In late September 1960, he 
told the Soviet senior officials in Moscow that “differences in opinions” between Beijing and 
Moscow could be overcome through periodic consultations to promote joint struggles 
against “the common enemy.”26 And in early 1962, Deng complimented the Soviet proposal 
for communist solidarity.27 Newly declassified documents also show that prior to 1963 the 
Chinese leadership valued Sino-Soviet solidarity tremendously. Zhou Enlai in this period 
																																																																		
20 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 379-91. 
21 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 192-193. 
22 Cited in Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 161. It is worth noting that this piece of evidence is obtained from the archive 
of China’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is not closed.  
23 Wu, Shinian Lunzhan, 261.  
24 Li Danhui, “Zuihou de nuli: zhongsu zai 1960 niandai chu de douzheng yu tiaohe” [last effort: struggle and reconciliation 
between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s], Shehui kexue [the social sciences] no. 6 (2006). 
25 Deng Xiaoping zhuan, 1904-1974 [biography of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2014), 1247. 
26 Cited in Vladislav Zubok, ""Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!" Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 
1956-1963," Cold War International History Bulletin (CWIHB), no. 10 (March 1998): 157. 
27 Li Danhui, “Cong fenlie dao duikang, 1960-1978” [From Split to Confrontation, 1960-1978], in Zhongsu guanxi shigang, 
343.  
	125		
turned down the request from Albania—a former Soviet ally—for weapons as well as food 
and uniform in order to reduce misunderstanding with Moscow.28 In August 1961 Zhou 
conveyed a message to the DRV’s minister of foreign affairs that to reconcile the Sino-Soviet 
differences was less difficult than achieve the Soviet-Albanian rapprochement. The reason, 
Zhou argued, was that resolving the Sino-Soviet differences did not have to touch on 
matters of prestige. Zhou’s statement, though, did not mean the Chinese could avoid 
viewing their relationship with the Soviets through the lens of prestige; it was nevertheless 
clear that for the time being prestige was not a major issue at all in Sino-Soviet relations.29  
At the very least, the Chinese were committed to keeping the Soviets as a security 
partner against China’s primary adversary, the United States.30 In June 1962, Liu Shaoqi 
openly suggested that a unified international front include the “revisionists,” namely the 
Soviets as well as their followers.31 Also remarkable was Mao’s comment on the Soviet 
Union during the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in early 1962. 
“I urge all comrades to firmly believe that the Soviet Union is a good country, and 
that the Soviet Communist Party is a good party. At any time, at present, in the future, 
and throughout our lives, we should learn from the Soviet Union, learn from their 
experience. [If we] do not study the Soviet Union, [we will] make mistakes.”32  
Although these words might not represent Mao’s genuine attitude toward the Soviet 
Union, they nevertheless suggested that the Chairman did not want to part his way with the 
Soviets for the time being. As such, the nationalist insurgencies in the nonwestern world had 
yet to become an ideological vehicle for China to challenge Moscow’s international authority. 
There is no denying, though, that by 1960 Beijing had aligned with Hanoi against 
Khrushchev’s proposal for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist rivals, as both parties 
were respectively engaged in struggles against America’s military presence in Taiwan and 
Indochina. And even earlier than 1960 Beijing had promised “political, economic, and 
military support” for the pro-Hanoi guerilla forces operating in South Vietnam.33 However, 
the Chinese leaders did not throw unconditional support behind the guerilla warfare in 
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South Vietnam in 1960.34 During the visit to North Vietnam in late 1961, for instance, the 
Chinese military delegation cautioned their North Vietnamese counterparts not to launch 
large-scale battles.35 Similarly, although Beijing urged revolutionary parties in Laos to take a 
tough stance against the coalition government, it ended up accepting the Geneva 
Agreements in 1962 that reestablished Laos as a neutral state.36  
The evidence cited above shows that the Chinese charted an ambiguous course in the 
early 1960s. After 1962, however, the domestic political developments deepened the 
emergent split and led Mao to give up the hope of détente with Moscow. By the year’s end, 
he set out to run a series of commentary articles in the People’s Daily to question the 
legitimacy of Soviet leadership in the international communist movement. Through an 
ideological struggle against Moscow, Mao also sought to delegitimize his domestic rivals. In 
late 1962, with Wang Jiaxiang being sidelined, the central leadership for the first time 
officially endorsed the line of “fighting with the revisionists for leadership.”37 Meanwhile, 
Mao appointed his close lieutenant, Kang Sheng, to head the “central anti-revisionist 
drafting group” to work on polemics against the Soviet leadership. 38  The Chairman 
finalized the draft in early 1963 and brought the Sino-Soviet split to international attention 
by presenting it as a struggle between the two divergent paths of socialist development.39 
The Chinese employment of delegitimation rhetoric thus gained international salience, 
which represented a crucial step toward the pursuit of delegitimation strategy. 
The final stage of the Soviet-American-British negotiation of the Non-proliferation 
Treaty coincided with the Sino-Soviet party talks in Moscow. Up to this point, the leadership 
in Beijing already decided to take a no-holds-barred approach toward the Sino-Soviet 
differences; they thereby gave the delegation a free rein in criticizing the Soviets.40 In his 
public speech, Deng Xiaoping, the head of the delegation, stated that the Sino-Soviet 
differences began to cumulate since the de-Stalinization drives initiated by Khrushchev. 
Subsequently Deng cited a wide range of disputes ranging form the Soviet neutrality in the 
Sino-Indian border conflicts in 1959 and 1962 to Moscow’s quest for détente with 
Washington. After repeated failures to solve these disputes, Deng argued, the bilateral 
relationship had deteriorated to an unprecedented extent. Throughout the statement Deng 																																																																		
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liberation movements,” as diplomatic historian Zhai Qiang argues, “did not immediately translate into an active support for 
Hanoi’s war efforts in South Vietnam.” Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 82. 
35 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 113; Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel 
(London: Hurst, 1995), 45. 
36 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, chap. 4. 
37 Li, “Cong fenlie dao duikang,” in Zhongsu guanxi shigang, 366. 
38 MacFarquhar, The Origins vol. 3, 260-62. 
39 Wu, Shinian lunzhan, 577.  
40 Yin Jiamin, “Zhongsu lunzhan zhong de Deng Xiaoping” [Deng Xiaoping in the Sino-Soviet polemics], Dangshi bolan 
[general review of the Communist Party of China] 8 (2014), 22-23. 
	127		
faulted the Soviets for all downturns in the Sino-Soviet relationship.41 In such a charged 
atmosphere, the party talks “were neither conversations nor negotiations, but a mutual 
lecturing about past mistakes, real and invented, of the other side.”42 When it came to the 
drafting of a communiqué, Deng even rejected the Soviet suggestion that the words that 
“meeting proceeded in a friendly, fraternal atmosphere” be injected into the joint 
statement.43  
Although there is no evidence to suggest any direct influence of the US-Soviet détente 
on Mao’s expectations for party talks, Deng’s statement nevertheless revealed quite clearly 
that the Sino-Soviet rivalry was irreversible. Tensions between the two parties had 
accumulated to the point of no return. In the process, security imperatives and status 
aspirations became inextricably intertwined; eventually ideological disputes came to act as a 
principal vehicle for their competition for influences in the communist world. As the mutual 
suspicions deepened, Chinese leaders increasingly viewed the Soviet Union as a geopolitical 
threat. In July 1964 Mao for the first time raised the issue of armed conflict between China 
and the Soviet Union before Politburo officials.44 One year later, in the context of the US 
government escalating the Vietnam War, Zhou Enlai echoed Mao’s threat assessment in 
stating to the Central Military Commission—the highest organ of military decision making 
in Chinese political system—that the worst-case scenario was that “the revisionists (e.g. the 
Soviets) and the imperialists (e.g. the Americans) would join forces to attack [China].”45   
As the Chinese leaders grew anxious that the Soviet Union was to impinge on its 
geopolitical security via its policy of détente with China’s primary adversary—the United 
States, tensions on the northwestern Sino-Soviet borders fueled Chinese perception of the 
Soviet threat to their regime stability. During the first half of 1962 Xinjiang witnessed a mass 
exodus of local residents from China. While trying to flee from China, in some places the 
local population clashed violently with the government apparatus.46 The Soviet diplomats 
appeared to be involved in instigating unrest and facilitating some residents’ entry into the 
Soviet territory. These incidents convinced Mao that “the fraternal Sino-Soviet relations 
were changing in nature.”47 Besides America, the Soviet Union now featured prominently in 																																																																		
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Mao’s threat assessment. 
In sum, Chinese threat perception grew in proportion with the leaders’ frustration with 
Khrushchev’s lack of willing to help China fulfill its status aspiration. Security imperatives 
and status aspirations were entangled in the evolution of the bilateral relationship. Botched 
diplomatic communications, the Soviet-American collaboration on nuclear nonproliferation, 
and skirmishes on the Sino-Soviet borders all contributed to the Chinese sense of 
geopolitical threat from the Soviets. Underlying these concrete incidents were dynamics of 
“status dilemma,” which hindered Chinese assertions of great-power status from gaining 
favorable recognition from the Soviets. As diplomatic bargaining broke down, the conflict of 
security interests came to the fore.  
The Chinese, in turn, expressed its animosity toward the Soviets’ lack of attention to its 
status aspiration in a strong rhetoric to delegitimize the Soviet credentials in assuming the 
international communist movement. This delegitimating rhetoric acted as a prelude to the 
pursuit of delegitimation strategy, and reflected a genuine sense of frustration on the 
Chinese part. This sense of frustration could turn into fear of Soviet invasion in the context 
of a substantial conflict of geopolitical interests between Beijing and Moscow.  
 
The Emergence of Delegitimation Strategy in China’s Soviet Policy:  
From Rhetoric to Practice 
In practicing delegitimation strategy, a state actor needs bolster the delegitimating rhetoric 
with exemplary deeds. Actions speak louder than words. International norms, after all, are 
always susceptible to conflicting interpretations. As such, the state deploying the 
delegitimating rhetoric could hardly convince the international audiences that the target of 
its critique is inconsistent in words and deeds—and therefore being hypocritical—without 
exemplifying what a competent practice is.  
As state leaders try to bolster its delegitimating rhetoric with acts, contests over status 
would concentrate on a concrete issue—and in this study the issue should concern security 
imperatives of a state. By this definition, competitive status-seeking strategy did not come to 
dominate China’s approach to the SU until the Sino-Soviet rivalry unfolded in China’s 
proximate region—notably Vietnam. The Sino-Soviet split, though, did not evolve into 
hostility until the armed conflict erupted over the Zhenbao Island in 1969—instead, the split 
between the two communist powers manifested itself as struggle for ideological authority. 
Nonetheless, it touched upon security imperatives as the competition reached audiences 
inhabiting in China’s southern vicinity. The Sino-Soviet split provided an impetus for China 
to convert its delegitimating rhetoric into practices when the Soviets deepened their 
involvement in the Vietnam War.  
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A Clarification: Delegitimating Rhetoric and the Role of Prestige Politics at Home 
The Sino-Soviet polemics began with the Chinese decision in April 1960 to challenge 
Khrushchev’s line by reference to reasserting the Leninist doctrines.48 From then on, the 
Chinese leadership employed anti-Soviet rhetoric to delegitimize the Soviet leadership in the 
non-western world. In this regard, ideological appeal came to act as a dominant vehicle for 
the Sino-Soviet struggle for geopolitical influences. And yet, absent security imperatives 
delegitimation strategy does not have to be put into practice. The leaders could settle for the 
delegitimating rhetoric. This could boost their personal prestige at home and even helped to 
promote national status without incurring high security risks.  
The politics of personal prestige in Beijing contributed significantly to the emergence of 
the delegitimating rhetoric in Beijing’s approach to Moscow. The Soviet bureaucratic model 
of socialism under Khrushchev did serve as a convenient adversary against which Mao 
could assert his ideological authority at home. Resentful of Khrushchev’s denouncement of 
Stalin’s charismatic authority, Mao identified the Soviet Union as an ideological adversary, a 
traitor of the socialist cause, and a target of class struggle. In his words, “the capitalist class 
can be reborn; that’s how it is in the Soviet Union.”49 As an eminent historian in China 
argues, “what stimulated the CCP to take a critical step toward parting with the Soviet 
Communist Party was not the conflict of national interests between the two countries but the 
domestic political developments in China.”50 
Yet, we should not attribute the continued deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations solely to 
Mao’s domestic political maneuvers. Had Mao escalated the Sino-Soviet conflict purely for 
domestic political reasons—that is, to enhance his charismatic authority on the basis of 
revolutionary commitments as opposed to institutional orders—the Chairman would have 
settled for the delegitimizing rhetoric without taking on the Soviets over the matters of 
geopolitical security. After all, delegitimation strategy entails both rhetoric and deeds. And 
given the risks of war, China did not have to take on the Soviets by asserting the 
revolutionary doctrines of fighting against the western powers. Rather, it could have 
employed delegitimizing rhetoric to boost risk-averse strategies of status seeking.  
If, on the other hand, the Chairman had considered the Soviet Union to fall under the 
non-Marxist rulers, it was natural to conclude that its every interest was in conflict with the 
PRC. As such, the seemingly ideologically charged rhetoric could reveal a genuine concern 
for the Soviet geopolitical threat. Security imperatives are worth noting. We can surmise 
here that Mao’s domestic maneuver to define the Soviets as an ideological enemy simply 																																																																		
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reflects the salient aspect of the Soviet geopolitical threat. Undoubtedly, the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry began with ideological divergence. In turn, Mao was prone to portray the Soviet 
Union as posing an ideological threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese socialist regime. To be 
sure, the intensification of prestige politics in Beijing may be able to explain the timing by 
which Mao openly stressed the ideological aspect of the Soviet threat—doing so allowed 
him to stigmatize his opponents as “revisionists” who allegedly had more in common with 
the Soviets in terms of ideological beliefs. Yet, prestige politics by itself cannot explain why 
the Chinese adopted delegitimation strategy—a variant of competitive status-seeking 
strategy. Absent a geopolitical threat, leaders could employ delegitimizing rhetoric to 
promote other status-enhancing strategies than competitive status-seeking strategy. China’s 
status seeking in Africa is a case in point.  
 
A Negative Case in Brief: China’s Status Seeking in Africa 
China’s engagement with African countries features creative status-seeking policies. 
Typically, practitioners of this type of status-enhancing strategy seek to justify their policy 
innovations as honorable. Delegitimating rhetoric can perform this function by stigmatizing 
certain practices as unjust; it in turn helps to highlight a novel aspect of a state’s 
international practices. Importantly, delegitimating rhetoric employed in this way does not 
lead to confrontational stances and involves little risk of military conflict—hence, “a shortcut 
to greatness.” In undertaking creative status-seeking policies Chinese leaders found Africa a 
new area whereby to promote its economic model. In late 1963 and early 1964, a Chinese 
delegation led by premier Zhou Enlai and foreign minister Chen Yi visited ten African 
countries. At the end of their visit, Zhou laid out the general principles of China’s foreign 
aid.51 The Chinese emphasized their foreign aid was a means for the recipient countries to 
achieve economic autonomy—rather than socialism; relatedly, the Chinese principles 
showed “less concern with the issue of ownership of the means of production than with the 
growth of production in general”; and finally, the actual aid agreements China made with 
the African countries gravitated toward agriculture and light industry. All these 
characteristics signified Beijing’s effort to introduce a model “substantially different from 
the Soviet model of the ‘non-capitalist path of development.’”52  
Unquestionably, by 1963 the open split between China and the Soviet Union left each 
other with “no alternatives to a naked competition for influence” among the Third World 
nations. And since Beijing had “publicly staked its claim to the mantle of leadership of the 
world revolution……, the People’s Republic of China had to present itself as a full-service 																																																																		
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alternative to the Soviet Union, with an aid program and development model in addition to 
its rhetoric of militant anti-imperialism.”53 The Chinese thus sought to demonstrate the 
appeal of their developmental model. The Chinese were intent on outperforming not just the 
Soviets but also the Americans in Africa. The Chinese believed that through economic aid 
they could help the Africans remove shackles of their colonial past and fend off perils of the 
American-led capitalism. 54  Their approach was risk-averse, however. The creative 
status-seeking acts as undertaken by them involved no confrontational stances with either 
superpower. Rather, it sought to carve out a new realm of international activities whereby to 
display Chinese honorable traits.  
In contrast to creative status seeking, competitive status-seeking strategy is more 
risk-prone because it is typically confrontation-oriented. Yet this very behavioral style is also 
instrumental role in advancing geopolitical security. This can be illustrated by China’s 
Vietnam policy in the post-Khrushchev era. After Moscow’s new leadership decided to 
assume a more active role in the Vietnam War, leaders in Beijing became determined to 
exclude the Soviet influences from Hanoi. To this end, they escalated China’s commitment 
to Hanoi’s fight against the Americans. As such, the Chinese set out to bolster the 
delegitimating rhetoric with concrete acts. Their Vietnam policy would clearly exhibit 
elements of delegitimation strategy.  
    
Khrushchev’s Fall  
Khrushchev’s fall was a critical episode in the Sino-Soviet relations. On October 13, 1964, 
upon his return from a vacation on the Black Sea, Khrushchev was confronted with a list of 
convictions issued by other Politburo members. Among the charges, one Politburo member 
singled out his provocative acts over Suez, Berlin, and Cuba as disgraceful international 
failures. Khrushchev’s opponents believed these fiascos caused a decline in Moscow’s 
international prestige.55 As such, Khrushchev’s fall from power precipitated a shift of Soviet 
attention toward Vietnam where the new leadership under Aleksei Brezhnev hoped to 
regain its lost prestige elsewhere in the world.56 The shift in Soviet policy toward Vietnam, 
however, was to exacerbate the existing Sino-Soviet rivalry, as the Chinese leaders believed 
that the Soviets were to replace the American imperialists in a design to contain China. 
Initially, Mao took Khrushchev’s downfall to be the triumph of his ideological line. This 
incident met his expectation that the Soviet revisionism was doomed to fail.57 Accordingly, 																																																																		
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the Chairman sent Zhou Enlai to attend the Moscow conference in late 1964, expecting to 
reap the prestige of his triumph over the revisionist line.58 However, the Soviets’ clumsy 
treatment of Zhou at the cocktail party on November 7th dashed his hope. At a reception on 
November 7, the intoxicated Rodion Malinovskii, the Soviet defense minister, proposed that 
the bilateral relationship would improve if the Chinese could oust their supreme leader. 
Zhou was furious over such comments, and refused to accept an official apology from the 
Soviets the next day.59 Zhou’s response was not inappropriate in terms of diplomatic 
convention. But it is worth noting that Zhou took this opportunity to delegitimize the Soviet 
leadership in the international arena. In particular, the Chinese premier tried to push the 
Soviet leadership to postpone the conference of socialist countries, which he claimed was a 
symbolic heritage of Khrushchev’s policy. 60  Further, Zhou asserted that the Soviet 
leadership inherited Khrushchev pretension to paternalism (yi laozi dang ziju) over other 
communist parties.61 At the meetings with the communist leaders from many countries, 
Zhou reiterated the Chinese determination to continue the polemics with the Soviets.62 He 
then conveyed to the Vietnamese delegation that the Soviet leadership was “weak and 
internally controversial, chaotic and turbulent.”63  
The Soviets’ misconduct, in short, allowed the Chinese to seize a moral high ground in 
the ongoing ideological struggle. Mao took advantage of this diplomatic incident to 
highlight the Sino-Soviet rift. Following Beijing’s instructions, Zhou chastised the Soviet 
leadership for treating “[the Chinese] friends as enemies,” capitulating to the American 
imperialism, and practicing great-power chauvinism.64 The Chairman endorsed Zhou’s 
diplomatic performance by leading a group of politburo leaders to greet the premier upon 
his return from Moscow.65 At the meeting convened upon Zhou’s arrival, Mao managed to 
rally all top leaders around the view that the Soviet leadership was not competent enough to 
lead international communist movement.66   
While delegitimizing the Soviet international leadership, Mao reasserted authority 
before his domestic rivals. In the context of the Brezhnev leadership continuing 
Khrushchev’s China policy, Mao justified his assertive line against Khrushchev by stating 
that “throughout the whole history of international communist movement, Khrushchev’s 																																																																		
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performance is only a short episode…..From now on anyone who wants to perform the role 
of Khrushchevism without Khrushchev will only suffer a similar fate as did Khrushchev.” In 
fact, Mao added these words to an editorial draft for People’s Daily.67 Clearly, this was 
intended for domestic consumption. Mao, in this way, signaled to his domestic rivals that 
only his own ideological line represented the orthodox of Chinese political life. At this 
juncture, the contest between Mao and Liu over domestic authority had just reached a 
pitch. 68  Liu could not afford to challenge Mao on this foreign policy issue. The 
delegitimating rhetoric against the Soviets had fostered an atmosphere in which moderate 
leaders on foreign policy was to lose prestige by being labeled as a “revisionist.” Mao was a 
central player in this prestige politics. In fact, he went further than Liu by suggesting that if 
the Sino-Soviet split was unavoidable China should take the initiative to part its way with 
the Soviets.69 
Beijing’s unwillingness to achieve a rapprochement with the Soviet new leadership 
shows that concerns for personal prestige could add to the momentum of delegitimating 
rhetoric. Such rhetoric did fuel tensions between Beijing and Moscow in ways that rendered 
their conflict of security interests unmanageable. In such circumstances, delegitimating 
rhetoric may lead to the pursuit of a delegitimating strategy, as leaders seek to further their 
interests in both geopolitical security and domestic political survival.  
In theory, though, the delegitimating rhetoric might bestow upon an emerging power a 
preeminent status, which would later on help to coordinate international efforts to displace 
the established hegemon.70 Yet, by such rhetoric alone it is difficult to ascertain whether a 
country is trying to advance geopolitical security via status competition or is just seeking 
status preeminence as an end in itself. Rather, the importance of delegitimating rhetoric lies 
in aggravating existing rivalry to the point that the leaders believe that the pursuit of 
delegitimating strategy is necessary for safeguarding the country’s core interests. As such, it 
is the Soviet extension of its geopolitical influences to China’s key ally—the Hanoi 
regime—that steeled Chinese leaders to adopt delegitimation strategy. By such a policy, 
China effectively engaged in competitive status-seeking strategy against the Soviet Union in 
Vietnam—an area critical to its geopolitical security. This argument can be bolstered by the 
fact that Mao did not turn its delegitimating rhetoric into a concrete strategy for geopolitical 
contests against the Soviets until Kosygin visited Hanoi and Beijing in late 1964.  
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Kosygin’s Visit to China  
The Soviet premier wished to forge a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation on the ceasefire in 
the ongoing Vietnam War; for Beijing’s part, his move suggested a Soviet intention to 
interfere with the Vietnamese affairs over which China used to have a dominant say. As 
noted, Mao deployed the delegitimizing rhetoric against the Soviets in an effort to assert 
personal prestige at home. But it was not until the Soviet involvement in the war in Vietnam 
the Chinese began to translate the rhetoric into actions. Mao’s refusal to cooperate with the 
Soviets to aid the Vietnamese anti-imperialist struggles marked the turning point in Beijing’s 
pursuit of delegitimation strategy against Moscow.  
In the context of the US escalating the Vietnam War in late 1964, China showed a strong 
resolve to assert great-power status vis-à-vis the Soviets. The escalation of the Vietnam War 
by the US posed a direct geopolitical threat to China, as well as an indirect challenge to the 
Soviet standing in the US-Soviet global competition. It thus provided an opening for the 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement. On the other hand, by 1964 the Sino-Soviet polemics had 
reached a climax. Could Beijing tone down its delegitimating rhetoric in pursuit of common 
security interests with Moscow over the Vietnam issue? This constitutes a critical test for my 
theoretical claim. Whereas defensive realism claims that states tend to join forces against a 
common threat, my argument would predict that China would not opt for security 
cooperation with the Soviets, or “external balancing,” despite a common threat. It holds that 
prestige politics at home combined with geopolitical pressures to motivate the Chinese 
leadership to pursue security through competitive status-seeking acts.   
From a defensive realist standpoint, we can expect the Sino-Soviet common threats in 
balancing against the American power to bring the two countries together regardless of their 
ideological differences.71 This did not materialize. On the contrary, the relationship between 
Beijing and Moscow deteriorated after 1965. To explain this deviation from the defensive 
realist prediction, it is important to focus on both the Soviet threat as perceived by the 
Chinese and the dynamics of elite politics in Beijing. As noted, the Chinese perception of the 
Soviet Union as a geopolitical threat had hardened by early 1964, and ideological 
antagonism featured centrally in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Meanwhile, the Mao-Liu contest for 
institutional authority had reached its peak on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. In this 
circumstance, Mao was prone to perceive the Soviet ideological influences as threatening to 
undermine the Chinese communist regime. In early 1964 the Chairman expressed concern 
that the Soviets agents had infiltrated China’s security apparatus.72  
Once the Soviets became involved in the Vietnam War, it was tempting for the Chinese 
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to assert great-power status vis-à-vis the Soviets in order to extrude Moscow’s influences 
from China’s southern vicinity. In early 1965, Kosygin paid a visit Hanoi on his rout to 
China. In Hanoi the Soviet premier promised to material and moral support for the 
Vietnamese struggle against the US forces. While calling for a total withdrawal of US forces 
from South Vietnam, the Soviet premier tried to get the Chinese to help the US “find a way 
out of Vietnam.”73 These diplomatic initiatives signified that Moscow began to play a more 
active role in the Vietnam War. In response, the Chinese warned the Soviet leaders not to 
use the Vietnamese issue to bargain with the Americans.74 Now Beijing had decided to 
focus on Vietnam as an arena of status competition with Moscow.  
The Soviet premier Kosygin’s vision for Sino-Soviet relations was congruent with the 
defensive realist rationale. The Soviet premier initially believed that the Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement was possible. He was keen to see the two gigantic socialist powers set aside 
their ideological differences in a common struggle against America in Indochina.75 Kosygin 
visited Beijing in February 1965 in the hope that the Sino-Soviet relationship could be 
restored to normalcy. Yet, he was ignorant that the tense political atmosphere in China had 
created tremendous obstacles to Sino-Soviet détente. By the time he arrived in Beijing, the 
elite contestation was dividing China’s top leadership. Liu had been ascendant among the 
party elites.76 While being the preeminent ideological theoretician, Mao had great difficulty 
in translating his authority into the policy outcomes he desired, as Liu’s leadership of the 
bureaucratic institutions proved capable of implementing domestic policies on his own 
terms. Accordingly, Mao had little choice but to use foreign policy as a realm whereby he 
could try to reestablish the indisputable supremacy by demonstrating personal prestige. As 
such, Kosygin’s visit just provided an opening for Mao to assert personal prestige. 
Consequently, Kosygin not only achieved no diplomatic success in Beijing but also suffered 
humiliation by Mao.  
Details of Kosygin’s meeting with Mao not only revealed Beijing’s perception of the 
Soviet involvement in the area of China’s geostrategic concern as a serious challenge to the 
Chinese claim to great-power status; these details also exhibited the peculiar way in which 
Mao exploited personal prestige as a vehicle for domestic political survival. In the presence 
of Chinese senior leaders—including Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai—Mao 
conducted himself in a manner that was “emphatically sarcastic, at times bordering on 
insult.” To the Soviet visitors this was intended to assert China’s great-power status. To his 																																																																		
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domestic audience, the Chairman often “looked around after each important statement to 
make sure he made the needed impression.”77 Such symbolic acts meant the Chairman was 
intent on bringing his associates on board with the anti-Soviet delegitimation strategy he 
preferred. In the process, he managed to demonstrate personal prestige to his fellows.  
The Chairman was quite sincere in his determination to enhance Chinese status 
internationally vis-à-vis the two superpowers. In his view, the Soviet-US collaboration had 
materialized in a way that alarmed the Chinese and the world community at large. An 
enhanced status would in turn grant other nations geopolitical autonomy. In his words, 
The US and the USSR are now deciding the world’s destiny. Well, go ahead and 
decide. But within the next 10-15 years you will not be able to decide the world’s 
destiny. It is in the hands of the nations of the world, and not in the hands of the 
imperialists, exploiters, or revisionists.78 
In response, Kosygin invoked his defensive realist rationale, arguing that the imperative 
of fighting against America was sufficient to bring about a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. 
“Since the Soviets and Chinese had been engaged in the struggle against the imperialists, 
why can’t we unite in a common fight against imperialists?”79 Mao ostensibly agreed that 
threats from “imperialists” could help reinvigorate the Sino-Soviet unity in the future.80 But 
he did not specify the terms on which to pursue Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Overall, the 
atmosphere of their meeting was tense and nothing was achieved.81  
While a strategy of delegitimation could help China to hold off the Soviet containment, 
Mao also used it as a vehicle for his domestic power struggle. By demonstrating that the 
Chinese practice of revolutionary communism had gained traction internationally, Mao 
hoped to enhance his authority vis-à-vis Liu Shaoqi and other leaders, whom he perceived 
as the emerging revisionists in China. Since his return to active leadership in late 1962, the 
Chairman had constantly asserted the interrelationship of geopolitical and domestic threats. 
Early on he had warned that, “China must oppose and be alert to revisionism at home and 
abroad,” and Khrushchev was likely to “impose war upon us [China]” and revisionism 
could “usurp the state and party leadership.”82 This attitude now carried into his approach 
to the post-Khrushchev leadership. Needless to say, Mao’s drive to delegitimize the Soviet 
leadership role in the international arena had both geopolitical and domestic political 
rationales.  
Inasmuch as the leaders in China had come to rely upon prestige as a dominant vehicle 																																																																		
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for authority legitimation, no one in the Politburo could politically afford to mend fences 
with the Soviet “revisionists”—being labeled this way meant a loss of prestige at home. 
Accordingly, the whole leadership felt compelled to support Mao, who set out to couple his 
delegitimizing rhetoric with competitive status-seeking acts against the Soviets over the 
issue of Vietnam. As Mao’s attitude toward the Soviet premier already signaled his 
unwillingness to join hands with the Soviet revisionists, no Chinese leaders could politically 
afford to seek reconciliation with Moscow. Anyone making such an attempt would be 
vulnerable to the charge of undermining China’s socialist system by aligning with the Soviet 
revisionists.  
Beijing’s unwillingness to mend fences with Moscow then became evident in the daily 
practice of diplomacy. Throughout 1965, Sergei Lapin, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, 
found it increasingly difficult to meet with China’s senior officials. Those who used to 
maintain regular contact with the Soviet officials including Liu Shaoqi now merely paid lip 
service to the need for bilateral diplomatic communications. By late 1965, it became clear to 
Lapin that setting up meetings with China’s top officials was out of the question. Despite his 
repeated requests, Lapin was told that Zhou Enlai and foreign minister Chen Yi were “very 
busy” and Mao was “out of town.”83 Quite evidently, the Chinese leaders did not believe 
they could afford domestically to pursue a policy of realignment with Moscow for fighting 
against America in Indochina. In the final analysis, Kosygin failed to dampen Beijing’s 
delegitimizing rhetoric because Mao managed to deploy that rhetoric to dissuade Hanoi’s 
leaders from accepting international mediation. Equally important, in the run-up to the 
Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leaders—notably Mao—relied upon personal prestige for 
political survival among domestic political elites. In an ideologically charged domestic 
political context, the deepening suspicion on the Chinese part over the Soviet initiative over 
Vietnam stimulated Beijing to turn the delegitimizing rhetoric into delegitimation strategy. 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed here: concerns for personal prestige on their own are unable to 
motivate leaders to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy; as illustrated by China’s 
employment of delegitimizing rhetoric against the Soviets, in such circumstances leaders 
would prefer to pursue status on the cheap.  
And yet, the delegitimating rhetoric may help to worsen a country’s relationship with 
its geopolitical rival, as illustrated by Mao’s employment delegitimating rhetoric against 
Kosygin. As their Soviet rival extended geopolitical influences into China’s vicinity, Beijing’s 
leaders involved in domestic prestige politics would find competitive status-seeking 
strategy a preferable policy response to this challenge. This is what happened after Kosygin 
left Beijing.  																																																																		
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China’s Resist-America-Aid-Vietnam War Campaign as Delegitimation Strategy 
As a corollary of refusing to cooperate with Moscow, Beijing took unilateral actions to aid 
the Vietnamese fight against the US forces. In June 1965, China began to dispatch 
“volunteers” into Vietnam. Up to March 1968, Beijing had sent 32,000 armed forces to assist 
Vietnamese communists.84 Through such symbolic acts, the Chinese signaled remarkable 
resolve to vindicate its commitment to promoting revolutions. Their ultimate objective was 
to establish superiority of Chinese communist appeals vis-à-vis the Soviet “revisionist” line.  
The Chinese leaders, in turn, launched the resist-America-aid-Vietnam War campaign to 
compete with the Soviets for status preeminence in Vietnam. After the Tonkin Gulf incident 
in August 1964, the Vietnam War faced grave prospects of escalation, which constituted an 
increase of US geopolitical threat to China. By this time, however, China had already 
focused on the Soviet Union as its dominant threat; as such, the Chinese did not want this 
chief adversary to intervene in their backyard. Accordingly, they bolstered the 
delegitimizing rhetoric against the Soviets with attempts to shape the fighting strategy 
undertaken by the Vietnamese. Ultimately, the Chinese sought to assert their great-power 
status in the international communist movement—and this made a Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement against the US in supporting the Vietnamese inconceivable.   
Unquestionably, the Chinese aid to the DRV served to defend China against the 
perceived American aggression in Southeast Asia. In a speech made on the NLF’s founding 
anniversary in late 1965—when the US military commitment to Vietnam was a fait 
accompli—Zhou Enlai asserted vehemently that the only option for the Vietnamese people 
now was “to fight the American invaders until they got out of Vietnam” and that the 
Chinese would always side with the Vietnamese cause.85 A closer examination, however, 
reveals that the dramatic increase of Chinese aid to Vietnam was not just intended to 
counter the escalation of US military commitment to Vietnam in the summer of 1965. It was 
also aimed at competing with the Soviets for geopolitical influences.  
There is substantial evidence to bolster this contention. For one thing, officials in China 
genuinely perceived the Soviet involvement in the Indochina affairs as collusion with the US 
strategy of containment. In August 1965, a document from China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (which now remains semi-classified) judged that “although the Soviet revisionists 
dare not openly participate in peace talk activities, the Soviet government has privately 
colluded with the United States.”86 Clearly, the Chinese up to this point had associated the 																																																																		
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Soviet Union closely with the United States in terms of their intent of containing China. In 
practice, the Chinese went to considerable lengths to bar the Soviets from their aid programs 
to the Vietnamese communists. Beijing opposed Moscow’s plan of dispatching 4,000 military 
personnel to North Vietnam, refused to let the Soviet air force fly from Kunming to defend 
the DRV territory, and rejected the Soviet proposal to transport military supplies via 
Chinese airspace.87  
Whereas the offensive alliance Beijing had forged with Hanoi around 1963 was 
designed to undermine the US geopolitical influences by supporting the guerilla insurgents in 
South Vietnam, after 1965 Beijing pursued a strategy of delegitimation in the Vietnam arena 
designed to counter the Soviet involvement by vindicating ideological doctrines. To display 
ideological appeal as an element of state power, the Chinese signaled commitment to the 
military struggles undertaken by the Vietnamese revolutionaries while chastising the Soviet 
policy of détente with America. In this way, the Chinese tried to delegitimize the Soviet 
influences in the international communist movement in general and on Vietnamese 
communists in particular. The Soviet policy, a senior Chinese diplomat charged, “is not to 
render real aid to Vietnam in its struggle against American imperialism, but to put China 
and Vietnam under [its] control and acquire for [itself] capital for bargaining with the US.”88 
By framing the Soviet initiative as an attempt to collaborate with the imperialists, the 
Chinese leadership tried to prevent the Soviets from wooing the Vietnamese communists to 
the Soviet “revisionist” side. In a nutshell, an anti-Soviet intention featured prominently in 
China’s drive of aiding the Vietnamese to resist America. It not only acted as a strategy to 
delegitimize the Soviet authority in the international communist movement; more crucially, 
it served to hold off Moscow’s geopolitical influences in Indochina.  
 
The Radicalization of Chinese Politics: Beginning of the Cultural Revolution  
The years from 1965 to 1968 witnessed radicalization of Chinese politics characterized by 
intensified elite conflicts and social upheavals. The Mao-Liu conflict culminated in the 
Cultural Revolution in the summer of 1966, and ended with the purge of Liu Shaoqi and his 
factions in 1967. As Mao found it impossible to reconcile with Liu’s vision for bureaucratic 
mode of rule in China after the Great Leap Forward, their conflict became a life-and-death 
struggle. Mao eventually made up his mind to demolish the whole bureaucratic structure of 																																																																																																																																																																																																								
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the party and government in which Liu’s influences were entrenched. To this end, Mao 
appealed to personal prestige as a vehicle for legitimizing charismatic authority that enabled 
him to mobilize grassroots revolts against state bureaucracies. As such, Mao was sensitive to 
prestige in the domestic arena till 1968 when he set out to restore domestic orders via state 
bureaucratic authority.  
 
The Cultural Revolution and Elite Politics in China 
It is widely acknowledged that Mao’s motive in launching the Cultural Revolution was to 
shake up the party, the state, and the whole Chinese society.89 As Mao himself remarked,  
[The Cultural Revolution] isn’t simply a question of replacing the Tsar with 
Khrushchev, one bourgeoisie with another, even if it’s called communist. The thought, 
culture and customs which brought China to where we found her must disappear, the 
thought, customs, and culture of proletarian China, which does not yet exist, must 
appear.90  
The scope and purposes of the Cultural Revolution are certainly not reducible to elite 
competitions.91 Yet, for the sake of exploring the dynamics among institutional change, elite 
contests, and the politics of personal prestige, this study approaches the Cultural Revolution 
in terms of a series of conflicts among China’s top leaders. In launching the Cultural 
Revolution, Mao did intend to eliminate his principal rivals, notably Liu Shaoqi and possibly 
Deng Xiaoping.92 In Mao’s view, these two leaders had betrayed his vision for continuous 
revolution in China. Specifically, Mao viewed the bureaucratic apparatus run by Liu and 
Deng as the major impediment to his effort to create an egalitarian Chinese society through 
constant mobilization of the grassroots population.93 China’s supreme leader thereby called 
upon the masses to rise up and overthrow a wide variety of sociopolitical institutions.94 In 																																																																		
89 For Mao’s motive in launching the Cultural Revolution, see MacFarquhar, The Origins 3; Dittmer, Liu Shaoqi and the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution; China’s Continuous Revolution; Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and the Post-Mao Reforms.  
90 Cited from Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens, 167-168. 
91 For the grassroots dynamics of the Cultural Revolution, see, for instance, Shaoguang Wang, Failure of Charisma: The 
Cultural Revolution in Wuhan (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995); Yang Su, Collective Killings in Rural China 
during the Cultural Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
92 It is important to note that Mao intentionally separated Liu and Deng in terms of their “political errors”—that is, their 
challenge to his authority in the 1960s. However, with the radicalization of the mass movements during the Cultural 
Revolution, Deng and his family were compromised. See Yang Changgui, “Mao Zedong heshi tichu ‘Liu Deng keyi fenkai’” 
[when did Mao suggest that Liu and Deng were separable], Dangshi bolan [general review of the Communist Party of China] 
no. 9 (2014); Deng Rong, Wode fuqin Deng Xiaoping: wenge suiyue [my father Deng Xiaoping: years of the Cultural 
Revolution] (Beijing: sanlian, 2012), 33-34. 
93 Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-Chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism (Berkeley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 1974). 
94 For the political history of the Cultural Revolution, see Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao's Last 
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis," in The 
Politics of China: Sixty Yeras of the People's Republic of China, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  
	141		
short, Mao was determined to overturn the whole bureaucratic infrastructure centered upon 
Liu—just as Zhou Enlai remarked, the Cultural Revolution was essentially a “life-or-death” 
ideological struggle.95 Large-scale purges followed. Senior leaders were either forced out of 
their positions or marginalized in their decision-making role, and the majority of them were 
sent to labor camps in the countryside. Within a few months, the decision-making authority 
to which Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had been entitled shifted to the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group (CCRG), which fell under control of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing.96 Needless to 
say, by late 1966 Mao emerged triumphant in his struggle with Liu and Deng.  
In hindsight, the ease with which Mao ousted Liu and Deng out of power testifies to his 
unparalleled charismatic authority. While charisma is a crucial source of Mao’s authority, 
the Chairman would not have been able to reassert his charismatic authority without 
asserting prestige. As prestige is derivative of demonstrable symbols that make political 
audiences believe that someone is superior in characters or skills, it provides a layer of 
authority and is subject to the audiences’ perception of leaders’ performative acts. It was by 
virtue of rhetorical skills in deploying revolutionary discourses that Mao managed to 
establish personal authority against the state bureaucracies led by Liu. Throughout the 
second half of 1966, Mao put his prestige on display via meetings with the Red Guards at the 
Tiananmen Square.97 On top of that, he authorized publication of a series of editorials by 
official media, which denounced the party elites as “capitalist roaders”—namely, the 
betrayers of the revolutionary ideal he himself embodied. 98  By criticizing the whole 
leadership via the editorials, Mao managed to reestablish ideological superiority over the 
rest of the party elite. In the process, prestige served as the central vehicle for political 
survival.  
 
The Climax of China’s Pursuit of Delegitimation Strategy, 1965-1967  
By the mid-1960s, the Sino-Soviet rivalry had heightened the importance of ideological 
appeal as a vehicle for status competition that promised to enhance geopolitical security, 
and the intensification of the Mao-Liu schism had induced leaders in Beijing to boost 
personal prestige among the party elites. These incentives combined to motivate the Chinese 
leadership to delegitimize the Soviet leadership in the communist world. Following 
Kosygin’s aborted effort to promote Sino-Soviet détente, China stepped up competition with 
the Soviet Union for status preeminence in Vietnam.  
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China’s Competition with the Soviet Union for Status Preeminence in Vietnam 
Specifically, China was keen to dictate the manner in which the Vietnamese fought against 
the American forces. In fact, Beijing’s leaders by 1964 had come to view the Soviet support 
for Vietnamese struggle as a step to encircle China.99 Of course, the US threat remained a 
serious concern to the Chinese leadership. Their Vietnam policy after 1965, nevertheless, had 
come to assume a strong anti-Soviet stance. The Chinese government ostensibly allowed the 
Soviet Union to transport supplies to North Vietnam through the Chinese railway 
corridors.100 And yet, logistical disputes soon emerged to plague the delivery process. The 
high-level officials in both Moscow and Beijing were reluctant to ease the matter.101 Mao, in 
particular, portrayed Moscow’s proposal for a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese summit to achieve 
“concerted actions” as an attempt to bring the Chinese and other “brothers parties to obey 
their command.” The Chinese thereby asserted that realignment with the Soviets in aiding 
the Vietnamese communists would help Moscow “promote the US-Soviet co-dominance 
over the world.”102 
If the geopolitical pressures from America’s escalation of the Vietnam War after 1965 
had been sufficient for the Sino-Soviet leaders to overcome their disputes, the leaders in 
Beijing would have welcomed and tried to facilitate the delivery of Soviet aid to the DRV. 
But it turned out that they were persistently opposed to Hanoi’s acceptance of Soviet 
support. In October 1965, Zhou Enlai cautioned Pham Van Dong not to accept military 
equipment from the Soviets.103 According to a Soviet intelligence report, Beijing did work to 
prevent the stationing of the Soviet heavy weapons in Chinese provinces close to Vietnam.104 
Meanwhile, China stepped up its military aid to Hanoi in 1965, which reached its peak in 
1968, the height of the Cultural Revolution.105 Such a dramatic increase of Chinese aid was 
in large part motivated by the imperative to compete with the Soviets for status preeminence 
in Indochina. Arguably, the prospect of Hanoi leaning toward Moscow was more imminent 
than the expansion of military conflicts to the Chinese borders. For China’s part, therefore, 
the DRV’s importance in countering the Soviet design to encircle China from Southeast Asia 
had trumped its role as a counterweight to US military forces. 																																																																		
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At a meeting with the Albanian party leaders Enver Hoxha in late March, Zhou 
elaborated on the rationales behind Beijing’s pursuit of delegitimation strategy against 
Moscow. This conversation arguably reveals genuine motives on the Chinese part. Albania’s 
alliance relationship with China was largely symbolic, as the country was geographically 
remote from China and not powerful in material terms. It could not help further China’s 
geopolitical security; rather, its role was to boost China’s propaganda campaign against the 
Soviet Union around the globe. As such, Zhou had every reason to share his thought with 
this foreign guest in order to keep this ideological ally. While stressing that “the most 
important [enemy] is……American imperialism,”106 the Chinese premier spent more time 
denouncing the Soviet Union for colliding with the Americans. Zhou asserted in particular 
that, “Vietnam and Indochina have become the center of the war against American 
imperialism, modern revisionism, and the reactionaries of the various countries.”107 As a 
corollary, the Soviet proposal for any kind of peace must be rejected. This line of reasoning 
figured prominently in Chinese diplomatic strategy. In May, Zhou Enlai insisted to Ho Chi 
Minh that the Soviet proposal for the cease-fire dialogue between Hanoi and Washington 
was to “put the NLF [the Hanoi-sponsored guerilla forces] aside and sell out its brothers.” 
Deng Xiaoping went on to argue that Moscow’s aid to Hanoi was designed to serve its 
self-interests and the Chinese were willing to expose this on the Vietnamese behalf.108 All 
these remarks resonated with Mao’s emphasis on the need to step up military struggles in 
Vietnam.109 For the Chinese leaders, any form of military cooperation would increase 
Hanoi’s dependence on the Soviet Union, a superpower they now deemed as a geopolitical 
threat.   
The Chinese leaders not only engaged in the rhetoric of criticizing the alleged Soviet 
collusion with the US in suppressing the revolutions worldwide; they also made efforts to 
exemplify what a faithful revolutionary diplomacy should look like. Here, what 
differentiates the Chinese support for the Vietnamese struggles against the US from its 
pursuit of offensive alliance with the DRV was that Beijing tried to dictate how the 
Vietnamese should fight against the Americans. It is worth noting that the symbolic value of 
the Chinese aid to North Vietnam far exceeded its material function of fighting against the 
US forces. The Chinese aid by itself was actually insufficient to guarantee a military success 
of the DRV—as Ho Chi Minh said in private, “the Chinese aid was insignificant.”110 By 
contrast, the Soviet missiles proved to have boosted the DRV’s defense performance 																																																																		
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tremendously. 111  The Chinese leaders were unimpressed. They instead justified their 
opposition to the Soviet aid by invoking the People’s War doctrine, thereby seeking to 
display the appeal of China’s revolutionary ideology. On this matter, the prevailing 
ideological discourse in China frequently found its way into the diplomatic statements made 
by the top leaders in Beijing. Specifically, Zhou Enlai protested to Ho against Hanoi’s 
acceptance of Soviet military aid by asserting that the war “could only be won if it was 
played by the way China had outlined: Mao’s strategy of a people’s war.”112 In a speech 
titled “Long Live the People’s War,” Defense Minister Lin Biao chastised the Soviet 
leadership since Khrushchev for seeking peace with the imperialists to demoralize 
revolutionary forces across the world. Accordingly, Lin extolled Mao’s revolutionary 
doctrine and asserted that the Chinese model of mobilizing the mass has worldwide 
applicability.113 In the speech, Lin mentioned Vietnam most frequently as the place where 
the international revolutionary forces were gaining strength. A rising star in Chinese politics 
after 1962, Lin followed Mao closely in indoctrinating the military with Mao’s ideological 
thinking. At the critical juncture of late 1965 when the Mao-Liu conflict was at its zenith, 
many leaders in Beijing certainly could not afford to depart from the Maoist ideology of war, 
which prioritized grassroots-based guerrilla warfare over military professionalism. By 
extolling the People’s War doctrine, Lin bandwagoned with Mao in order to boost personal 
prestige.114  
As a corollary of promoting its own model of revolutionary warfare, the Chinese 
declined various offers for negotiating an end to the Vietnam War. They insisted that the 
Vietnamese persevere in their armed struggles, as this would allow Beijing to claim status 
preeminence over Moscow in terms of the ability to wage revolutions abroad. Hence, the 
Chinese leadership not only refused to cooperate with Moscow for negotiating any form of 
peace in Indochina; they also took this opportunity to assault the Soviet credibility in 
assuming the leadership in the anti-imperialist drive. Between 1965 and 1968, Beijing 
rejected a number of international initiatives committed to a negotiated peace Indochina.115 
The fact that Moscow was an active force behind many of these peace initiatives gave Beijing 
considerable ammunition in pursuit of its delegitimation strategy.116 During the bombing 																																																																		
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pause over the 1965 Christmas holiday, the senior diplomat Averell Harriman and the vice 
president in the Johnson administration, Hubert Humphery, travelled around the world to 
spread the message of Johnson’s readiness to negotiate without conditions. A senior official 
in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jerzy Michalowski, also took Harriman’s visit to his country 
as a chance for building bridge between the US and the Sino-Vietnamese bloc. In China, 
however, the polish diplomat only managed to see deputy foreign minister Wang Bingnan 
who rejected his peace proposals.117 In a similar vein, Soviet politburo member Alexander 
Shlepin was given a cold shoulder in Beijing where Mao only sent deputy premier Li 
Xiannian to meet with him. Li urged the Soviets to step up pressures on the US in Berlin and 
West Germany; as such, the Chinese implicitly asked the Soviets to demonstrate they were 
faithful revolutionaries.118 It was inconceivable that Moscow would follow the Chinese 
advice to reverse its policy of détente with Washington. The Chinese purpose, in fact, was 
not to coordinate with the Soviets in an effort to tilt the global balance of power to their 
favor. Rather, Beijing simply wanted to embarrass Moscow, which had long been the center 
of aspiration for socialist and nationalist revolutions around the world. Revealing the 
Soviets’ lack of faith in supporting revolutions in the Third World could serve to 
delegitimize the Soviet authority in the international communist hierarchy. In stressing the 
need for armed struggles, Mao invoked an ideological rationale. “The struggle against 
modern revisionism is the international duty of all Marxist-Leninist,” he argued in a meeting 
with Ho Chi Minh. But he also urged the DRV leader to “consider in what kind of a situation 
[North Vietnam] will be once [Soviet] revisionism has left the stage.”119  
Nevertheless, the Chinese were not immune to geostrategic ramifications in the pursuit 
of great-power status vis-à-vis the Soviets in Southeast Asia. Beijing’s overriding objective 
was to keep Hanoi as a faithful ally. A December 1965 report from the Soviet embassy in 
Hanoi reveals the geopolitical rationale behind China’s policy of status competition. 
According to the report, China’s staunch opposition to peace negotiations “contains the 
actions of the Vietnamese, reinforces their inflexible positions……and in practice means the 
tying of the Vietnamese side to the Chinese line.”120 At a later moment, the Chinese premier 
was quite explicit about China’s own security imperatives, as he pointed out to Pham Van 
Dong, “for a long time, the United States has been half-encircling China. Now the Soviet 
Union is also encircling China. The circle is getting complete, except [the part of] 																																																																																																																																																																																																								
Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, chap. 5. 
117 Zhai, “Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks,” 12. 
118 Ibid., 13. Also see Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, and Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam 
(South Bend, Ind.: Regnery Publishing, 1978), 167.  
119 Excerpts from a Note by GDR Ambassador to the DRV Kohrt on the Current Policy of the Chinese Leadership, 11 
December 1965, in “Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents on Vietnam,” 385.   
120 Cited in Friedman, Shadow Cold War, 165.  
	146		
Vietnam.”121 As such, Beijing’s assertion of ideological superiority over Moscow acted as a 
form of soft power to expel the Soviet influences from its southern vicinity. China sought to 
advance geopolitical security through competitive status-seeking acts.  
To summarize, through the substantial aid to Hanoi for its struggle against America, 
China sought to delegitimize the Soviet credentials for leading the anti-imperialist drive in 
the international arena. Delegitimation strategy helped to signal Chinese prestige based on 
the ideological appeal of the Chinese communist regime. It reached a climax after Kosygin’s 
aborted effort to promote Sino-Soviet cooperation in supporting Hanoi’s armed struggle 
against the American forces. From 1965 to 1967, both the geopolitical threat facing China and 
the elite conflict within the country had intensified to an unprecedented degree for China. 
Mao was particularly active in promoting anti-Soviet stance. In an effort to promote 
revolution in Vietnam, Mao asserted China’s great-power status vis-à-vis the Soviets in 
terms of commitment to revolutionary struggles against the capitalist order. Domestically, 
this strategy also worked to put other leaders at a disadvantage in the run-up to the Cultural 
Revolution. A variant of competitive status-seeking strategy, delegitimation strategy helped 
Mao signal resolve to defend the Chinese communist state against the pernicious influence 
of Soviet revisionism; in this way, it also served as an ideological weapon against those who 
appeared to have acted against his ideological doctrines. It was through such symbolic acts 
in the international arena that Mao managed to reassert personal authority on the home 
front, which was necessary for launching large-scale political campaign in 1966-1967.  
It is conceivable, though, that Mao genuinely tried to promote China’s status within the 
international communist movement. That is, his staunch support for the Hanoi regime 
might be motivated by the desire to demonstrate Beijing’s competence in living up to the 
revolutionary doctrine of fighting against imperialists.122 That desire might be genuine on 
Mao’s part and shared by other top leaders—in this sense, the Chinese leaders might have 
valued status in its own right. True, Mao could see intrinsic value in Hanoi’s application of 
his revolutionary doctrines for fighting against the US in Indochina. But this value was 
indeed congruent with the need for political survival and China’s geopolitical interests. 
Undeniably, China’s pursuit of delegitimation strategy against the Soviets could serve 
Beijing’s geopolitical interest by keeping Hanoi within the Chinese orbit. Also, it might help 
Mao outmaneuver his domestic political rivals who had appeared as acting against his 
ideological beliefs. Moreover, focusing on Mao’s ideological predisposition is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for explaining the Chinese aversion to Hanoi accepting any peace 																																																																		
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initiatives from the international community. In what follows, it shall be shown that after 
Hanoi dealt a fatal blow to America’s fighting spirit through the Tet Offensive in 1968, 
Chinese leaders began to favor the negotiation approach as adopted by their Vietnamese 
counterparts. The shift in China’s approach to the Vietnam War was driven by an acute 
sense of the Soviet threat, as well as the changing domestic political environment. The 
prestige politics on the domestic front had come to attenuate with the establishment of 
absolute authority of Mao. The Chinese leaders thus gained more autonomy in taking a 
relatively risk-averse approach to coping with the Soviet threat.  
 
Toward the Ninth Party Congress: Domestic Order Consolidation and the End of China’s 
Delegitimation Strategy 
The years of 1966-1967 witnessed the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution. Social 
disorders, terrors of anarchy, and group violence incidents reigned across China in this 
period. The collapse of state bureaucracies deprived Liu of his power base—as such, Mao 
emerged triumphant in the power struggle that began in 1962. Subsequently, he turned 
attention to the imperative of restoring orders at home. True, the dynamics of elite conflict 
were still of much relevance to what happened after 1968, and ruthless conflicts among the 
Politburo elite were indeed a central characteristic of Chinese politics till Mao’s death in 1976. 
However, all these things should not belie the fact that the Chairman was unchallengeable at 
home during most of the Cultural Revolution. As such, he no longer needed prestige to 
legitimize personal authority. It was prestige that stemmed from his authority rather than 
the other way around.  
In 1968, as Mao made his mind to restore orders by sending in the People’s Liberation 
Army, he was determined to restore social orders, and reunify the Politburo elite around 
him. His ultimate purpose was to restore orders and re-institutionalize the pre-Cultural 
Revolution practices. As two leading historians on the Cultural Revolution note, “the 
reconstructed political system was in the end not so much what Mao might have called a 
‘negation’ of what had preceded it, as a modified version staffed by new people, principally 
PLA officers.”123 For all its inadequacies, this system accommodated no rival factions to 
Mao. So there was no need for Mao to resort to prestige as a vehicle for authority contests. 
On top of that, the Wuhan Incident in the summer of 1967 laid bare the limits of the 
Chairman’s charismatic authority. That incident happened as a mob of soldiers and party 
cadres in Wuhan detained the senior officials sent from Beijing to meditate local factional 
conflicts. Mao was scheduled to meet with the mass rallies in Wuhan at that time, but the 
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spot was too chaotic to guarantee his physical security if he made a public appearance.124 
The Wuhan Incident reveals that “[Mao’s] personal authority gave him enough power to 
unleash potent social forces……but not enough power to control them.”125 Shocked by the 
Wuhan Incident, Mao decided to enforce social orders. State apparatus was a critical vehicle 
for him to attain this end, as they would arguably be more effective than grassroots 
organizations in imposing disciplines.  
Now the supreme leader was determined to subordinate his prestige to political 
institutions. Toward this end, Mao needed the old cadres to help him restore social orders. 
Many of the old cadres in the political wilderness after late 1966 had close connections with 
the military; as such, they could provide the last resort for Mao to maintain regime 
stability.126 Mao’s decision to bring them back to power showed his disinclination to 
continue to rely upon prestige for political survival.  
 Indeed, there is no good reason to resort to prestige politics for consolidating authority 
when Mao already stood unrivaled domestically. With the removal of Liu out of the political 
arena and the Liu-led state bureaucracies overturned, Mao had put in place his idealized 
institutions. At least this was what he declared to be by the end of 1967—and so personal 
prestige was no longer a dominant vehicle for domestic legitimation. According to an expert 
on the Cultural Revolution, “labeling Liu Shaoqi the number one enemy served a dual 
purpose: it answered Mao’s psychological need to find a ‘Chinese Khrushchev,’ and it 
provided a common target for mass criticism.”127 More important, eliminating the “Chinese 
Khrushchev” signified Mao’s political triumph. As such, the Party elite and the whole nation 
could rally around Mao who was poised to reverse the chaotic course of the Cultural 
Revolution.  
Absent prestige politics at home, the Chinese leadership could address the security 
imperatives on their own merits without implicating their own prestige in foreign policy 
decisions—as least Mao was able to do this and relieve other leaders of concerns for 
personal prestige. Meanwhile, developments in the Vietnam War also reduced the incentive 
for Chinese leaders to continue their policy of status competition. The Tet Offensive signaled 
Hanoi’s quest for independence from Beijing’s tutelage in fighting against the Americans. In 
tactical terms, the Tet Offensive signified Hanoi’s departure from protracted guerrilla 
warfare in rural areas—a strategy that the Chinese had strongly recommended—in favor of 
positional warfare targeting the cities.128 The political implication was that Hanoi would no 
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longer act under Beijing’s guidance on military matters.129 On top of that, Hanoi’s shift 
toward positional warfare increased the importance of Soviet weapon support. As long as 
Hanoi wanted to continue its fight, its reliance on the Soviet material aid was to grow; 
accordingly, its tilt toward Moscow was irreversible over time.130 In short, Hanoi’s decision 
on the Tet Offensive indicated that Beijing’s delegitimation strategy had almost failed. 
Moreover, China’s geopolitical environment was undergoing profound changes. 
America’s unilateral halt of bombing North Vietnam indicated a reduction of the military 
threat in Indochina. And despite the continued Soviet influences in Vietnam, the focus of 
Sino-Soviet rivalry increasingly shifted to the north in 1968. The militarization of the 
Sino-Soviet northeastern border and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 combined 
to convince the Chinese leaders that the probability of the Soviet interference in Chinese 
domestic politics was high.131 Finally, Hanoi’s refusal to join the Chinese in condemning the 
Soviet invasion demonstrated that Beijing’s delegitimation strategy against Moscow in 
Indochina was hard to sustain.132 Equally important, the Soviets had proved themselves 
more capable of providing material aid that the Vietnamese needed. The year 1967 saw the 
largest Vietnamese request of Soviet aid, a testimony that the Chinese were no rival to the 
Soviets in sustaining an anti-imperialist stance.133  
Given all these developments, China had come close to falling out of favor with the 
Vietnamese communists. For Beijing’s part, then, stabilizing the situation in Indochina began 
to take priority over the pursuit of delegitimation strategy against Moscow. That could 
allow China to shift more attention and energy toward addressing the Soviet threat 
elsewhere. Confronted with this imperative, the Chinese became reluctant to persevere in 
their competition with the Soviets for Hanoi’s mind and heart. Rather, the Chinese leaders 
could only complain about the North Vietnamese departure from their favored policy line. 
Upon knowing Hanoi’s decision to negotiate, Zhou Enlai argued to the North Vietnamese 
counterparts that Hanoi had agreed prematurely to the American negotiation offer without 
gaining sufficient advantages on the battlefield. 134  On this occasion, the chief party 
ideologue Kang Sheng made no reference to the people’s war doctrine that had previously 
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consent to private meetings that had a greater chance to produce substantial progress.” See Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, 121.  
131 Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 203-10. 
132 Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 177. 
133 Information, [undated], in “Twenty-Four Soviet-Bloc Documents on Vietnam,” 396. 
134 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 172-73. 
	150		
linked the Cultural Revolution’s ideological zeal to the Vietnam War.135 The Chinese, 
though, made repeated assertions to the North Vietnamese that the Soviets would be 
unreliable and that cooperation with them would not Hanoi’s interests. But it is worth 
noting here that they no longer pressured their Vietnamese counterparts to follow their 
ideological guidance.  
China’s approach to the Vietnam War took a radical turn when Beijing endorsed 
Hanoi’s participation in the Paris negotiation with Washington.136  Mao, in particular, 
decided that the Chinese support for negotiation could better help the Vietnamese. “We 
agree with your slogan of fighting while negotiating. Some comrades worry that the US will 
deceive you. But I tell them not to [worry], negotiations are just like fighting.”137  
The Chinese enthusiasm for supporting Hanoi’s war effort also waned. As he told the 
DRV prime minister, “keep what you still need and we withdraw what you no longer need 
or do not yet need.”138 “After the opening of the Paris peace talks,” historian Zhai Qiang 
observes, “China began to pull back its support troops from the DRV [Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam]. It completed the withdrawal of its antiaircraft artillery units in March 1969. By 
July 1970 all the rest of the Chinese support troops had returned home.”139 China had never 
ceased its anti-Soviet rhetoric afterwards. But for delegitimation strategy to work, words 
need to be coupled with deeds. Through its unconditional support for Hanoi’s fight against 
the American military presence in Indochina, Beijing had tried unsuccessfully to outcompete 
Moscow in terms of commitment to anti-imperialist revolutionary doctrines. The departure 
from this position thus signaled Beijing’s abandonment of delegitimizing the Soviet 
leadership role in the communist world. It is also important to note that by encouraging 
negotiations Beijing was in effect taking the Soviet stance, which they previously 
stigmatized as an act of collusion with the imperialists. Needless to say, Beijing had come to 
phase out its delegitimation strategy.140  
Beijing’s abandonment of delegitimation strategy was made possible by the attenuation 
of elite infighting in Chinese domestic politics after 1968. Prior to 1968, Mao supported 
																																																																		
135 For Kang Sheng’s words, see 77 Conversations, 128-131.  
136 Khoo, Collateral Damage, 39-41.  
137 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 17 November, 1968, in Ibid., 143.  
138 Ibid. 
139 Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 179. 
140 China resumed massive delivery of aid to Vietnam in 1971. But this was not designed to demonstrate China’s ideological 
commitment to the Vietnamese revolution; rather, China intended its aid to help the Vietnamese fight more effectively 
against the US forces and accordingly, to pressure the US to conclude the Paris peace agreement. As the Chinese leaders 
believed, this would help disengage the US from military and diplomatic commitments in Vietnam and keep the Vietnam 
issue from complicating the US-China collaboration against the Soviet Union. See Li Danhui, “Zhongmei huanhe yu 
yuanyue kangmei: zhongguo waijiao zhanlue tiaozheng zhong de yuenan yinsu” [the US-China rapprochement and the 
China’s efforts to aid Vietnam and struggle against the US: the Vietnam factor in the adjustment of Chinese foreign policy 
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Vietnamese fighting America partly in order to boost personal prestige and discredit his 
political rivals. With this objective accomplished after the purge of Liu and Deng, 
geopolitical issues rose to the top of Mao’s agenda. Absent the need to use national security 
strategy as an instrument in domestic prestige politics, Mao could rely upon other 
risk-averse strategies than delegitimation strategy to address the Soviet threat. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter addresses a second variant of competitive status-seeking strategy as practiced 
by Chinese leaders: delegitimation strategy. It is particularly focused on the implications of 
the Sino-Soviet split for China’s approach to the Vietnam War after 1965. With Moscow 
showing an tendency to intervene in Vietnam, the delegitimating rhetoric employed by 
Beijing in the early 1960s began to evolve into delegitimation strategy, which could serve to 
extrude the Soviet influence from Indochina. With the post-GLF dynamics of institutional 
change heightening individual leaders’ reliance upon personal prestige, on the other hand, 
the Chinese leaders—notably Mao Zedong—had growing incentives to opt for 
delegitimation strategy—a variant of competitive status-seeking strategy—that promises to 
serve their geopolitical and domestic political ends. As such, China’s delegitimation strategy 
against the Soviet Union reflects the instrumental roles of personal prestige and great-power 
status—specifically, it underscores the importance of prestige in legitimizing leaders’ 
personal authority at home, and the relevance of great-power status to China’s geopolitical 
security.  
The escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965 presents a critical case for testing this claim 
against competing hypotheses. Defensive realism posits that external imperatives can 
motivate a prudent policy of balancing. This hypothesis is disconfirmed by the fact that the 
concern for personal prestige—fueled by institutional change dynamics—did hinder Beijing 
from joining forces with Moscow to support Hanoi’s fight against the United States. On the 
other hand, the authoritarian politics thesis seems well placed for explaining Mao’s 
persistent tendency to compete with the Soviet Union for leadership of the international 
communist movement. This thesis, however, is indeterminate as regards the concrete 
strategies by which Mao competed with Moscow. Arguably, Mao’s delegitimizing rhetoric 
on Moscow’s betrayal of revolutionary Leninism reflected an idiosyncratic preference for 
preeminence in the communist world. However, personal idiosyncrasies as a constant 
cannot explain variation in China’s international conduct. Specifically, the personality factor 
does not explain why Mao did not translate delegitimating rhetoric into competitive acts 
against the Soviets in Africa, whereas he did so in Vietnam. As such, focusing on the 
characters of authoritarian leaders does not offer sufficient explanatory leverage over the 
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variation in China’s international conduct.  
By contrast, my argument suggests that leaders would opt for competitive 
status-seeking strategy when they face the need to assert great-power status in response to 
geopolitical threats and rely on prestige for their political survival at home—in so doing, 
they assert (but not necessarily gain) great-power status and personal prestige to both 
geopolitical and domestic political rivals. This argument not only explains the anomaly in 
Chinese security policy seen from the defensive realist standpoint, but also addresses the 
variation in a crucial aspect of Chinese international conduct—namely, the translation of 
delegitimating rhetoric into delegitimation strategy against the Soviet influences in Vietnam. 
The argument advanced here, however, does not seek to explain all cases of Chinese 
promotion of revolutions in the Third World. Indeed, the Chinese support for the Third 
World revolutions beyond Vietnam receives scant attention here. Investigating why China 
launched comprehensive campaigns to discredit the Soviet leadership in the communist 
world is certainly important in its own right.141 That said, inasmuch as this study is focused 
on the relevance of security imperatives to competitive status-seeking acts, it is appropriate 
it select the Vietnam War as a case study. 
																																																																		
141 See, for instance, Friedman, Shadow Cold War; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and 
the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 160-70.  
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Chapter 5 
China’s Use of Military Force:  
From the 1969 Border Conflict to the Invasion of Vietnam in 1979 
  
 
Our proposals are: (1) Our border garrisons should not respond to the demands of the Soviet border 
garrisons. (2) We should adjust the positions of our cannons, aiming at the enemy’s artillery posts 
and concealed concentration areas for T-62 tanks and armored vehicles. After the enemy artillery has 
fired for a few days, we should suddenly fire back, causing heavy casualties for them. We should then 
issue our protest statement.   
Zhou Enlai’s report to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao (April 1969)1 
 
We find that Vietnam has become totally Soviet-controlled, and the fact of its flagrant invasion of 
Cambodia, its plot to establish an Indochinese Federation under Vietnamese control is more grave 
than you think……Proceeding therefore from global strategic as well as from Asian considerations, 
we consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambition of the Vietnamese and to give them an 
appropriate limited lesson. 
Deng Xiaoping’s conversation with Jimmy Carter (January 1979)2 
 
 
This chapter addresses a third variety of competitive status-seeking strategy in Chinese 
security policy: the use of military force. Given its conceptual proximity to coercive 
diplomacy, this chapter in the first place tries to empirically distinguish coercive diplomacy 
from a competitive status-seeking policy of using force. A second task then is to examine 
how great-power status and personal prestige could take on instrumental roles for state 
leaders and motivate their pursuit of competitive status-seeking strategy.  
It is critical to note that not all policies involving the use of force qualify as a strategy for 
competitive status-seeking strategy. When it comes to the use of military power, competitive 
status-seeking strategy entails states demonstrating military power as a symbol of status. To 
this end, leaders would place a premium on the symbolic value of military power. Thus, a 
state’s international conduct may exhibit a lack of specification of political demands on the 
adversary prior to the employment of military power. In addition, the use of military power 
for the purpose of competitive status-seeking strategy would lack the reassurance 																																																																		
1  Cited in Report, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, 3 April 1969, in “New Evidence on Sino-Soviet 
Rapprochement,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 11 (Winter 1998), 162. For the original text, see 
Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan, vol., 554-55. 
2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, vol. XIII (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 2013), 767-68.  
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component essential to the conduct of coercive diplomacy. Finally, for the practitioners of 
competitive status-seeking strategy to enhance the prospects of success in achieving 
preeminent status internationally, they would prefer not targeting the chief adversary, 
which is higher-ranked and often militarily powerful. Instead, the leaders would likely 
impose military punishment on a materially weaker state aligned with their major 
geopolitical adversary. All these behavioral traits are sufficient to differentiate status 
competition from coercive diplomacy when it comes the display of military power.  
The two cases examined here illustrate these differences between a military strategy of 
status seeking and coercive diplomacy. While in both cases China employed military power, 
the two cases assume dissimilar characteristics. China’s use of military force against the 
Soviet border guards in 1969 approximates to a model of coercive diplomacy. In this case 
Beijing’s leaders stressed the need to stabilize the border conditions and went to 
considerable lengths to deescalate tensions with the Soviets. By contrast, China’s military 
operation against Vietnam in 1979 was designed to punish Hanoi for its alignment with the 
Soviet Union and the occupation of Cambodia, China’s crucial diplomatic partner in 
Southeast Asia. Apparently, the use of military force by China in 1979 did not aim at altering 
Vietnam’s international conduct immediately. In this case, China’s conflict strategy features 
a lack of specification of demands on Vietnam, and Beijing’s signaling of self-restraint to 
Hanoi was half-hearted. China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 as such is better categorized as 
competitive status-seeking strategy against the Soviet Union, whose support for Vietnam is 
directly accountable for China’s military acts.  
Why did the conflict behaviors undertaken by the Chinese leaders differ so significantly 
between the 1969 Sino-Soviet and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border wars? Through an 
examination of China’s conflict strategy in 1969, the development of US-China relations, and 
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, this chapter argues that state leaders are 
not likely to opt for competitive status-seeking strategy unless institutional change dynamics 
at home fuel their concerns for personal prestige while geopolitical threats encourage them 
to assert great-power status which provides a route to security. In the 1969 case, only a 
geopolitical threat is present. When individual leaders do not need rely on personal prestige 
as a vehicle for consolidating domestic authority, there are no concerns for personal prestige 
and so leaders’ implementation of conflict strategy approximates the model of coercive 
diplomacy. This was manifest in Beijing’s defensive posture and demonstrated restraint 
during the Zhenbao Island crisis. In the 1979 case, the Sino-Soviet rivalry had featured 
elements of military confrontation and the Deng-Hua struggle for post-Mao institutional 
reforms heightened the instrumental importance of personal prestige as a resource for 
political survival. Correspondingly, China’s conflict behaviors exhibited elements of 
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competitive status-seeking strategy. Typically, it chose a lesser power—Vietnam—as the 
direct target of military operation. In addition, China fell short in specifying its demand on 
Vietnam and trying to reassure Hanoi of the limits of its actions prior to the 1979 military 
invasion.  
The two cases of China’s use of military power also contrast with the case of US-China 
rapprochement. The US-China rapprochement shows that absent pressures for institutional 
change, leaders would not rely upon prestige as a vehicle to legitimize their power at home. 
As such, they could afford to make concessions with the adversary.  
 
The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflict 
In early 1969 Mao took an important step to restore domestic orders by convening the party 
elite across the country to Beijing for the Ninth Party Congress. As many of the delegates to 
the congress were radicals who benefited from the Chairman’s campaign to overthrow the 
old bureaucratic elites, they arguably harbored full-hearted loyalty to Mao who now 
decided to end the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.3 The Ninth Party Congress signified 
Mao ability to impose solidarity upon the party elite. Arguably he would enjoy considerable 
latitude in conducting national security strategy. It was striking to audiences in China and 
beyond that during this period Mao escalated conflict with the Soviet Union over the 
Zhenbao Island, a disputed territory on the Sino-Soviet borders. Why did this armed clash 
happen? What factors could inform Mao’s decision to take on the Soviets?  
 
The Escalation of the Sino-Soviet Border Rivalry 
Mao’s decision to escalate conflict against the Soviet Union in 1969 is explicable in light of 
his threat perception of the Soviet intent of encroaching on the Chinese borders.  
Early in July 1964, Mao was keen on emphasizing the existing Sino-Soviet tensions. He 
reacted vehemently to the signing of a Soviet-Outer Mongolian defense agreement.4 In this 
context, he intensified criticism of past Russia-Soviet imperialist practices before a group of 
Japanese visitors in the same month. However, Mao’s statement worked to sabotage the 
border negotiations between the Chinese and Soviet diplomats, which had come close to a 
successful end.5 One of Mao’s close associates recalled that Mao did not want to achieve any 
concrete result in the negotiation.6  
This piece of evidence should be treated with caution. It is likely though that Mao 
probably intended to advertise an imperialist image of the Soviet Union, which could help 																																																																		
3 MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution, 288-89. 
4 Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 276.  
5 Li, “Cong fenlie dao duikang, 1960-1978,” in Zhongsu guanxi shigang, 396.  
6 Ibid., 396 (fn. 5).  
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to justify his anti-Soviet rhetoric. He thus might have intended the anti-Soviet rhetoric as a 
prelude to the full-fledged practice of delegitimation strategy. Equally important, however, 
Mao’s perception of the Soviet threat might have gone beyond border issues. The Chinese 
fear of encirclement by superpowers was persistently intense during the Cold War—and 
this misgiving just intensified after the mid-1960s. The Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed in 1966, as the Cultural 
Revolution chaos attended by the ideological excesses posed an unprecedented threatening 
image to both countries.7 The treaty signified a formal alliance against China: it allowed the 
Soviets to station increasing military forces along the Chinese borders.8 On the other hand, 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the promulgation of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine afterwards signaled Moscow’s resolve to eliminate by force the perceived rivals 
within the socialist camp.9 These developments in and beyond China’s neighborhood 
deeply unsettled Mao, who arranged for the publication of a People’s Daily editorial 
denouncing the Soviet invasion of a small country.10 Reportedly, Mao even stated that the 
Soviet army would invade China to bring the “revisionists” back to power.11 At various 
meetings with foreign delegations, Mao and Zhou invariably charged the Soviet military 
invention as an imperialist practice.12  
Reportedly, there occurred over four thousand border clashes from October 1964 to the 
Zhenbao Island clashes. Although this number might be exaggerated, it nevertheless 
testified to the severity of Sino-Soviet tensions along the borders.13 Such level of security 
threat was serious enough to warrant the use of military force, by which leaders in Beijing 
could signal Chinese resolve for defending their territorial claims and deter the Soviet force. 
Yet, Chinese military response was characterized by a great deal of self-restraint. As 
Beijing’s leaders took pains to contain the conflict in intensity and scope, the Chinese 
behavior approximates coercive diplomacy more than competitive status-seeking strategy.  
 
China’s Coercive Diplomacy toward the Soviet Union 
On March 2, the local Chinese military units clashed with the Soviet forces. There is no 																																																																		
7 Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens, 174-195; Sergey Radchenko, "The Soviets’ Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian 
Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split," Cold War international History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper, no. 42 (November 
2003): 16-19. 
8 Xu Yan, “1969 nian zhongsu bianjie de wuzhuang chongtu” [The 1969 Armed Conflict on Sino-Soviet Border], 
Dangdaishi yanjiu ziliao [studies of contemporary history], no. 5, 3-4.  
9 Matthew Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003). 
10 Mao Zedong nianpu, 1949-1976 vol. 6 [the chronological records of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 2013), 188. 
11 See Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 210.  
12 See Chen, Mao’s China, 245.  
13 Niu Jun, “1969 nian zhongsu bianjie chongtu yu zhongguo waijiao zhanlue de tiaozheng” [the 1969 Sino-Soviet border 
conflict and the adjustment of China’s foreign policy strategy], dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu [studies of modern Chinese 
history], no. 1 (1999), 71. 
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definitive conclusion as to who shot first, but it is highly likely that the Chinese did.14 In the 
following days, the concentration of Soviet troops along the borders brought the conflict to 
the verge of an all-out war between the two nations. The second violent clash took place on 
March 15 on a more intensive scale. As both sides were better prepared for the fight, they 
inflicted more casualties on each other.15 The Soviet side followed up with a series of 
threatening and conciliatory moves to bring down Beijing’s resolve. On April 26 Moscow 
proposed to resume lower-level discussions on the border issue with Beijing. Reopened in 
late May, the negotiations made no substantial progress. 16  Meanwhile, the Soviets 
undertook a series of preventive measures, including military deployment on the borders. 
They also instigated armed frictions in the border areas beyond the Zhenbao Island. From 
June to August small-scale clashes broke out in the widely scattered locations along the 
Sino-Soviet border.17 Apparently, all of these acts were intended to pressure the Chinese to 
accept Moscow’s terms in negotiations. In late August, the Soviet Union openly threatened 
nuclear attack on China. Meanwhile, the Soviets escalated the conflict by sending about 
three hundred soldiers—in conjunction with mechanized weapons and air force—to mount 
a conventional assault on Chinese border guards along the Xinjiang border.18  
This attack drove home to the Chinese leaders the sense of an all-out war. While Zhou 
Enlai managed to arrange a meeting with the Soviet premier Kosygin at the Beijing airport, 
Mao was deeply worried that the Soviet Union would take the chance to launch a surprise 
attack on China.19 To prevent escalation of the border conflict, he gave serious emphasis to 
confidence-building measures, and suggested that the border disputes could be shelved in 
order for both sides to establish peace.20 Consequently, Sino-Soviet border tensions began to 
phase out. 
China’s conflict behavior during the Zhenbao Island crisis approximates to a model of 
coercive diplomacy more than that of competitive status-seeking strategy. Analytically, one 
can distinguish coercive diplomacy from competitive status-seeking strategy by observing 
																																																																		
14 For the causes and details of the crisis, see Xu Yan, “1969 nian zhongsu bianjie de wuzhuang chongtu”; Kuisong Yang, 
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whether the coercer state offers an opportunity for its target to back down. The instruction 
issued by the Central Military Commission in early 1968 showed the Chinese inclination to 
do so. “To resort to any kind of self-defense,” it read, “you must see to it that courteous and 
peaceful means precede military action and that counterattacks are kept within Chinese 
territory.”21  
The central characteristic of Chinese conduct was a consistent effort to signal 
self-restraint while prosecuting the conflict for coercive purposes. Typically, China tried to 
avoid taking on the Soviets on a large scale. From 1966 on, armed frictions between the 
Chinese and Soviet personnel occurred frequently, as the Soviet border guards shifted to a 
more aggressive patrolling posture.22 Mao encouraged the Chinese border guards to use 
force to counter Soviet aggressiveness, but at the same time he counseled restraint. In 1968, 
the Central Military Commission instructed local PLA officials to “follow the principle of 
‘giving tit-for-tat’, ‘gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck’, and to ‘use 
military operations to support the diplomatic struggle’.”23 This instruction suggests that 
Mao intended the tit-for-tat strategy to signal Chinese resolve for defending the borders 
rather than to gain local military advantages. Behind the use of force China’s intention was 
defensive.  
The Chinese leaders also micromanaged the tit-for-tat strategy to reassure the Soviets 
that China harbored no intention to escalate the scope and level of violence. The central 
leadership instructed that “counter-attacks, if any, [were to be conducted] in a concentrated 
way……as quickly as possible without getting tied down by the enemy.”24 This strategy, 
though, failed to deter the Soviets from enhancing their military presence on the 
borders—and this led to the March 2 ambush by the Chinese border guards of the Soviet 
soldiers. Nevertheless, in the middle of the conflict escalation, Mao again counseled restraint. 
On March 15, as the second armed conflict erupted Mao suggested that while it was 
important to enhance China’s military preparedness for the long term, the current 
Sino-Soviet hostilities should not be related to any kind of “great war” (da zhan). 25 
Subsequently, he endorsed the military’s proposal not to retaliate immediately against the 
Soviet shelling on April 3.26  
Clearly, Mao micromanaged the conflict with the Soviets in order to signal the Chinese 
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resolve to defend their border while trying to restrict the scope of the conflict. He had gone 
to considerable lengths to reassure the Soviets lest the military conflict ran its course. In late 
March, Mao approved Zhou’s proposal for resuming border negotiations.27 In mid-May, the 
Chinese government issued an official statement on the Sino-Soviet border conflict, in which 
Mao ruled out the option of preemptive strike.28 In the meeting with a North Korean 
delegate, Mao said that China did not hope to fight war with the Soviets and there was no 
need to chastise the Soviets frequently.29 Indeed, after September 1968 the Peking Review—a 
major Chinese official journal for foreign consumption—significantly reduced polemical 
invectives against the Soviets.30 All these signs suggest that Mao resorted to means of 
diplomatic engagement to ensure that the military pressures China had exerted on the 
Soviets in early 1969 could work to restore the border peace. In this regard, Chinese conflict 
behaviors throughout the crisis approximates to the model of coercive diplomacy. 
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Why the Status Motive Did Not Lead to Competitive status-seeking strategy 
Although the geopolitical factor predominates my explanation, the psychological factor 
cannot be ruled out. Undeniably, the Chinese threat perception was mediated by Mao’s 
psychological dynamics and geostrategic concerns. Given that the great-power status could 
allow Beijing to gain an upper hand in its competition with Moscow for geopolitical 
influences in Asia and Mao had been engaged in the status struggle with the Soviets for 
years (as discussed in the preceding chapter), the status motive might have been a key factor 
in Mao’s geostrategic considerations. Thus, the Zhanbao crisis presents an ideal case for 
studying leaders’ decision when status ambitions diverge from security imperatives.  
It is important to note, on the other hand, that by 1969 personal prestige was no longer 
Mao’s dominant consideration. With Mao being domestically unchallengeable, there was no 
need for him to rely upon personal prestige to legitimize authority. From his unrivaled 
authority could flow enormous prestige (rather than the other way around). Mao’s 
unchallengeable position at home, therefore, granted him enormous latitude in foreign 
policy decisions. He was arguably able to deescalate the conflict with the Soviets. While the 
status motive cannot be ruled out, the empirical evidence demonstrates that Mao was 
capable of prudence in the conflict situation with the Soviets when an all-out war seemed to 
be imminent. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed in this case: status ambitions were a permissive factor 
for Beijing to launch a preventive conflict to deter the Soviets troop presence on the Chinese 
borders; yet this factor was insufficient to make the Chinese so determined to undertake 
conflict behaviors in the way that fits the model of competitive status-seeking strategy. 
The Zhenbao Island conflict in March 1969 took place at the time when Mao held 
indisputable power domestically. He had faced no rivals since mid-1968. Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping as well as the leaders associated with them had been ousted from power. 
Mao’s domestic priority then shifted from enhancing his grip on power via grassroots 
mobilization to restoring institutional order. By denouncing Liu and Deng as capitalist 
roaders, Mao ushered in mass movements against the bureaucratic establishment in which 
Liu and Deng had entrenched influences. As Mao declared war on the entire state 
bureaucracy, the ultraleftists took this opportunity to fill government posts with their own 
supporters. Led by Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife and the nominal leader of ultraleftist factions in 
the Politburo, the radicals set out to grab the leadership posts from the veteran 
revolutionaries in the name of promoting the Cultural Revolution and mobilizing the mass. 
The radicals were composed of intellectuals and secretaries close to Mao and relatively 
junior bureaucrats. The veteran revolutionaries—whose political careers dated back to the 
1920s—were guardians of institutional orders, and unsurprisingly averse to the leftists’ 
ambitions. While the destructions Mao wrought on the existing institutions precipitated the 
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split of the Politburo into rival factions, all pledged loyalty to Mao. Unlike the Mao-Liu 
factions, therefore, none of these rivals constituted a real challenge to Mao’s authority. 
In spite of this, tensions between the veteran revolutionaries and the radicals 
culminated in an emotional exchange at an enlarged Politburo Standing Committee meeting 
in February 1967 (known as the “February Countercurrent”). It annoyed Mao. The supreme 
leader found it hard to believe that the old revolutionary cadres—his decades-long 
lieutenants—harbored strong opposition to the Cultural Revolution. 31  Yet he showed 
leniency to the veteran revolutionaries to avert “the danger that the old guards would unite 
against himself.”32 The old guards had deeply entrenched influences in the government and 
military establishment. For the purpose of stabilizing the political order, Mao managed to 
mediate the conflict between the old guards and the radicals. With unrivaled authority at 
home, Mao decided at the Twelfth Plenum of Eighth Central Committee in October 1968 
that, “the revolution should approach its end by next summer.”33 As the radical phase of the 
Cultural Revolution came to an end after 1968, the Chairman came to realign himself with 
the veteran revolutionaries who were to help him restore domestic orders. In the 
preparatory stage of the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, he even managed to raise the profile 
of the veteran revolutionaries who challenged his Cultural Revolution programs in February 
1967.34 In particular, the Chairman suggested that the veteran revolutionaries be seated on 
the front lines and some of them be rehabilitated into the Politburo.35 In so doing, Mao 
sought to restore institutional power as the dominant means in providing ruling the country. 
Needless to say, he had decided to put individual charisma on the back burner, as it proved 
more efficient in eliminating political rivals than in constructing a new order at home.  
This is not to argue, of course, that the Chinese supreme leader harbored no status 
ambitions. He might have sought great-power status for its own sake—and this was 
showcased by his abiding preoccupation with elevating his status in the international 
communist movement.36 In this regard, the authoritarian politics thesis may suggest that an 
authoritarian leader like Mao who emerged out of harsh political struggles at home is prone 
to conflict abroad.37 Since the 1960s, according to Jin Qiu, “Mao’s psychological adjustment 
to aging was not that of a person coming to terms with himself and his family and 
immediate circumstances, but that of a man exaggerating the relationship between himself 
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as a powerful charismatic leader and the people, the country, and the causes he had led.”38 
As such, the Chairman was keen to demonstrate his indispensability to the Communist 
cause in China and the world.  
While status ambitions could be relevant in Mao’s decision to escalate the border 
disputes with the Soviets in 1969, status-seeking acts abroad had no similar implications for 
domestic politics as they had in the years of Mao-Liu split.39 Mao no longer expected his 
pursuit of great-power status to contribute to personal prestige at home. As the Chairman 
was intent on restoring institutional orders in the state bureaucracies, personal prestige was 
no longer the dominant vehicle for him to legitimize power. In particular, Mao sought to 
dampen the personality cult of himself by suggesting the term “Chairman Mao” be replaced 
by “Comrade Mao” at the preparatory meetings for the Ninth Party Congress—which was 
intended to provide a ritual for declaring an end to the Cultural Revolution.40 Mao’s 
unchallengeable position at home meant he did not need to rely upon prestige as a crucial 
vehicle for legitimizing his personal authority. This in turn allowed for more flexibility in his 
management of conflict crisis with the Soviets; he now had the freedom to back down from a 
tough stance abroad. As noted, he repeatedly counseled restraint in the use of military force 
against the Soviet border guards and had tentatively turned to diplomatic means to defuse 
the border tensions. In the final analysis, even if Mao’s decision to escalate the border 
conflict with the Soviet Union was in part driven by prestige, he could afford to cope with 
security imperatives in a risk-averse manner. As such, Chinese conflict behaviors during the 
1969 border conflicts exhibit no substantial traits of competitive status-seeking strategy. As 
is to be shown, during the crisis, statements by Mao and Zhou represented their effort to 
reassure the Soviets about the Chinese intention to restore peace with the Soviets. They 
feature elements of reassurance characteristic of a prudent exercise of coercive diplomacy. 
 
A Diversionary Conflict?  
The Zhenbao Island crisis coincided with the opening of the Ninth Party Congress. For 
contemporary observers, this conveys the impression that Chinese leaders initiated the 
border conflict in order to reimpose disciplines on Chinese society at large.41 Historian Yang 
Kuisong provides the most detailed account supportive of the thesis of diversionary conflict. 
In his argument, Mao intended the crisis with the Soviet Union to rally the party elite, as 
well as the general public, around him. This argument can be corroborated by Mao’s 
hyperbolic, bellicose rhetoric after the hostilities broke out, leading one to believe that Mao 																																																																		
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intended the Sino-Soviet hostilities to serve his domestic agenda.42  
In theory, though, the border tension Mao provoked might help to boost his prestige in 
the eyes of his domestic audiences, who might believe that the border conflict lent credence 
to Mao’s great-power status vis-à-vis the Soviets. And the Chinese supreme leader did 
exploit the prospect of war after the Zhenbao Island conflict broke out in March. During the 
Ninth Party Congress convened in late April, Mao repeatedly stressed that the Soviet 
invasion could help Chinese society to get mobilized.43 But the supreme leader’s public 
rhetoric does not necessarily reflect his genuine motive in escalating the border conflict with 
the Soviets. Crucially, it was in the wake of the eruption of the hostilities that Mao invoked 
this diversionary conflict logic. And despite his rhetoric that the whole national should get 
mobilized for a world war in the future, he did not stress the imminence of the war.44 Prior 
to the conflict, there was in fact few mention of the need for domestic mobilization. Rather, 
the Chairman repeatedly emphasized the security threat posed by the Soviet army on the 
disputed borders. Hence, the argument that Mao initiated the Zhenbao Island crisis in order 
to enhance domestic solidarity is problematic. Intuitively appealing as it is, the diversionary 
conflict thesis does not stand up to scrutiny in the case of the Zhenbao island conflict.  
On top of that, the diversionary conflict thesis as applied to the 1969 Sino-Soviet border 
conflict is flawed in theoretical terms. Arguably, armed conflicts with the Soviets carried real 
danger of war. Had the Soviet army invaded Chinese territory, the war would have 
destroyed the sociopolitical orders Mao had taken great pains to reestablish thus far. China 
in 1969 had passed the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution. Even if Mao had been 
determined to use a foreign policy crisis to quiet down domestic chaos, he would have 
chosen to instigate a crisis with the Soviets a year earlier, when the PLA was sent to take 
heavy-handed measures against the Red Guards movement in 1967.45 It turned out that the 
Chinese leader was able to cope with the regime crisis by means of sheer crackdown. Even if 
social orders had not been fully restored across China by 1969, this imperative at home 
arguably could only have a moderating effect on China’s conflict behavior. That is, it 
provided stronger incentives for China to avoid than to aggravate any international conflict. 
As Zhou told Kosygin at the Beijing airport, “now we have very many domestic problems to 
deal with. How can you believe that we want a war?” 46  Shortly thereafter, Zhou 
incorporated the suggestion of restoring border tranquility in a draft letter to Kosygin, to 
which Mao added that, “the stopgap measures to prevent armed conflict [should] not affect 
respective interpretations of the border issues and the sovereign ownership of the disputed 																																																																		
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areas by both sides.”47 This statement reflected Mao’s intention to keep the status quo on the 
border. After the Zhou-Kosygin meeting in September the Sino-Soviet crisis began to phase 
out. In spite of this, the Chairman in October relayed again his concern about the worsening 
Sino-Soviet relationship. As he remarked, “there is no need to continue diatribes against the 
Soviets……The Sino-Soviet split will only delight the Americans.”48 Quite evidently, Mao 
was reluctant to mobilize the Chinese public by inflaming anti-Soviet rhetoric. The fact that 
he did not do so suggests he had put aside the ideological agenda in pursuit of 
security-related ends. Seen in this light, domestic priorities strongly motivated the Chinese 
leaders to favor stability over conflict on the Sino-Soviet borders. Mao’s emphasis on 
domestic mobilization and ideological rhetoric would be better seen as a post-hoc 
rationalization of his decision to escalate border conflict with the Soviets.  
 
The Emergent Idea of US-China Rapprochement  
The formidable power at Mao’s disposal allowed him a wider room for maneuver in foreign 
policy. After 1969, Chinese diplomats, who had been recalled to participate in the Cultural 
Revolution at home, were returning to their posts.49 By implication, the daily functioning of 
Chinese diplomacy had returned to normal—and this signifies the top leaders’ decision to 
disentangle foreign affairs from internal turmoil. Upon the departure of a senior diplomat 
Lei Yang to Poland, Zhou Enlai instructed him to “take a close look at the development of 
Sino-American relations, especially the signs of change in US policy, and to report back on 
anything significant.” 50  From then on, the leadership in Beijing began to probe the 
possibility for ameliorating relations with the United States. 
The Chinese leaders were capable of this dramatic adjustment because absent pressures 
for institutional change they no longer relied upon prestige as the dominant vehicle for 
political survival. This is indeed consistent with my hypothesis that absent concerns for 
personal prestige, leaders would turn to relatively risk-averse strategies in handling security 
imperatives. Mao’s misgiving about the Soviet threat led him to reassess China’s security 
environment and the probe the possibility for strategic adjustments. In February 1969, Mao 
called on four marshals, Chen Yi, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying, and Xu Xiangqian, to study 
the international situation. As veteran revolutionaries and establishment leaders, the four 
marshals were long marginalized in their decision-making roles after the outset of the 
Cultural Revolution. The fact that the veteran revolutionaries were assigned such an 
important job signaled Mao’s determination to redefine national priorities. The new 
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direction of national policy was not immediately clear, though. Initially, the four marshals 
proceeded slowly and limited their first report to only general discussions of the 
international situation. While their reports argued that the probability of Soviet invasion of 
China was low, the issue of US-China rapprochement was too sensitive for them to touch 
upon.51 With the specter of an all-out war looming large in the following months, the four 
marshals eventually ventured to suggest playing the “American card” against the 
Soviets—although they intentionally kept this suggestion ambiguous in order not to deviate 
too far from the ideological orthodox of US-Soviet hostility toward China.52 There is no clear 
evidence suggesting Mao’s immediate response to the four marshals’ reports.  
Still, the Chairman did once urge the four marshals to provide “unconventional thought” 
on the international situation. This is sufficient to demonstrate that an idea of US-China 
rapprochement was emerging in the Chinese leadership. Zhou Enlai conveyed Mao’s 
message by suggesting that discussions among the four marshals not be restricted by any 
frameworks [buyao you tiaotiao kuangkuang].53 Crucially, this occurred shortly after the Ninth 
Party Congress, which still adhered to the ideological dogma in asserting the US-Soviet 
collusion against China. Of course, the four marshals felt restrained in proposing a too 
dramatic change in Chinese security policy lines. And careful investigations of Mao’s 
instructions in 1969 do suggest that Mao harbored no conclusive thoughts on the imperative 
of seeking rapprochement with the United States.54 But it is nevertheless clear that he 
allowed Zhou and the four marshals to make unprecedented suggestions. This 
extraordinary move facilitated his initiations of the US-China rapprochement once the 
Nixon administration proposed to resume diplomatic exchanges between Beijing and 
Washington. It is very likely, argues an eminent Chinese diplomatic historian, that “Zhou 
acted within the ideological parameters Mao had established to initiate the shift of Chinese 
security policy.”55     
 
The US-China Rapprochement   
The diplomatic history of the US-China rapprochement is well known. The success of the 
two former adversaries in reaching a modus vivendi was made possible not only by the 																																																																		
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common interests of Beijing and Washington in containing the Soviet aggressive posture but 
also by their patience and far-sightedness in diplomatic engagement. Scholarly works have 
scrutinized the US-China diplomacy that culminated in Richard Nixon’s historic visit to 
China in 1972. The Nixon trip signified the beginning of the US-China collaboration, and is 
worth being studied in its own right.56 This study does not repeat that endeavor. Instead, 
the emphasis here is on the diplomatic prudence of Chinese leaders who, despite ideological 
radicalism and dogmatism prevalent in the Cultural Revolution, were not so much 
constrained by pragmatic concerns for personal prestige. In addition, this section pays 
special attention to Lin Biao’s role in this grand strategic adjustment in elite politics. Given 
that the alleged Mao-Lin split following Lin’s failed coup and death has been considered an 
outstanding ideological barrier against the US-China rapprochement, it deserves particular 
treatment here.57  
The US-China negotiation over Taiwan’s status is a case in point. Taiwan had long been 
a symbolic challenge to the CCP rule on China’s mainland. Given the purported 
commitment of the CCP regime to “reunification,” the willingness on Beijing’s part to 
postpone the settlement of the Taiwan issue is arguably an extraordinary concession. The 
concession initiative originated from a Politburo meeting in May 1971. Under Mao’s 
supervision, it was determined that even if the US government failed to meet the Chinese 
demand to withdraw its military personnel from Taiwan and commit to noninterference in 
the cross-Strait relations, liaison offices could still be established in both capitals to facilitate 
official communications.58 After Zhou Enlai’s first meeting with Henry Kissinger during the 
latter’s secret visit to Beijing in early July 1971, Mao immediately decided to put the Taiwan 
issue on the back burner. The Chairman’s decision had to do with the perception of 
declining US geopolitical influences in Vietnam.59 As he told Zhou, “we are not in hurry on 
the Taiwan issue because there is no fighting there……but there is a war in Vietnam and 
people are being killed there. We should not invite Nixon to come just for our own 
interests.”60 This statement, though, might indicate Mao’s aspiration for preserving China’s 
prestige in the communist world—indeed, Chinese leaders had gone to considerable lengths 																																																																		
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in keeping the DRV informed of progress in US-China rapprochement. Yet, it was Mao’s 
sincere hope to ease the way for the US to disengage from Indochina, as that would allow in 
Washington to concentrate on the endeavor to balance against the Soviet influences in 
Asia.61 Arguably, by accelerating this process and gaining American support for Beijing’s 
confrontation with Moscow, China could put itself in a more favorable position vis-à-vis 
both superpowers. Viewed in this light, Mao’s promotion of prestige fell in line with the 
imperative of enhancing China’s geopolitical autonomy. 
In Kissinger’s account, the Chinese leaders were farsighted in their willingness to table 
the status of Taiwan for the pursuit of common interests with the United States.62 This 
account confirms the defensive realist logic in Beijing’s pursuit of rapprochement with 
Washington—namely, states tend to balance against the dominant threat, despite their 
differences in other aspects. Moreover, rapprochement with America would spare the 
Chinese leaders some geopolitical pressure from the US allies, which had haunted them 
since the 1950s. If US-China rapprochement were achieved, then Taiwan would cease to be 
an immediate threat to China’s territorial security. As Mao confided privately to his doctor 
Li Zhisui, “we have the Soviet Union to the north and the set, India to the south, and Japan 
to the east. If all our enemies were to unite, attacking us from the north, south, east, and 
west, what do you think we should do?......Didn’t our ancestors counsel negotiating with 
faraway countries while fighting with those that are near?”63 For Mao’s part, aligning with 
the United States would not only ameliorate the geopolitical environment but also enhance 
Chinese capacity to balance against the Soviet military presence in Asia.  
To be clear, my analysis does not dismiss status aspirations as irrelevant in Chinese 
security policy practices after 1969. Rather, it suggests that absent pressures for institutional 
change, the instrumental role of personal prestige would not be salient, and as the Chinese 
leaders did not rely on prestige as a dominant vehicle for political survival, they could 
afford to make concessions to their geopolitical adversary the United States in 1972. As 
noted in the preceding chapter, concerns for personal prestige as fueled by the Mao-Liu split 
hindered China from mending fences with the Soviet Union in the face of their common 
adversary (e.g. America) escalating the war in Vietnam; meanwhile, the instrumental 
importance of great-power status induced leaders in Beijing to compete with the Soviet 
Union in Indochina once Mao suggested the desirability of doing so. In 1972, by contrast, 
prestige politics at home was no longer a factor for the formulation of Chinese security 
policy. The purge of Liu Shaoqi and the sidelining of his associates in 1966-1967 had left Mao 
as the absolute leader; as such, it was not imperative for Mao to legitimize his domestic 																																																																		
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authority via personal prestige—now prestige followed from his absolute personal authority 
rather than vice versa. Accordingly, the supreme leader Mao faced no strong incentives to 
engage in competitive assertions of status against either of the superpowers. In this context, 
diplomatic accommodation with one superpower adversary could restore China to the 
centrality of international community. The US-China rapprochement and China’s 
reemergence in the international community went hand in hand. Absent America’s 
obstructionism, the PRC managed to take over the United Nations membership and the 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council from the KMT regime.64 Mao thereby gained an 
authoritative forum at which to resume his anti-imperialist mantle. As such, competitive 
status-seeking strategy proved not the optimal approach to promoting the Chinese, as well 
as Mao’s, status aspiration internationally.65  
In short, Mao was able to reconcile his status aspiration with the security imperatives 
facing China. In this regard, his diplomatic initiatives featured a willingness to 
accommodate demands from the adversary. This was manifest in the Chairman’s 
willingness to delegate much of the negotiating work to Zhou Enlai, a life-long diplomat and 
skillful negotiator capable of flexibility and concessions.66 During Nixon’s visit, Zhou 
showed himself to be virtuoso in drafting the communiqué in the agree-to-disagree spirit. In 
it, Washington recognized that there is only one government in China, leaving the dispute 
over the legitimacy of that government to the Chinese across the Strait. Beijing’s leaders 
acquiesced in this arrangement.67 Here, they showed sufficient willingness to set aside the 
issue of Taiwan for the time being and leave it for future negotiations.  
It is certainly true that in scrambling this deal, Zhou left himself vulnerable to the 
ideological charge from the Cultural Revolution leftists that he was appeasing the 
Americans. The Taiwan issue, after all, was a legacy of the Chinese civil war in 1946-1949 
and carried symbolic importance to the CCP’s claim to legitimacy in ruling China—and 
concessions over it could be controversial in any circumstances. Predictably, the Chairman 
gave countenance to some critiques of Zhou in the aftermath of Nixon’s visit. In spite of this, 
the supreme leader ensured the premier’s political survival.68 Zhou stayed on as the 
premier and continued to lead the negotiation over establishment of liaison offices in Beijing 
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and Washington, which was finalized during Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in February 1973.69  
The bilateral relationship made little progress toward normalization afterward. 
Apparently, this was attributable to the resurgence of leftist ideology against Zhou.70 
Former party historian Gao Wenqian argues that the US-China normalization came to a halt 
as Mao tried to prevent Zhou from continuing to gain prestige from his prominent role in 
diplomacy.71 And yet, this argument exaggerates the Mao-Zhou friction while according too 
much weight to Mao’s personal role. True, Mao found it difficult to reconcile his 
anti-imperialist ideological commitment with the geopolitical imperative of balancing 
against Moscow with Washington’s help, and progress in the US-Soviet détente just 
provided an outlet for his emotional outburst.72 This exposed Zhou to ideological charges at 
home, as the premier was the chief proponent of US-China cooperation. Yet, there is no 
evidence that Zhou’s diplomatic performance actually challenged Mao’s authority. Quite the 
contrary, it was apparent to the outsiders at the time that Zhou was submissive to Mao.73 In 
hindsight, historians believe that despite the fragile physical condition, Mao retained a firm 
grip on decision-making authority in almost all realms of national policy up to his death in 
1976.74 Arguably, the stagnation of US-China relations up to Mao’s death in 1976 had more 
to do with geopolitical dynamics and American politics. Specifically, the Watergate scandals 
caused substantial difficulties for Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford to concentrate on 
foreign affairs, whereas the lessened Soviet military pressures actually dampened the 
incentives for Washington to seek closer cooperation with Beijing. These factors played more 
important roles in slowing down the pace of the US-China normalization.75 
 
Lin Biao’s Rise and Fall: the Alleged Mao-Lin Split and Its Marginal Impact on the US-China 																																																																		
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Rapprochement 
Lin Biao’s rise and fall was one of the most dramatic events in the PRC history. Apparently, 
his failed coup against Mao and his death on the route of fleeing China testify to his 
ambition to replace Mao. In his talk with the American leaders, Mao famously blamed Lin 
Biao and his faction for thwarting the US-China rapprochement.76  
Since then, Chinese official history has held that Lin, as well as his faction, long 
conspired to supplant Mao’s leadership.77 Should this interpretation hold true, there is no 
doubt that an elite schism unfolded after Lin was designated as Mao’s successor at the Ninth 
Party Congress in 1969. It is important to address whether this open split in Chinese elite 
politics caused prestige contests between Mao and Lin.  
The official accounts, however, provide no clear evidence in support of the allegation of 
Lin’s political ambitions. Even the official biography of Mao Zedong suggests that the 
Mao-Lin split did not occur until August 1970. It is shown in the released official records 
that Lin and his faction took great pains to promote the personality cult of Mao and tried to 
mobilize the whole party elites in support of Mao resuming the state chairman.78 Suspicious 
about Lin’s political ambition, Mao seized this chance to undermine Lin. In early 1971, the 
Chairman left Beijing for a tour to southern provinces. During his journey, Mao managed to 
elicit support from various provincial leaders for his harsh criticism of Lin. As a 
consequence, Lin had no choice but attempt assassination of Mao and flee China. While it is 
true that the planned assassination and his family’s attempt to flee China clearly signify his 
split with Mao, this open split did not feature centrally in Chinese politics until 1971.79 As 
such, there was no time for Lin to engage in substantial contests for authority with Mao. 
Since no prestige politics could possibly occur between Mao and Lin in such circumstances, 
its impact on Mao’s foreign policy decisions must have been minimal.  
On top of that, a revisionist historical scholarship has flourished since the late 1980s, 
which argues that the tragic end of Lin Biao is virtually caused by his relentless effort to 
bandwagon with the supreme leader. 80  While Lin had distinguished himself by 																																																																		
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extraordinary military expertise and loyalty to Mao prior to 1949, he was inactive in Chinese 
politics until the Seven Thousand Conference at which he openly spoke in support of Mao. 
Thereafter, Lin worked hard to indoctrinate the PLA with Mao’s ideological orthodoxy. His 
pledging of loyalty boosted Mao’s confidence in launching the Cultural Revolution.81 Since 
the Cultural Revolution, the PLA had played a dual role: it initially acquiesced to, and in 
some instances assisted the Red Guards with their efforts to seize state power in various 
provinces; from the early 1967 on, it was assigned the opposite task: restricting social 
violence. Lin Biao supervised the implementation of all these policies.82  
Several points are worth noting, none of which suggest Lin’s ambition to undermine 
Mao’s authority. Quite the contrary, Lin’s success in indoctrinating the PLA with Mao’s 
ideological dogma after the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, ensured the PLA support 
behind Mao’s drive to launch the Cultural Revolution in 1966.83 During the Cultural 
Revolution, Lin took great pains to take a low profile in Mao’s byzantine game of power 
struggle in the central leadership. After the purge of Liu and Deng, Lin confided to his 
associates that the best way to protect himself was “following Mao unconditionally.”84 In 
fact, Lin seldom committed to any clear position on policy issues; he instead concurred on 
almost anything Mao had decided upon.85 Upon close examination of Lin’s involvement in 
the political decisions during the Cultural Revolution, Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun 
conclude that Lin’s “basic political posture was passive, his few active interventions sought 
to limit the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution, and the inevitable tension 
between military men and civilians did not translate into a Bonapartist challenge.”86  
As regards Lin’s political ambitions and policymaking role, recollections by one of Lin 
Biao’s inner-circle secretaries—Zhang Yunsheng—provide critical insights. 87  A critical 
departure from the conventional view regarding Lin’s political ambition, Zhang points out 
that Lin’s political ambition for the top leadership was at best ambiguous, and he provided 																																																																																																																																																																																																								
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vivid evidence showing Lin’s lack of interest in foreign affairs.88 Zhang’s recollections 
repudiate the Chinese official charge of Lin’s political ambition. And in recent years 
accumulative evidence from assistants close to Lin and his family members and from some 
official accounts have emerged to corroborate Zhang’s point.89 Lin’s lack of interest in 
foreign affairs was particularly remarkable in those accounts. The major official accounts 
regarding the four marshals’ proposal of US-China rapprochement do not emphasize Lin’s 
decision-making role at all, not to mention his alleged obstructionism.90  
Whereas no evidence can lend unambiguous support to Lin’s role in foreign and 
security policy, circumstantial evidence may provide some clue. In this regard, the so-called 
No.1 mobilization order (diyi haoling) issued in Lin’s name in October 1969 stands out as the 
major piece of evidence revealing Lin’s policy preference. Since the mid-May, skirmishes on 
the Sino-Soviet western borders also escalated, which raised the specter of an all-out war. 
This development heightened the threat perception of Chinese leadership; Mao in turn 
stressed the necessity of war preparations on various occasions. In this circumstance, Lin 
issued a mobilization order to keep the whole military establishment on alert. As Wang 
Dongxing recalled, Mao was irritated by Lin’s conduct and incinerated the document 
immediately.91 Wang believed that Lin took the Sino-Soviet border conflict as a chance to 
probe Mao’s alertness to his political ambition—and this interpretation is indeed consistent 
with the orthodox view established after Lin’s failed coup.92 However, other sources, 
including some official publications, show that Lin’s order completely fell in line with Mao’s 
instructions on mobilizing the countries for war. 93  Significantly, according to Zhang 
Yunsheng, the document that Mao actually received was simply a draft of the order, which 
shows that Lin did manage to keep Mao informed.94 Party historian Shu Yun similarly 
showed that Lin was simply intent on implementing Mao’s instructions on war preparations, 
and this was indeed shared by Zhou Enlai and other leaders.95 Moreover, both Zhang and 
Shu point out that it was other military leaders who entitled the order as No. 1.96 While this 
incident aroused Mao’s disaffection, it reflected more of the misunderstandings on the part 
of Mao and other military leaders associated with Lin; Lin’s role in it was only marginal.  																																																																		
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In a nutshell, what has emerged from the evidence available so far is a Lin Biao striving 
to bandwagon with Mao on almost every issue, rather than use Mao’s authority to his 
advantage. Although we are still unable to address why Lin eventually attempted 
assassination at Mao. This historical episode remains shrouded in mystery, recently 
available nevertheless shows that Lin had shown no inclination to challenge Mao’s 
position—he made Mao’s paranoid largely because he misread Mao’s intention.  
From the outset, Lin seemingly believed that he could use the proposal for instituting 
the post of state chairman to mobilize the whole party elite to honor Mao and obtain Mao’s 
favor.97 His very insistence, however, deepened Mao’s suspicion. The Chairman clashed 
with Lin at the August-September Lushan plenum in 1970 when Lin stubbornly insisted on 
reinstituting the post of state chairman with Mao assuming it.98 Chinese official accounts, 
though, portray Lin’s initiative as an attempt to position himself as Mao’s successor. In their 
viewpoint, if Mao assumed the post of state chairman, then Lin would naturally become the 
vice chairman, which would presumably pave the way for his succession of Mao in the 
future.99 Yet, this view is already invalidated by the Chinese official accounts, which shows 
that early on Lin had flatly refused to take the post of vice chairman.100 Moreover, there is 
evidence to suggest that while Lin relentlessly promoted the personality cult of Mao at the 
Lushan plenum, Mao approved Lin’s speech and agreed to circulate it among the party 
elites.101 As such, it was likely that Lin viewed Mao’s refusal to assume the post of state 
chairman as an invitation for greater effort to honor the supreme leader. This turned out to 
be a fatal misperception. As Mao became increasingly suspicious of him and even openly 
chastised his misconduct and alleged ambition, his close associates drafted a coup plan (in 
which his son was involved) but failed to implement. Lin’s whole family (except his 
daughter) then sought to flee China but ended up in an air crash in Outer Mongolia.  
To conclude, there is no solid evidence that Lin was determined to expand his power 
and influences at Mao’s expense. Unlike Liu, Lin presented no alternative vision for 
institutions of Chinese politics that could challenge Mao’s initiatives. The Mao-Lin friction 
over the post of state chairman was in large part an unanticipated event, but it tragically led 
up to Lin’s demise from politics and death. Apparently, Mao-Lin split erupted in late 1970, 																																																																		
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when the two leaders’ difference over the state chairmanship deepened reciprocal 
suspicions. But there is no solid evidence to show any of its significant impact on Chinese 
foreign-policy making. While in the presence of Nixon Mao blamed Lin for delaying the 
US-China rapprochement, it is reasonable to argue that on that occasion the Chairman was 
desperate to salvage his broken prestige. Unquestionably, the Lin Biao Incident dealt a 
severe blow to the image of the Chairman’s infallibility. Thus, Mao had every reason to 
boost his personal prestige by achievements in foreign affairs. In this regard, the US-China 
rapprochement was perhaps his most glamorous success.  
 
A Resurgence of Competitive Status-seeking strategy: The Soviet-Vietnamese Alignment, 
Prestige Politics in Beijing, and China’s Invasion of Vietnam in 1976-1979  
China’s military attack on Vietnam in mid-February 1979 signified a resurgence of 
competitive status-seeking strategy on the Chinese part. The military operations lasted for 
roughly a month, during which China invaded the broad northern part of Vietnam, 
captured two provincial capitals and a key border town, and engaged the Vietnamese army 
in dozens of battles.102 As Deng Xiaoping and the official media outlets framed it, this war 
was designed to “punish” Vietnam for its growing collaboration with the SU and invasion of 
Cambodia to overturn the Chinese-sponsored regime. Typically, the Chinese leaders did not 
specify any concrete demands on Vietnam before taking military acts. Given this defining 
feature, the Chinese act approximates less to the prudent exercise of coercive diplomacy 
than competitive status-seeking strategy.  
The bulk of the existing literature underscores a variety of geopolitical factors to explain 
China’s military acts. They include the Soviet Union’s alignment with Vietnam, the 
worsening of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, and the overthrow of pro-China regime in 
Cambodia by the Vietnamese military force.103 However, this geopolitical-oriented view 
offers partial explanations only. It fails to consider alternative strategies Beijing would have 
chosen in response to the geopolitical threat from the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment. 
Moreover, it rests on a problematic assumption that military intervention was a desirable 
strategy to ameliorate China’s geopolitical environment.104 In fact, the Chinese military was 
left in a poor condition in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. It was not fit for fighting. 
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As such, it is puzzling why the Chinese leaders employed military power in response to the 
perceived Soviet encirclement.  
Given that the display of military power may constitute a key variant of competitive 
status-seeking strategy, my theoretical argument should be able to address this puzzle. To 
be specific, my argument suggests that competitive status-seeking strategy is a preferable 
policy for leaders who rely upon prestige to legitimize their power positions at home while 
regarding great-power status as a route to geopolitical security. This argument complements, 
rather than overturn the geopolitics-oriented view. It does not dismiss geopolitical 
pressures—especially the Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration in support of Vietnam’s 
expansionist drive in Southeast Asia; but it gives more emphasis to the authority contest 
between Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, which heightened their reliance upon prestige as 
a kind of political capital. It was the interplay of such an pragmatic concern for personal 
prestige and geopolitical imperatives that encouraged the Chinese leadership to opt for 
competitive status-seeking strategy as a strategy for dealing with the emergent 
Soviet-Vietnamese threat.  
 
The International Context: China’s Worsening Relations with the Unified Vietnam and the 
Intensification of the Soviet Threat 
Vietnam achieved reunification in 1975 with the US-backed Saigon regime overturned by 
the military forces Hanoi commanded. While Beijing continued to provide materials support 
for Hanoi’s struggles for national reunification, the Chinese ideological vigor for promoting 
revolutions in Southeast Asia actually attenuated in 1975. After Mao’s death, however, 
Beijing shifted away from its moderate attitude toward the communist insurgents in 
Southeast Asia. “Compared with that in 1976,” Robert Ross observes, “PRC media attention 
to the illegal Communist parties of Southeast Asia further increased.”105 Hua Guofeng 
himself also hosted a banquet for the Indonesian Communist leader Jusef Adjitorop in 
Beijing during his visit in May.106 This gesture of Chinese support for insurgents in 
Southeast Asia departed from the moderate line Hua initially espoused. This was in large 
part motivated by Hua’s concern for vulnerability in prestige politics. The arrest of the Gang 
of Four left Hua vulnerable to the accusation of betraying the Maoist orthodox. The 
politically inexperienced Hua therefore felt compelled to revert, albeit ostensibly, to the 
Maoist line. 
By echoing Mao’s foreign policy practice dating back to the 1960, Hua signaled his 
commitment to revolutionary orthodoxy. Yet, Hua met opposition from other Chinese 
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leaders soon after he openly encouraged the communist insurgents in Indochina. Upon his 
return to power, Deng had endorsed the proposal from Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian to 
adjust the level of foreign aid.107 And in July, Li Xiannnian instructed the bureaucracies to 
“put more restrictions on foreign aid” (kou jin yidian), which suggests that the central 
leadership had managed to repudiate Hua’s policy initiative.108 This instance just proves the 
bottom line of my theoretical argument. That is, as leaders often pursue status 
internationally for instrumental purposes, an effort at status enhancement is unsustainable if 
it deviates too far from a state’s geopolitical imperatives. 
That noted, in spite of their difference over foreign aid, leaders in Beijing unanimously 
perceived the increasingly close relationship between Hanoi and Moscow as a sign of the 
Soviet threat lurking in Southeast Asia. From late 1977 to early March 1978, Moscow and 
Hanoi exchanged messages to signal mutual trust and commitment to cooperation. With the 
enhancement of diplomatic engagement between the two capitals came various economic 
agreements.109 When Vietnam’s premier Phan Van Dong visited China in June, Li Xiannian 
voiced his concern to him over the state of Sino-Vietnamese relations and enumerated major 
diplomatic problems between the two countries.110 While Li also expressed to Dong the 
Chinese commitment to improve the bilateral relationship, China’s attitude toward Vietnam 
further cooled down soon afterward. During Le Duan’s visit to Beijing in late November, 
Hua Guofeng openly stated that “the two sides [China and Vietnam] now have had 
differences over principles [yuanze fenqi], some disputes have intensified, and the [bilateral] 
relationship has worsened.”111  
Deng Xiaoping’s speech before the Chinese military in late December featured a 
negative assessment of the international situation. “Because hegemonic powers are fanatical,” 
Deng claimed, “it is uncertain where they would create small events that may provoke war. 
[So] [the outbreak of] great war could be postponed, but some accidental, regional incidents 
are hard to predict.”112 “In the final analysis,” he concluded, “war will eventually break out. 
We can’t waste time, [we] should accelerate war preparation, especially the training of 
military leaders in conducting modern war.”113 Hua concurred with Deng’s suggestion for 
an open discussion of this report.114 The whole leadership soon reached consensus that 
China was facing an unfavorable geopolitical environment. 
																																																																		
107 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 vol. 1, 168. 
108 Li Xiannian nianpu vol. 5 [The chronological records of Li Xiannian] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian, 2011), 496. 
109 Ross, The Indochina Tangle, 145-46.  
110 Li Xiannian nianpu vol. 5, 487-88.  
111 Wang Taiping, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi 3 [diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China] 
(Beijing: shijie zhishi, 1999), 66.  
112 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982 (Beijing: renmin, 1983), 74.  
113 Ibid., 75. 
114 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 vol. 1, 255-56.  
	177		
In short, Beijing’s leaders perceived the growth of Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration after 
1976 as a pressing geopolitical threat. The Chinese misgiving about hegemonic powers and 
their propensity for war contributed significantly to their emphasis on military power as a 
vehicle for geopolitical competitions with the Soviets. Unquestionably, Hua and the Chinese 
leadership inherited a highly militarized rivalry with Moscow. After the 1969 border conflict, 
the Soviet military deployments close to China’s borders had loomed large in Chinese threat 
perception. It was no longer ideological penetration but prospects of military aggression by 
the Soviets that became Chinese leaders’ overriding concern. 115  Ameliorating the 
relationship with the Soviet Union would entail a comprehensive adjustment of Chinese 
policy. Hua was obviously unable to accomplish this task overnight. Nevertheless, China’s 
conflict with the Soviets or the Vietnamese was not inevitable. It remained possible for 
leaders in Beijing to adopt strategies that were relatively risk-averse. To address why 
Beijing’s leaders became risk-prone as they undertook competitive status-seeking strategy, it 
is then important to examine dynamics in Chinese elite politics after the death of Mao.  
 
China after Mao: Ideological Polarization, Prestige Politics, and the Deng-Hua Split 
The death of Mao in 1976 left a political and ideological vacuum in Chinese politics. The 
party elite and the population had submitted themselves to Mao’s personalist authority for 
decades. The death of Mao meant the overarching charismatic authority was unavailable 
and political orders in China must be legitimized along new lines.116 Hence, the removal of 
the absolute central authority unleashed intense pressures for institutional change. 
The authority vacuum exacerbated power struggles within the Politburo. In the process, 
challenger factions exploited the widespread grievances about the Cultural Revolution 
excesses. As such, both the purge of the Gang of Four and the subsequent Deng-Hua contest 
revolved around competitions for the supreme authority in Chinese politics. After the purge 
of the Gang of Four, the Deng-Hua split shifted its focus onto the agenda for institutional 
reforms in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.117  
Upon his succession to Mao, Hua found his political standing precarious. To strengthen 
his authority as the supreme leader, Hua aligned himself with the veteran revolutionaries 
and launched a coup that removed the Gang of Four from the political scene.118 The removal 																																																																		
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of the Gang of Four did not take pressures off Hua, however. In eliminating the Gang of 
Four, Hua became indebted to the veteran revolutionaries, especially Ye Jianying and Li 
Xiannian, who had helped him consolidate power within the Party. As Ye and Li 
appreciated Deng’s talents and leadership experience, Hua reluctantly approved their 
request for restoring Deng to leadership posts.119 Deng was officially rehabilitated at the 
Third Plenum of Tenth Party Congress in mid-July and assumed the titles of vice chairman 
of the central party leadership, vice premier of the government, and the PLA’s chief of 
staff.120 Although these institutional posts did not rival Hua’s standing as the paramount 
leader, they did grant Deng significant decision-making authority on critical matters.  
After Deng’s rehabilitation, Hua’s concern for personal prestige motivated him to take a 
rigid ideological stance. The bulk of his constituents were composed of relatively junior 
cadres who rose to leadership posts during the Cultural Revolution. As beneficiaries of the 
Cultural Revolution, Hua and his political allies had to derive their legitimacy to rule from 
Maoist dogmas. In this regard, the very good fortune they had enjoyed in the past decade 
came to be a political liability. Since Hua himself was vulnerable to any charge of betraying 
Mao’s cause, his room for political maneuver was more limited than that of Deng, who was 
entitled to the prestige of being Mao’s lifelong protégé. In their authority contests, then, 
Deng and Hua found ideological debate a device for mobilizing their supporters. In early 
February 1977, Hua approved publication of the editorial that called the Chinese people to 
categorically follow the Mao’s instructions. The editorial was then referred to as the “two 
whatevers” (meaning that whatever Chairman Mao says is eternally correct; whatever Mao 
says must be categorically followed).121 Thereafter, the authority contest among the political 
elite gravitated toward interpretations of the orthodox party line. Through the struggle to 
give Maoist orthodoxy a plausible interpretation, the contending leaders sought to 
legitimize their hold on authority in the central leadership. Here, the ideological debate 
served as a vehicle for them to mobilize supporting coalitions.  
Hua, in fact, was not enthusiastic about continuing the Cultural Revolution. Having 
initially enhanced domestic authority, he declared an end to the Cultural Revolution in 
1977.122 Recent historical studies shows that Hua was virtually a moderate leader, and was 
not opposed to the rehabilitation of party elites who became affiliated with Deng’s reform 
																																																																																																																																																																																																								
Ye Jianying] (Beijing: zhongyang wenxian), 1112-3. For an updated account of the arrest of the Gang of Four based on open 
and official sources, see Teiwess and Sun, The End of the Maoist Era, chap. 8.  
119 Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, 196-97. 
120 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 vol. 1 [The Chronological Records of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1997] (Beijing: 
zhongyang wenxian, 2004), 162. 
121 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975-1997 vol. 1, 155. 
122 Zhongguo gongchandang lishi, 1949-1978 vol. 2 [History of Chinese Communist Party, 1949-1978] (Beijing: 
zhonggongdangshi, 2010), 1004; Chen Yun nianpu vol. 2 [the chronological records of Chen Yun] (Beijing: zhongyang 
wenxian, 2015), 235. 
	179		
coalition later on.123 Yet, as Hua tried to legitimize his authority, he employed a flawed 
tactic: Hua’s purported commitment to the “two whatevers” inevitably antagonized the 
party elders who fell victim to the Cultural Revolution. The elders rose to the party 
leadership in the pre-1949 era. They shared Maoist ideology, but not on the terms Hua 
defined. While the elders held no uniform vision for China’s future, they did share one 
common interest at present—that was to restore their standing after the Cultural Revolution. 
Yet, the “two whatevers” meant that the Cultural Revolution’s verdicts to downgrade them 
were all justified. As such, Hua’s open espouse of the “two whatevers” seemed to frustrate 
their aspiration. Hua’s opposition to bringing Chen Yun, a prominent party leader, back into 
leadership post, must have deepened their concern.124  
Deng took this opportunity to mobilize an anti-Hua coalition. From April 1977, Deng 
began to voice opposition to the “two whatevers” to the party elders visiting his family.125 
On multiple occasions, then, he stressed the need to grasp Mao’s thought in “correct” and 
“comprehensive” manners.126 “By using this clever formulation,” according to historian 
Ezra Vogel, “Deng accepted the authority of Mao, while asserting, in effect, that Hua 
Guofeng was not the only one who had the authority to interpret Mao’s views.”127 Implicitly 
Deng asserted his own authority. Whereas his decades-long experience of serving as Mao’s 
lieutenant was certainly a crucial source of authority, it was necessary for him to assert 
authority through some symbolic acts—just as Hua did by issuing ideological cues of “two 
whatevers.” Prestige, in turn, served as a vehicle for authority contests.  
As the prestige politics between Deng and Hua took on momentum, Deng’s decades 
long associate—Chen Yun—published an article in late 1977 to support his political ally.128 
By this move, Chen took the lead in openly challenging Hua. Subsequently in early 1978, Hu 
Yaobang, Deng’s protégé, instigated contestation over “the criterion of truth” (zhenli 
biaozhun de taolun). The contestation soon evolved into an ideological campaign on how to 
interpret Mao’s ideological orthodoxy. The campaign enabled Deng to undermine Hua’s 
ideological authority. Deng openly committed himself in late July, when he criticized the 
chief of the propaganda department, a proponent of Hua’s line, for stifling the lively 
atmosphere of ideological debate.129 Shortly thereafter, he intensified criticism of the “two 																																																																		
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whatevers” by associating its proponents with “the thought system of Lin Biao and the Gang 
of Four.”130 Given that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four had been stigmatized as traitors to the 
“correct” Party line, Deng clearly showed his intention to undermine Hua’s prestige.  
Deng staked his prestige upon the debate on the criterion of truth, as he sought to seize 
upon this ideological issue to mobilize the party elites against Hua. In early August, he 
convened a group of party scholars to his home, and urged them to spell out a new 
orthodoxy. He specified a few issues for party scholars to work on, including “ideological 
line” (zhengzhi luxian), “[the examples of] competent work units and individuals” (xianjin 
danwei he xianjin renwu), and “[how to] evaluate the cadres” [pingjia ganbu].131 Each touched 
upon a critical aspect of political life. Instigating such kind of public discussion of 
ideological issues could publicize the split among the top leaders. Deng, however, believed 
that doing so would help to expand the coalition of his supporters. In late August, he called 
on party cadres again to intensify the debate on the criterion of truth. This issue, he argued, 
“will affect our work if it is not addressed.”132 The tide against Hua gained momentum 
during the Central Party Work Conference in November. At that time, Deng suggested that 
the party cadres “spend two or three days discussing [how to] shift the focus of party 
work.”133 Although Deng himself was absent at the beginning of the conference, his 
suggestion was faithfully pursued. A senior party leader since the 1950s, Chen Yun 
promoted Deng’s agenda as he intervened to urge the party leadership to “resolve problems 
concerning the contribution and faults of some important party leaders”—that is, to 
rehabilitate the cadres victimized by the Cultural Revolution.134 Chen’s intervention was 
critical in tipping the domestic balance of power in Deng’s favor. Hua failed to bring the 
discussion back to the prescheduled topics. As such, Chen’s argument became a rallying cry 
among the conference participants.135 Hua had clearly lost control of the event. In hindsight, 
though, the Central Party Work Conference marked a turning point for the establishment of 
Deng as China’s paramount leader after Mao. In reality, it took an additional year of 
ideological and personnel struggles on a less dramatic scale to institutionalize Deng’s 
authority.136 As such, at the critical juncture of 1978-1979 personal prestige remained a 
dominant vehicle of political survival in Chinese elite politics. 
In parallel with the prestige politics between Hua and Deng, China’s security 
environment worsened considerably with the formation of Soviet-Vietnamese alignment. 																																																																		
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Whereas Deng-Hua split heightened the leaders’ reliance on prestige political survival at 
home, the geopolitical imperatives heightened their sensitivity to great-power status as a 
route to security. In turn, Deng and Hua found it desirable to adopt competitive policy for 
the purpose of status assertion. In this effort, they sought to enhance geopolitical security 
while boosting personal prestige at home.  
 
1978-February 1979: the Soviet-Vietnamese Alignment, the Third Indochina War, and Deng 
Xiaoping’s Propensity for Competitive status-seeking strategy 
International and domestic developments in 1978 profoundly altered the context in which 
the Chinese leaders approached the fluid situation in Southeast Asia. Leaders in Beijing 
regarded the emergent Soviet-Vietnamese alignment and the Vietnamese effort to 
undermine the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia as part of Moscow’s grand design to encircle 
China. On the other hand, intra-elite debate over the validity of the “two whatevers” further 
polarized the ruling elite, and elite conflict intensified accordingly. These developments 
combined to incline the Chinese leaders toward the choice on competitive status-seeking 
strategy, which took the form of China’s invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.  
The Deng-Hua split unfolded in the geopolitical context in which the Soviet threat 
expanded into Southeast via the formation of Soviet-Vietnamese alignment. As noted, the 
Chinese leaders had long been vigilant with regard to the Soviet influence in Asia. The 
Soviet threat was constant since the 1969 Zhenbao Island conflict even though conditions on 
the Sino-Soviet borders had stabilized since the US-China rapprochement.137 After 1970, 
needless to say, the Soviet military power had trumped the ideological antagonism as the 
most salient aspect in the Chinese perception of the Soviet threat. Following America’s 
disengagement from Vietnam in the wake of Saigon’s fall in 1975, the Chinese leadership 
was vigilant about Hanoi’s cooperation with Moscow in search for economic and military 
aid. 138  The Soviet threat from the south deepened considerably as the Soviet Union 
strengthened its military presence in Southeast Asia. Hanoi’s tilt toward Moscow since the 
1972 US-China rapprochement had been obvious.139 After 1975, the Soviets had come to fill 
the power vacuum left by the American withdrawal from Vietnam by providing the unified 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam with considerable economic and military aid. By March 
1978, the Soviet Union had also taken advantage of developments in Laos-Vietnam relations 
to establish a strong military presence in Laos, China’s neighboring country.140  
The period from late 1977 to early March 1978 witnessed frequent exchanges between 																																																																		
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the top leaders of Vietnam. The Kremlin now praised the development of the bilateral 
relationship to the degree that Hanoi apparently “flaunted its abandonment of a neutral 
position in the Sino-Soviet conflict.”141 In June 1978, “reports began emanating from China 
that the Soviet Union had established guided missile bases in Vietnam stocked with missiles 
directed at China.”142 The Soviet shift to an offensive posture was evident to Beijing—and 
Deng began to refer to Vietnam as “the Cuba of Asia” before the western visitors.143 As such, 
the growing cooperation between Moscow and Hanoi in the military realm had aroused 
“Chinese fears of an eventual encirclement of China from the south.”144 The Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation signed between Moscow and Hanoi on November 3 was 
particularly alarming to them. Deng referred to the treaty as a “military alliance” showing 
that “a big and a lesser state are cooperating” to “encircle China.”145  
Arguably, the Chinese sense of threat was genuine and legitimate. It was driven home 
by the development of the Third Indochina War over which Beijing had little control. The 
Third Indochina War began with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in response to 
Khmer Rouge’s conduct of guerrilla insurgency in the border areas. It soon expanded in 
scope and intensity.146 Beijing initially tried to mediate peace between the belligerents, but 
its diplomatic effort came to no fruition.147 The Soviet government, meanwhile, provided 
the Vietnamese army with military support throughout. In November 1978, the Vietnamese 
army took over Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, so that Pol Pot’s forces were 
compelled to prosecute guerilla warfare in the countryside.148 On November 3, the Soviet 
Union and Vietnam signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which formalized the 
Soviet-Vietnamese alignment.149 Facing the prospect of Soviet encirclement, the Chinese 
leadership was unified in taking precautionary measures against Vietnam and by extension, 
the Soviet Union. After November, all senior Chinese leaders had expressed anxiety over the 
deterioration of Cambodia’s resistance in the face of Vietnamese military offensives. A 
delegation led by Wang Dongxing—an ally of Hua Guofeng—and joined by leaders having 
factional affiliations with Deng also visited Cambodia in the last months of 1978 to inspect 
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the local situation.150  
For Chinese leaders, the Vietnamese expansionism and the emergent Soviet-Vietnamese 
alignment drove home the urgency of action. Whether in theory or in practice, a variety of 
strategies were available. If Chinese leaders had sought to address security imperatives on 
their own merits, they would have settled for balancing strategies, which entailed no more 
than mobilizing state power and seeking external allies. Indeed, China had enhanced its 
military preparedness in tandem with diplomatic efforts to balance against the expansion of 
Vietnamese power in Cambodia. As far back as December 1977, Deng had recommended 
that China enhance its military preparedness—although how China’s military would be 
deployed remained unspecified. He then endorsed the report from the General Staff, 
“Suggestions on [how to] Conduct Military Operations in the Early Stage of Anti-aggression 
War.”151 One year later, senior officials, including Ye Jianying and Deng himself, increased 
emphasis on air defense.152 From November 5 to 15, Deng made a trip to Southeast Asia 
during which he visited Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. All these countries played 
central role in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), an emerging regional 
organization committed to regional peace and noninterference from outside powers; as such, 
Deng hoped they could provide essential support to his diplomatic campaign to isolate 
Vietnam in the international community.153 Apparently, Deng was implementing a strategy 
to wear down the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. This strategy proved viable to the 
extent that Deng and his associates managed to negotiate a deal with the Thai government, 
which agreed to help transport military materials to the guerilla insurgents in the 
Vietnamese-occupied areas in Cambodia.154 
In retrospect, this mixture of balancing strategies by themselves could have worked to 
wear down the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia, thereby weakening the Soviet 
influence in Indochina. As Qian Qichen recalled, upon hearing the Brezhnev’s initiative of 
ameliorating the Sino-Soviet relations in late March 1982, many foreign ministry officials 
believed that the Soviet Union was weary of its current overexpansion.155 Crucially, Qian’s 
recollection reveals that balancing strategies might have been sufficient to deal with the 
Soviet threat; as such, it rendered the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in early 1979 unnecessary. 
To my knowledge, indeed, few Chinese officials have retrospectively attributed to Moscow’s 
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Vietnam in 1979. As such, the geopolitical threat alone is not sufficient to justify the Chinese 
decision to punish Vietnam with military force. 
A closer examination, furthermore, reveals that the Chinese leadership just 
half-heartedly pursued those risk-averse strategies. Deng, in particular, sought to use 
diplomacy to prepare the ground for a military invasion of Vietnam. According to Ezra 
Vogel, “Deng regarded the imminent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as sufficiently 
alarming that he put aside work conference participation and normalization discussions 
with the United States so that he could travel to Southeast Asia for ten days to gain their 
understanding for China’s planned response, an attack on Vietnam” [emphasis added].156 In 
other words, Deng already resolved to prosecute the punitive acts against Vietnam before 
embarking on the Southeast visits. Not surprisingly, he was impervious to the Southeast 
Asian interlocutors’ concern for China’s planned military response. Specifically, the ASEAN 
leaders were worried that China’s military conflict with Vietnam would aggravate division 
within the ASEAN.157 Among the countries that Deng visited there was a widely shared 
misgiving about China’s renewed assertiveness. After Saigon’s fall in 1975, the prevailing 
perception in Southeast Asia was that China represented a geopolitical threat.158 As Lee 
Kuan Yew relayed to Deng, “China wanted Southeast Asian countries to unite with it to 
isolate the ‘Russian bear’; [but] the fact was that our neighbors wanted us to unite and 
isolate the ‘Chinese dragon.’” After all, Lee argued, “there was no ‘overseas Russians’ in 
Southeast Asia leading communist insurgencies supported by the Soviet government, as 
there were ‘overseas Chinese’ encouraged and supported by the Chinese government.”159 
Quite evidently, Deng’s effort to organize an anti-Vietnamese coalition was not likely to 
succeed due to Chinese practices in the past of promoting revolutions in Asia. Predictably, 
China’s military operation could only heighten anxieties in Southeast Asia. The US president 
Jimmy Carter conveyed a similar misgiving during his meeting with Deng. As he argued, if 
China invaded Vietnam “the peaceful image of the PRC and the aggressive invader of Viet 
Nam would both be changed [to China’s disadvantage].”160 Worse still, it could jeopardize 
the development of US-China relations, because “armed conflict initiated by China would 
cause serious concern in the United States concerning the general character of China and the 
future peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.”161  
Both Lee and Carter pinpointed reputational costs of China’s military acts against 																																																																		
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Vietnam. But Deng held a different view on reputation. In response to Carter’s 
discouragement, he contended that “China must teach Vietnam a lesson……[Given that] 
Vietnam, and then Afghanistan will evolve into prox[ies] [of the Soviets]. The PRC is 
approaching this issue from a position of strength……If Vietnam thought the PRC soft, the 
situation will get worse.”162 Essentially, Deng was arguing that in the eyes of adversaries, 
China must assert its great-power status with a show of strength. In his view, geopolitical 
adversaries must be defeated or deterred—and international status preeminence is to derive 
from the outcome regardless of how that outcome is attained.  
Needless to say, Deng sought to impress the foreign leaders with China’s resolve to 
punish Vietnam by force. To both Lee and Carter, Deng made it clear that China would 
“make the Vietnamese pay a heavy price” for their invasion of Cambodia, while the “the 
Soviet Union would discover that supporting Vietnam was too heavy a burden.”163 Viewed 
in this light, Deng’s Southeast Asia trip was not so much intended to seek diplomatic 
solution to the Vietnamese-Cambodia conflict than to prepare some diplomatic ground for 
employment of Chinese military power. More important, it was clear from Deng’s statement 
that China’s policy of status competition was primarily directed against the Soviets. These 
strategic rationales boil down to the point that the symbolic use of military force could 
signal strength and resolve, which in turn helps to deter the adversaries. As Deng Xiaoping 
conveyed Jimmy Carter, China’s military action would let the Vietnamese “learn that the 
Soviet Union would not always come to its aid and that Vietnam should reduce its 
ambitions in the region. And by attacking Vietnam, not the Soviet Union, China would show 
the Soviet Union that any effort to build up its forces in the area would be very costly.”164 In 
this way, China’s military operations were intended to establish a reputation of strength, 
which signaled its claim to great-power status. For the Chinese part, an invasion of Vietnam 
was designed to show strength to the Soviet leaders; ideally such an act could deter the 
Soviets from continuing to enhance their military presence in Indochina. Additionally, 
invading Vietnam—the Soviet allied partner in Southeast Asia—might help to drive a 
wedge in the Soviets-Vietnamese relationship if the Soviets proved unable to offer their ally 
any form of protection.165 If the Soviet-Vietnamese relations soured, such an outcome could 
also have certain deterrent effects on the Soviet expansion in China’s vicinity.  
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Had the Chinese decision just been based on a geopolitical rationale, they would have 
favored coercive diplomacy and balancing strategies, which allowed the Chinese address 
the security imperatives on their own merits. As noted, however, China pursued alternative 
strategies just half-heartedly. In the run-up to China’s invasion of Vietnam, China’s 
international conduct assumed features distinct from coercive diplomacy deserves more 
emphasis.  
The first aspect of China’s deviation from the practice of coercive diplomacy is that 
Beijing did not specify its demands on Vietnam. While Beijing invariably denounced Hanoi 
for pursuing imperialist policy in Indochina by invading Cambodia, it did not specify the 
terms on which Hanoi could undo its so-called imperialist policy. “Punishing Vietnam” or 
“teaching Vietnam” was too elusive to make Hanoi aware of any substantive costs Beijing 
would impose should Hanoi stay in the current course of action.166 Second, there was “no 
consistent pattern of escalating Chinese warnings to Vietnam that China would strike, for 
even the final warning from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 16 February, was no 
different from earlier statements.”167 The Chinese denouncement of the Vietnamese was 
scattered among several editorials on official media, which made it difficult even in 
hindsight to judge whether China tried to calibrate pressure on Vietnam in accordance to the 
latter’s action. Keeping the pressures constant could not make Hanoi sense anything 
different; as such, Beijing failed to drive home to Hanoi the imminence of its military 
invasion. According to an international observer at the time, “the Chinese ‘pacification’ of 
the border was intended to ‘punish’ the Vietnamese and ‘teach them a lesson.’ Exactly what 
this entailed was only gradually spelled out after the first week of the invasion.”168  
Additionally, prior to the military acts China demonstrated no serious commitment to 
solving the mounting tension with Vietnam in 1978. In the context of the 
Cambodia-Vietnamese conflict, border frictions between China and Vietnam considerably 
deepened the Chinese suspicions of Hanoi’s aggressiveness.169 Although there was only a 
slim chance for Beijing and Hanoi to resolve their longstanding tensions, the two sides could 
have addressed the contentious issues case by case. Whereas in 1969 the Chinese and the 
Soviets managed to conduct negotiations in the midst of the border conflict, Beijing did not 
take similar measures to manage the mounting crisis. The Chinese officials simply viewed 
the border incidents as confirming their view of Vietnamese hostility. This further hardened 																																																																		
166 Due the ambiguity in Chinese effort to signal its “genuine” intention, there exist multiple, though not contradictory, 
interpretations of China’s strategic purpose. See, for instance, Xiaoming Zhang, "China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A 
Reassessment," The China Quarterly 184 (2005); Harlan Jenks, "China's' Punitive War on Vietnam: A Military 
Assessment," Asian Survey 19, no. 8 (1979); King Chen, China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and 
Implications (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).  
167 Segal, Defending China, 213. 
168 Jenks, "China's' Punitive War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," 802.  
169 Khoo, Collateral Damage, 125. 
	187		
their determination to undertake acts of competitive status-seeking strategy. Reportedly, an 
enlarged Politburo meeting in May had already come to the decision on a limited war to “hit 
back” at Vietnam. Although this decision was taken in response to Vietnam’s pursuit of 
“military adventure,” it was quite evident that the military invasion option was firmly on 
Beijing’s agenda well before all other means for containing Hanoi were exhausted.170 Indeed, 
Beijing’s policy establishment seized upon Vietnam’s persecution of ethnic Chinese to 
publicize and confirm its own perception of Vietnamese hostility soon afterward. According 
to a high ranking military official who participated in the meetings of military planning in 
September, the participants were presented with documents showing the alleged atrocities 
committed by the Vietnamese army vis-à-vis the Chinese residents near the borders and the 
past records of the Hanoi leadership’s expansionist policy.171 The participants soon reached 
a consensus on the need for punishing the Vietnam, despite the remaining differences over 
the scope and intensity of the military attack being planned.172  
Given all these distinctive features, China’s punitive military acts against Vietnam fit 
awkwardly with the category of coercive diplomacy. As such, conventional analyses of 
China’s military invasion in terms of coercive diplomacy cannot explain this actual deviation 
from the pattern of coercive diplomacy.173 This chapter thus categorizes China’s act as 
competitive status-seeking strategy and deploys the theoretical argument (proposed in 
Chapters 2) to explain it.  
 
Explaining the Final Decision to Invade Vietnam  
My explanation underscores concerns for great-power status and personal prestige on the 
level of individual leaders. It argues that the leaders in Beijing shared such concerns, which 
intensified for pragmatic reasons as related to geopolitical and domestic political challenges. 
In the midst of institutional change dynamics, prestige tends to become leaders’ own 
political capital. In 1978 the Deng-Hua struggles for China’s institutional reforms had 
polarized the regime and encouraged the Chinese leaders to rely upon personal prestige as a 
crucial political resource. The geopolitical threat from the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment, then, 
compelled the Chinese leaders to pursue great-power status by a competitive strategy. This 
strategy promised to enhance geopolitical autonomy of China in a long run while helping 
individual leaders boost personal prestige. Deng took the initiative to propose the punitive 
acts against Vietnam in response to the Soviet-Vietnamese collaboration to encircle China. 
Other leaders acquiesced in and some even showed enthusiastic support. Hence, the 																																																																		
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convergence of political incentives—concerning both great-power status and personal 
prestige—encouraged Beijing’s leadership to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy.  
Asserting great-power status through military power promises to deter the Soviet 
expansion in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, inasmuch as state leaders personify sovereign 
authority, the Chinese leaders could boost personal prestige among home 
audiences—especially the political elites—through the symbolic display of resolve for 
defending the national interest. In this endeavor, they can expect to legitimize and 
strengthen their power positions at home, as personal prestige highlights the personalistic 
dimension of power. Hence, leaders seek to further their interests in both geopolitical and 
domestic political arenas through competitive status-seeking strategy. Deng’s act fits this 
logic. Along with other leaders, he had been concerned about the emerging 
Soviet-Vietnamese threat. In the midst of elite power struggles at home, he was increasingly 
inclined to boost personal prestige. As such, competitive status-seeking strategy provides 
the very vehicle for him to cope with the geopolitical threats while enhancing personal 
prestige at home. But why was it Deng Xiaoping rather than other leaders who took the 
initiative to assert great-power status vis-à-vis the Soviets? This was in large part 
attributable to Deng’s strong personality. True, Deng’s strong personality might have 
inclined him to be staunch and at times, ruthless on critical matters whether domestic or 
international.174 But it is also reasonable to argue that the politics of personal prestige 
allowed Deng’s strong personality to play a pivotal role in foreign policy formulation. That 
is, Deng’s subjective sense of prestige might have enabled him to grasp the instrumental 
roles of great-power status and personal prestige. Because Deng had a strong personality, he 
was able to see advantages of engaging in competitive status-seeking acts for enhancing 
China’s geopolitical security, as well as his domestic authority.  
Hence, at the core of Deng’s decision lay pragmatic concerns for great-power status and 
personal prestige. Specifically, the Soviet-Vietnamese threat sensitized Deng to the relevance 
of great-power status to geopolitical security, whereas his growing split with Hua increased 
his reliance on personal prestige for domestic political survival. For Deng’s part, therefore, 
competitive status-seeking strategy became a preferable policy for addressing both 
geopolitical and domestic political challenges. And yet, for Deng’s war decision to gain 
support among the Politburo elite, other leaders needed to share his view, whether 
implicitly or explicitly. A shared threat perception, however, does not translate directly into 
the consensus on how to deal with the geopolitical threat. As such, the Chinese leadership’s 
opposition to the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment does not necessarily mean they would agree 																																																																		
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unanimously on a risky policy response. In line with my theoretical argument about 
personal prestige concerns, we can hypothesize that the Chinese leaders feared of losing 
prestige among the peers in their decision to support the war against Vietnam. If this 
hypothesis on personal prestige concerns holds true, we should expect to see individual 
leaders committed themselves to a “good” reputation for leadership. In foreign policy 
making, such kind of reputation is associated with an apparent willingness to defend the 
national interest—no one could afford politically to be accused of compromising the 
national interest. Thus, if it was the concern for personal prestige which induced individual 
leaders to take a hard line in foreign policy, we should expect to see Deng’s political rivals 
become supportive of his proposal to adopt a policy status competition against the 
Soviet-Vietnamese alignment.  
This hypothesis finds empirical support in the last stage of China’s decision process. 
When Deng formally proposed a punitive war against Vietnam on the last day of 1978, all 
participants including Hua Guofeng flocked to assertive lines. The precise view of Hua and 
his faction members on how to approach the Soviet-Vietnamese threats remained unclear to 
date. We now know that they had been involved in the war decision only to a moderate 
extent until the moment Deng asked for their formal approval. At the moment when their 
prestige based on the nationalist credentials was at stake, they unanimously supported 
Deng’s proposal the punitive war. Remarkably, Hua and his faction turned out to be more 
assertive in supporting the war, as they pressed for expanding the scope, duration, and 
intent of the operation. In this way, they demonstrated loyalty to the nationalist objective of 
punishing Vietnam that Deng had spearheaded.175 Also surprisingly, Chen Yun threw his 
full support behind Deng a few days later.176 Chen had long been a prudent policymaker. 
And the war on Vietnam would surely derail the local economy in the border areas, which 
ran counter to his abiding reservation against China’s involvement in war. 177  Quite 
evidently, all leaders sought to bandwagon for prestige once it became apparent that 
supporting Deng’s decision to invade Vietnam was an effective way to advance personal 
prestige.  
Another piece of evidence on the roles of concerns for great-power status and personal 
prestige in forging the war decision has to do with the Chinese post-conflict assessment. In 
the post-war analyses, a historian notes, “a growing discrepancy was evident between a 
Western view that tended to underscore the PLA’s shortcomings and a Chinese position that 																																																																		
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stressed the PLA’s victory over the PAVN [the Vietnamese army].”178 The Chinese leaders 
had every reason to proclaim victory, which could serve leaders’ interests in both 
geopolitical and domestic political arenas. Shortly after the Chinese military completed their 
military operations and withdrew from the Vietnamese territory, Deng proclaimed that his 
policy of punishing Hanoi had been successful. In particular, he asserted that the Chinese 
victory had “considerably boosted the prestige of our nation in international anti-hegemonic 
struggles, and the prestige of the PLA among the Chinese people.” 179  Here, Deng 
apparently glossed over the deficiencies of Chinese military in fighting capacities, which in 
large part resulted from the organizational chaos in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. 
Since Deng had staked personal prestige on the war, it was in his political interest to frame 
the war outcome in favorable terms. By claiming credit for China’s pursuit of honorable 
anti-hegemonic cause, Deng could therefore expect to protect his prestige in taking risks for 
initiating a military conflict with Vietnam.  
To be clear, my argument does not suggest that Deng’s support for competitive 
status-seeking strategy was the key to his success in the power struggle with Hua—rather, 
competitive status-seeking strategy just represents a consequence of the Deng-Hua split for 
the leadership’s foreign policy practice. As such, the prestige politics attending to the 
Deng-Hua split should not be overstated as the overriding cause for China’s invasion of 
Vietnam. Rather, it was the combination of prestige politics at home and the geopolitical 
threat arising from the Soviet support for Vietnam’s military conflict with Cambodia that 
generated the impulse for China to pursue competitive status-seeking strategy, which took 
the form of military acts against Vietnam in February 1979.  
In the final analysis, China’s invasion of Vietnam serves to illustrate how pragmatic 
concerns for great-power status and personal prestige—as related to geopolitical threat and 
institutional change dynamics at home—led the Chinese leaders to undertake competitive 
status-seeking strategy. In this case, competitive assertions of status entail the display of 
military power as a status symbol. The causal mechanisms underlying it are similar to those 
underlying other varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy: leaders opt for competitive 
status-seeking strategy in order to assert great-power status and prestige to home audiences. 
In this endeavor, they seek to deter or compel the foreign adversary while legitimizing their 
hold on power at home. Since, however, competitive status-seeking strategy carries 
tremendous risk of escalating international tension, leaders would not opt for it under usual 
circumstances. The Chinese decision to invade Vietnam shows how individual leaders’ 
pragmatic concerns for great-power status and personal prestige could arise in particular 
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circumstances, and motivated them to undertake competitive status-seeking strategy. 
Specifically, the Soviet-Vietnam alignment fueled Beijing’s sensitivity to great-power status 
as a vehicle for geopolitical autonomy (or security), and Deng-Hua split heightened leaders’ 
reliance on prestige as the principal vehicle for political survival. These geopolitical and 
domestic incentives combined to make competitive status-seeking strategy the preferable 
policy for the whole leadership. The causal mechanisms examined here represent no general 
theory of how competitive status-seeking strategy arises; rather, they represent a distinctive, 
and to some extent generalizable, pathway from leaders’ concerns for great-power status 
and personal prestige to competitive status-seeking strategy.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the decline and resurgence of competitive status-seeking strategy in 
Chinese security policy practices. It shows the motivations behind the Chinese use of 
military force in two cases. When China employed military force against the Soviets in 1969, 
it was primarily motivated by the geopolitical imperative. By contrast, a critical motivating 
force behind the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1978 was the leaders’ pragmatic concern for 
personal prestige. This chapter thus demonstrates how variation in the Chinese leaders’ 
reliance on prestige as a political vehicle generated differing approaches to the Soviet threat.  
Elite politics in China was fluid from 1969 to 1979. There is no denying that the purge of 
Liu Shaoqi and various central leaders in 1967 released unruly dynamics of factional 
infighting during this period. Mao, nevertheless, stood above factional infightings, and 
retained considerable detachment until his death in 1976. This was due to his unrivaled 
political authority. As such, Mao did not rely upon personal prestige as a crucial vehicle for 
political survival at home. And inasmuch as prestige politics ceased to be a domestic 
political imperative, Mao’s employment of military force against the Soviets in 1969 was not 
driven by concerns for personal prestige on the home front. Although Mao could capitalize 
on the post hoc effect of taking on a superpower for the purpose of domestic mobilization, 
prestige politics at home is no essential cause for China’s conflict behavior in 1969.  
Mao’s detachment in the elite conflict, in turn, gave him sufficient latitude in signaling 
self-restraint in the conduct of coercive diplomacy against the Soviet Union. Subsequently, 
Mao’s unrivaled authority made it possible that Zhou Enlai—a leader on the moderate 
foreign policy line—gained sufficient latitude to negotiate an de facto alignment with the 
United States. However, Mao’s death in 1976 triggered enormous pressures for institutional 
change of Chinese politics. This contributed significantly to China’s policy of status 
competition against the Soviet Union, which took the form of an invasion of Vietnam in 
1979.  
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This chapter shows the distinctiveness of my theoretical insight on competitive 
status-seeking strategy vis-à-vis alternative arguments. Defensive realism is at a loss over 
why the Chinese leaders went beyond the measure of strengthening defensive capacities in 
response to the Soviet-Vietnamese military collaboration. Given that in 1978 Chinese 
leadership had managed to combine border defense building with a diplomatic effort to 
contain the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment, balancing seemed to have been sufficient for 
safeguarding China’s geopolitical security. The Chinese use of force against Vietnam is thus 
unwarranted from a geostrategic standpoint—as such, defensive realism is inadequate for 
explaining China’s propensity for displaying military power. The authoritarian politics 
thesis is unable to explain why the whole leadership unanimously rallied behind Deng’s 
decision to invade Vietnam—despite the internecine power struggle. Specifically, it falls 
short in addressing why Hua Guofeng or any other leader failed to challenge Deng’s 
decision on war. This is a fatal anomaly to the authoritarian politics thesis, as the post-Mao 
China can be seen as an “elite-constrained” system whereby no single leader can dictate a 
foreign policy line.180 Inasmuch as their support was essential to Deng’s struggle against 
Hua, these leaders could have hindered Deng from pursing competitive status-seeking 
strategy. The authoritarian politics thesis, however, does not consider why other leaders—at 
the moment when they held veto power—bandwagoned with Deng on the war decision.
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Conclusions and Implications 
 
 
This thesis investigates the political logic of status competition. It argues that leaders may 
adopt competitive policies in pursuit of great-power status when they face significant 
challenges to the state’s geopolitical security as well as their personal authority at home. The 
instrumental role of great-power status and personal prestige features centrally in my 
explanation of competitive status-seeking strategies. This concluding chapter summarizes 
the arguments and key findings. In addition, it briefly discusses the theoretical implications 
of my theory and its relevance to contemporary unipolar world. Finally, it discusses the 
limits of my study and proposes avenues for future research. 
 
Great-Power Status, Personal Prestige, and Power Politics 
The political logic of status competition rests on three assumptions. To begin with, state 
leaders are central actors in formulating and implementing security strategy and in the 
process, they have to grapple with the tradeoffs among various commitments—not least 
geopolitical security, domestic political survival, and status ambitions. Second, great-power 
status and personal prestige are important vehicles for leaders to advance their interests in 
geopolitical and domestic political arenas.  
Third and most importantly, leaders pursue competitive status-seeking strategies when 
they are anxious about both great-power status and personal prestige—measured against 
the geopolitical and domestic political challenges. By demonstrating certain symbols 
indicative of state power, competitive status-seeking acts promise to impress international 
audiences with a manifestation of state power. Once an impression is established that a state 
gains advantage over others, it could over time deter other states from challenging its core 
claims. A favorable image of its power, in particular, could deter the main adversary; or, it 
could deter lesser states from working with other great powers, thereby denying them 
access to the actor’s vicinity. On the other hand, as competitive status-seeking acts allow 
individual leaders to demonstrate resolve for engaging in interstate competition, it could 
sensitize domestic audiences to great-power status as a national interest. In the process of 
showing readiness for promoting status, a leader seeks to gain personal prestige from the 
domestic audience expecting him/her to further their collective self-esteem. 
One caveat deserves particular emphasis. Leaders, in displaying state power, do not 
necessarily succeed in enhancing their nation’s status and personal prestige. Quite the 
contrary, the pursuit of competitive status-seeking policies threatens to escalate international 
tension and may even provoke war. Such policies incur tremendous security risks for the 
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state and ultimately, the political costs would be imposed on leaders themselves. Needless 
to say, competitive status-seeking strategy is no normal statecraft because it is highly risky. 
Leaders therefore are unlikely to pursue it unless their pragmatic concerns for social 
preeminence intensify to an extreme degree. That is, competitive status-seeking strategy is a 
preferable policy for those leaders who rely upon prestige as the vehicle for domestic 
political survival while viewing great-power status as a route to geopolitical security.  
Through a careful investigation of Chinese diplomatic and political history from 1962 to 
1979, this study examines how leaders’ concerns for great-power status and personal 
prestige arose and took on pragmatic characters. It finds that in response to institutional 
change dynamics, the Chinese leaders tended to rely upon personal prestige as political 
capital to keep their hold on power at home. And they viewed great-power status as a 
vehicle for addressing geopolitical threats. These incentives could combine to make 
competitive status-seeking strategy a preferable policy for leaders. Hence, they are very 
likely to undertake competitive status-seeking acts, which could enable them to transcend 
the tradeoffs among status aspirations, geopolitical security, and political survival in elite 
politics.  
Whether leaders would undertake competitive status-seeking strategy in a particular 
circumstance is ultimately a matter of human agency. After all, geopolitical threat and 
institutional change merely represent circumstances whereby leaders’ concerns for 
great-power status and personal prestige are supposedly intense. They act as peculiar stimuli 
to leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social preeminence, rather than good measures of 
psychological phenomena which are not directly observable. Here, I only seek to underscore 
the fact that concerns for social preeminence may arise for pragmatic reasons, and that as 
concrete expressions of social preeminence in geopolitical and domestic political arenas, 
great-power status and personal prestige could act as vehicles for leaders to achieve other 
important ends, such as geopolitical security and political survival in elite politics.  
With this caveat in mind, I argue that in the midst of institutional change dynamics 
leaders have to rely upon personal prestige for instrumental purposes of political survival 
among domestic elites. To the extent that political institutions do not serve as a dominant 
source of power for state leaders, leaders have to exploit the personalistic sources of power 
such as charisma and interpersonal skills for building and managing the ruling coalition. 
Prestige accordingly becomes a crucial vehicle for political survival, which allows leaders to 
consolidate their domestic positions. Personal prestige means positive reputation based on 
the demonstrated individual qualities. State leaders can gain prestige by displaying symbols 
that could confer them good reputation. It becomes visible to the political audiences when 
leaders engage in symbolic acts.  
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Whereas institutional change dynamics could heighten the need for prestige on the part 
of individual state leaders, geopolitical threat may compel them to assert great-power status. 
If a geopolitical rival is challenging a state’s core claims and threatens to draw a third party 
to its side—especially in that state’s vicinity, it is imperative for state leaders to demonstrate 
state power in order to signal resolve for defending its sphere of influence—a hallmark of 
great-power status. And if they manage to show that the state power at their disposal is 
superior to that of the adversary, then the very act displaying state power can establish a 
reputation for unchallengeable power, which would further security interests. In the process, 
leaders may also hope to boost their personal prestige through symbolic acts of displaying 
state power. This is achievable because political audiences, when organized in small groups, 
tend to favorably perceive those showing strong resolve for defending the community with 
which they are associated.  
The argument laid out above by no means suggests that through competitive 
status-seeking strategy, leaders can necessarily enhance the state’s geopolitical security and 
their domestic power positions. My argument, instead, is focused on the motivations behind 
leaders’ practice of competitive status-seeking strategy rather than the political effects of 
their acts. Whether competitive status-seeking strategy could serve leaders well hinges on a 
range of other factors operating in complex ways. Addressing that issue is beyond the 
analytic task of this study.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
By investigating the political logic of status competition, this study advances the notion that 
leaders may undertake competitive status-seeking strategy for pragmatic reasons—that is, 
for the purpose of enhancing the state’s geopolitical security and their grip on authority in 
domestic elite politics. This insight challenges the conventional wisdom, which implicitly 
assumes that leaders’ aspiration for great-power status is invariant. Rather, it shows that 
concerns for both great-power status and personal prestige are variables that beg for 
explanation on the level of individual leaders. By treating status and prestige this way, my 
study opens a new avenue for theoretical innovation and empirical research.  
In investigating the motivations behind leaders’ practice of competitive status-seeking 
strategy, this study suggests two ways in which leaders seek to establish social 
preeminence—namely by norm or by outcome. Theoretically, I assume that state leaders 
pursue the latter type of social preeminence in the geopolitical arena and that their pursuit 
of the former is confined to the domestic realm. This view tacitly assumes that the 
geopolitical arena is anarchical in general whereby state identities are heterogeneous and 
interstate networks are relatively sparse. It is unlikely that international audiences could 
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become emotionally attached to leaders of a certain state who are invoking transnational 
identity. By contrast, domestic political system features hierarchical authority structures 
whereby dense networks and homogeneous identity could ensure that home audiences 
identify with leaders who engage in symbolic acts invoking a nationalist or other forms of 
political identity.   
Due to the disparate dynamics prevalent in the anarchical realm of geopolitics and the 
hierarchical realm of domestic politics, leaders’ symbolic acts follow distinct logics. 
Homogeneous identities and interaction frequency are not normal conditions of the 
geopolitical realm; modern states, at least in its ideal type, feature dense networks 
facilitating frequent interactions and collective identity formation. This disparity means that 
the prevalent way leaders could establish status preeminence in the geopolitical realm is by 
trumping their adversaries—hence the logic of gaining great-power status (e.g. 
outcome-based social preeminence). By contrast, they may find it easier to invoke rally their 
audience around a collective identity they themselves personify—hence the logic of gaining 
personal prestige (e.g. norm-based social preeminence). Because leaders more often than not 
operate at the intersection of anarchical and hierarchical realms, they are apt to find 
themselves cross-pressured by both. Where they seek both outcome-based and norm-based 
social preeminence by symbolic acts of competitive status-seeking strategy, my theoretical 
argument would apply.  
Admittedly, this anarchy-hierarchy distinction may be too stark, as it might not strictly 
correspond to the international-domestic dichotomy. A distinctive feature of world politics 
is that various hierarchical authority structures are flourishing alongside the anarchical 
conditions of the system of states. 1  My theoretical insight arguably applies in any 
circumstance whereby leaders are cross-pressured by political challenges from within and 
without their polity. To be specific, authority contests within a given polity—whether in the 
form of national state, empire, or other kinds of polity based on dense networks and a 
relatively homogeneous identity—could possibly induce leaders to rely upon prestige as a 
dominant vehicle for political survival. If, at the same time, the anarchical domain of 
geopolitics induces security competitions, leaders would be motivated to engage in 
competitive status-seeking acts against their geopolitical adversary. The purpose of doing so 
is to deter external adversaries while enhancing personal prestige to audiences within the 
polity. Although competitive status-seeking strategy is no normal statecraft, structural 
attributes of world politics described above do encourage leaders to practice it. 
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One instance may help illustrate this point. Studies of democratic peace community, 
notably the NATO in the Cold War, have suggested that the democratic peace community 
changed the very structure of politics among modern liberal democracies. In both theory 
and practice, liberal democracies typically feature strong adherence to liberal values of rule 
of law, universal human rights, democratic governance, and free trade—as such, there exist 
dense policy networks and relatively homogeneous identity to facilitate and solidify 
cooperation among them. 2  In the postwar years, these defining features of liberal 
democracies provide American leaders with a vehicle for mobilizing their democratic allies 
in support of their policy.3 But they at the same time leave American leaders vulnerable to 
challengers in the international democratic community who could accuse them of 
abandoning the allies for self-interests. Hence, intra-alliance politics could provide a crucial 
source of concern for social preeminence on the part of American leaders during the Cold 
War and beyond.4 And such kind of concern is pragmatic.  
In addition to its potentials for theoretical extension, my argument promises to fill the 
gaps left by offensive realism, defensive realism, the thesis of authoritarian politics, which 
have yet to come to terms with matters of great-power status and personal prestige in 
international security studies. It also improves on some aspects of the diversionary conflict 
thesis.  
First, my theory offers a systematic explanation regarding when leaders become prone 
to international conflict. Offensive realism cannot account for this variation at all. As it treats 
systemic pressures for security competition as constantly intense, state leaders should 
always incline toward the behavioral pattern akin to competitive status-seeking strategy. 
Hence, it is puzzling to offensive realism why leaders at times do not pursue competitive 
policies if competitive pressures are invariably intense in an anarchical world. Defensive 
realism, by focusing on domestic coalitional dynamics and varied degrees of the security 
dilemma, is better able to address why state leaders shift to a more assertive line of strategy 
to further state security interests. Yet, because it gives insufficient attention to status as a 																																																																		
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vehicle for leaders furthering national security, defensive realism is inadequate for 
addressing the pattern of competitive state behavior. My theoretical insight fills this gap by 
according pride of place to status as a national objective without losing sight of its relevance 
to other political interests of central importance to leaders.   
Additionally, by focusing on individual leaders’ concerns for personal prestige, I 
uncover a significant limitation of the thesis of authoritarian politics. The authoritarian 
politics thesis highlights preferences of individual leaders as regards peace and war. Recent 
research, in particular, has shown that authoritarian leaders are not necessarily prone to 
international conflict, as individual leaders could be constrained within their elite circles. My 
research, however, suggests that the need for prestige—a crucial vehicle for political 
survival in authoritarian politics—could motivate elite consensus on a risk-prone foreign 
policy. Seen in this light, even when authoritarian leaders become prone to conflict abroad, 
this might not have to do with their personal idiosyncrasies. Instead, group dynamics could 
be a critical force to shape foreign policy considerations of authoritarian leaders.  
Finally, my argument improves on the diversionary conflict thesis. The diversionary 
conflict thesis does stress the positive correlation between intergroup conflict and in-group 
solidarity—and this offers critical insight to my theoretical argument. This psychodynamic 
helps leaders to establish personal prestige among domestic audiences, I argue; but it may 
not be operative in the absence of geopolitical imperatives. Hence, my argument emphasizes 
that concerns for personal prestige alone cannot motivate leaders to resort to the 
diversionary conflict logic in their foreign policy strategy. The diversionary logic may be 
necessary but is not sufficient to motivate leaders to undertake competitive status-seeking 
strategy.  
 
Empirical Findings 
Empirically, this study differentiates competitive status-seeking strategy from other security 
strategies, notably balancing, conventional diplomacy, and coercive diplomacy. My case 
studies highlight that in pursuing security through competitive status-seeking measures, 
state leaders seek to display state power as a symbol for status. Inasmuch as this strategy is 
implemented at the expense of chance for diplomatic accommodation, competitive 
status-seeking strategy signals a departure from conventional diplomacy. The fact that this 
strategy treats state power as a status symbol rather than an instrument for interstate 
bargaining differentiates it from balancing and coercive diplomacy.  
This study illustrates competitive status-seeking strategy via three cases of Chinese 
security strategy from 1962 to 1979, whereby Beijing’s leaders demonstrated diplomatic, 
ideological, and military aspects of Chinese power. In so doing, it probes the plausibility of 
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my central assertion that competitive status-seeking strategy is a preferable policy for 
leaders who consider great-power status a vehicle for geopolitical security and rely upon 
personal prestige for domestic political survival. My in-depth process tracing of Chinese 
security strategy from 1949 to 1979 bolsters this claim. The three variants of competitive 
status-seeking strategy took place in such circumstances: the superpowers’ involvement in 
China’s vicinity (e.g. Vietnam) encouraged Beijing’s leaders to view great-power status as a 
route to security while at the same time, institutional change dynamics at home heightened 
their reliance upon personal prestige for power legitimation and political survival. My case 
studies, in turn, suggest that as leaders’ concerns for both great-power status and personal 
prestige significantly intensified for pragmatic reasons, Chinese leaders would find it 
necessary to adopt competitive policies in international politics.   
Specifically, China pursued an offensive alliance against the US in 1962-1965. By 
encouraging the Hanoi regime to expand the guerilla warfare in South Vietnam, the Chinese 
leadership in effect mobilized Hanoi as a diplomatic asset to undermine the US geopolitical 
influence in Indochina, thereby asserting great-power status based on the Chinese power. 
After 1965 as China’s leaders came to perceive the Soviet Union as the primary geopolitical 
threat, they sought status through competitive policies by trying to dictate the tactics by 
which their Vietnamese counterparts conducted armed struggles in Indochina. Insisting that 
the Vietnamese communists prosecute guerilla (opposed to conventional) warfare against 
the US-backed Saigon regime and chastising the Soviet proposal for peace talks in Indochina, 
the Chinese leaders tried to delegitimize the Soviet Union in the international communist 
hierarchy. In these two cases, China pursuit of competitive status-seeking strategy took the 
form of offensive alliance with the Hanoi regime and delegitimation strategy against 
Moscow. Both policies were driven by the sense of Chinese leaders of the geopolitical 
challenges to their claim to great-power status, as well as the individual leaders’ reliance 
upon personal prestige as a dominant vehicle for political survival. The superpowers’ 
involvement in China’s southern vicinity sensitized leaders in Beijing to the instrumental 
value of great-power status, which they believed could provide a vehicle for geopolitical 
security. Institutional change dynamics unleashed by the Great Leap Forward fiasco, on the 
other hand, heightened Chinese leaders’ reliance upon prestige for political survival in elite 
politics. They in turn found competitive status-seeking strategy a desirable strategy for 
coping with geopolitical and domestic political challenges simultaneously. 
The Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 and China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 
illustrate two patterns of China’s use of military power. The former case fits the definition of 
coercive diplomacy. For one thing, China clearly specified its territorial claim to the Soviets 
before it initiated armed conflict. For another, while engaging the Soviet forces, Beijing’s 
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leaders were keen to open negotiation with Moscow. Such attempts at diplomatic 
accommodation are not present in 1979. This time the Chinese leadership openly stated their 
determination to punish Hanoi for pursuing alignment with the Soviets. Equally significant, 
China did not clearly specify its claims to the Vietnamese as well as the Soviets. Rather, it 
seems that China was simply intent on establishing an image of being powerful via its 
employment of military force to “punish” Hanoi. This behavioral trait is more compatible 
with competitive status-seeking strategy than coercive diplomacy. Additionally, it is 
important to note that in by 1979 the Soviet military threat that had extended to China’s 
southern vicinity had prompted Beijing to view military forces as a field of status 
competition; the struggle between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng for the agenda of 
post-Mao institutional reforms, on the other hand, fueled Chinese leaders’ concerns for 
personal prestige. By contrast, in 1969 such institutional change dynamics were nonexistent. 
The factional infightings during the Cultural Revolution posed no substantial challenge to 
Mao’s authority, which means he did not rely upon prestige as a dominant vehicle for 
political survival in elite politics. Accordingly, there was no need for Mao to promote his 
prestige via status competition, and China’s conflict strategy toward the Soviets follows the 
pattern of coercive diplomacy. This comparative study shows that status competition is no 
normal statecraft and leaders pursue competitive status-seeking strategy when they regard 
great-power status as a vehicle for geopolitical security and rely upon prestige to consolidate 
personal authority in elite politics.  
 
Contemporary Relevance: Status Competition in the Unipolar World 
William Wohlforth argues that the structural condition of the unipolar world—a world in 
which global power resources are concentrated in a single hegemonic state while other 
powers enjoy tremendous geopolitical influences in their own regions—would discourage 
the rising powers from engaging in competition against the US hegemonic leadership.5 As a 
corollary, the rising powers may prefer strategies of social mobility and creativity to 
competitive policies to enhancing their status. My study, however, suggests that certain 
geopolitical and domestic political conditions characteristic of rising and resurgent powers 
could work to fuel concerns for social preeminence on the part of individual leaders, and 
encourage these states to pursue competitive status-seeking strategy to some extent.  
Herein lies the relevance of my discussion of status competition to the contemporary 
world. Three decades after the Cold War saw the emergence of regional powers asserting 
their power and influences. The dominance of US power on the global scale, as some 
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international relations theorists argue, is not to stifle but unleash regional dynamics.6 The 
preponderance of power at the disposal of the United States is not sufficient to change the 
anarchical condition of international political life. As such, regional powers are induced, 
rather than restrained, to establish great-power status in their own backyards by virtue of 
their advantageous power resources vis-à-vis the local competitors. Doing so enables them 
to “tame” the US power—that is, to hinder the translation of US global preeminence into 
local predominance.7 In politics among nations, great-power status promises influences 
short of exercising power in costly ways. And the availability of nuclear weapons and the 
logic of mutually assured destruction only add to the instrumental role of enhanced status 
for states.8  
Hence, we should expect to see a growing propensity among the rising powers for 
competitive status-seeking strategy. Their preference for competitive policies may further be 
heightened by the domestic political dynamics that attend to the growth of their power 
capabilities. All rising powers tend to undergo sweeping societal changes at home that 
undermine their political institutional orders. As such, leaders tend to rely more on 
personalistic sources of power, such as charisma and positive reputations for managing the 
ruling coalition. For their part, personal prestige then becomes a crucial vehicle for political 
survival. Efforts to demonstrate they are “good” leaders entail symbolic acts—that is, to 
show the symbols indicative of competent leadership. Inasmuch as great-power status 
provides a route to geopolitical security and the leaders may rely upon personal prestige for 
domestic political survival, leaders of regional powers may arguably find it desirable to 
engage in competition with their proximate rival states—especially those aligned with the 
United States. While doing so, they employ state power as a symbol for status rather than as 
a normal instrument in interstate bargaining. This suggests that they will not allow the 
image of wielding state power to be shattered by a counteraction from the adversary. When 
competitive status-seeking acts bring them into a serious confrontation with other powers, it 
is politically desirable to persist rather than retreat. My study, to be sure, falls short in 
identifying all relevant conditions and mechanisms that could sensitize state leaders to the 
importance of personal prestige for political survival. Still, I do point out that when leaders 
rely upon prestige to strengthen their grip on power at home, they tend to be intransigent 
facing the pressures from the United States. Nowadays, this assertion seems to have been 
bolstered by the Chinese and Russian defiance against the US allies or diplomatic partners in 
their own regions—namely, East and South China Seas and Ukraine.  																																																																		
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The practice of competitive status-seeking strategy by regional powers such as China 
and Russia constitutes a novel challenge to the United States in exercising hegemonic 
leadership. The US hegemonic leadership by definition requires followers.9 Yet, the regional 
powers can resist by signaling defiance against the hegemon by demonstrating their 
material and ideational strengths. In this scenario, the “assertive” regional powers are not 
seeking to replace the US as the hegemonic leader but imposing burdens on its leadership 
role. China and Russia intent on establishing spheres of influence in East Asia and Ukraine 
are cases in point. Their respective acts of status competition as well as their diplomatic 
collaboration signals defiance against the US hegemony in the regional context without 
showing willingness to remove the US from its current leadership role in world politics. To 
paraphrase Thomas Christensen, they are “posing problems without catching up.”10  
This creates a dilemma for the US hegemony: to relinquish hegemony would invite the 
regional powers to fill the power vacuums thereby left; to engage in direct confrontation 
with the assertive regional powers may incur material costs. The Obama administration has 
tried to cope with this dilemma by avoiding overt confrontations with China and Russia 
asserting themselves in the regional contexts. It instead opted to “lead from behind,” 
focusing on enabling the lesser powers to balance against China and Russia. It is quite clear, 
however, such policy has worked to dissuade China and Russia. The lesser powers may not 
be responsive to the US request for resisting China and Russia, two gigantic powers intent 
on expanding regional influences by competitive status-seeking acts. Some powers directly 
involved in the disputes with China and Russia may succumb and others may not be willing 
to follow the US in helping to exert pressures on the two gigantic powers. Lesser powers 
may want to stay clear from dangerous great power conflicts in order to maximize their 
safety margin.11  
The current Trump administration in its promotion of “America first” has shown 
emergent signs of realizing the growing burdens of playing the hegemonic role in world 
politics. Of course, it remains to be seen how America would shift its burdens, manage its 
world roles, and assert its great-power status.12 That said, the rising and resurgent powers’ 
inclination for status competition might constitute a critical source of difficulty for the US to 
retain its hegemonic leadership in contemporary world. As the great powers displaying 
their power to challenge the US in the regional context, they threaten to impose tremendous 																																																																		
9 See Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity, 
2004). 
10 Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," 
International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001). 
11 For this observation, see John Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010). 
12 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016); William Wang, Stephen Brooks, and William Wohlforth, "Correspondence: Debating 
China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power," International Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016). 
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costs on America assuming commitments worldwide. The optimal strategy for the US then 
might be “selective engagement,” that is, to concentrate its national security assets on 
regions of dominant strategic importance to the US future.13 In pursuing this grand strategy, 
however, America may also find it necessary to display its power as symbols indicative of its 
superpower status. In this scenario, it would not be the regional powers but also the United 
States that tries to advance their core interests in international politics through competitive 
status-seeking acts.  
 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research          
This study advances an assertion that leaders, by displaying state power as a status symbol 
against a geopolitical rival, seek to further their interests in geopolitical security and 
domestic political survival simultaneously. The central vehicle for them to kill two birds by 
one stone is the symbolic acts of competitive status-seeking strategy, which signal leaders’ 
claims to great-power status and personal prestige. This is the very political logic driving 
leaders’ choice on competitive policies to enhance great-power status. A key question, then, 
concerns when this logic would operate strongly on leaders’ mind. My argument is in large 
part derived from an in-depth study of Chinese security policy and domestic politics from 
1962 to 1979. Its generalizability to other cases therefore deserves further investigation. As 
such, its inherent limits also point to multiple avenues for future research. 
First, this study investigates the political logic of status competition by examining how 
leaders respond to two peculiar types of events—namely, geopolitical threat and 
institutional change dynamics. Such events not only provide incentives for great-power 
status and personal prestige to take on instrumental roles for leaders but also intensify 
tradeoffs among geopolitical security, domestic political survival, and status ambitions. In 
both theoretical and empirical terms, it is certainly insufficient to focus on geopolitical threat 
and institutional change dynamics as sole catalysts for pragmatic concerns for social 
preeminence. Future studies should identify alternative events that could sensitize leaders to 
the instrumental importance of great-power status and personal prestige, and investigate 
alternative mechanisms for occurrences of status competition among nations. To avoid ad 
hoc selections, such events must be able to 1) heighten leaders’ pragmatic concerns for social 
preeminence; 2) intensify the tradeoffs among the interests of central importance to leaders. 
Second, while elaborating on some varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy, this 
study falls short in addressing variation in the intensity of competitive status-seeking 
strategy. It is important to note that the varieties of competitive status-seeking strategy 																																																																		
13 For the recent scholarship making the case for “selective engagement,” see Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Dead 
Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States," ibid.32 (Fall 2007); Barry Posen, Restraint: A New 
Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
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discussed here—namely, delegitimation strategy, offensive alliance, and use of force—do 
not represent varying degrees of risk-acceptance in a state’s international conduct. For 
instance, Deng chose to employ military force to signal status claims whereas Mao was 
intent on displaying “softer” aspects of Chinese power such as the regime’s ideological 
appeal and diplomatic assets. But it was Mao who appeared more prone to international risk 
as he undertook competitive status-seeking strategy throughout the 1960s. Hence, my study 
makes no effort to measure—let alone explain—varying degrees of competitive status 
competition. Future studies can elaborate on more variants of competitive status-seeking 
acts and compare their levels of assertiveness.  
A third avenue for future research concerns the implications of competitive 
status-seeking strategy. This study argues that through such kind of behavior, leaders want 
to legitimize their authority in domestic elite politics while deterring the geopolitical 
adversaries from challenging their core claims. But it is agnostic as to how likely this 
strategy would succeed on foreign and home fronts. As argued, this study is concerned 
more with the motives driving leaders’ acts of competitive status-seeking strategy than the 
effects of such kind of policy, but the latter issue should not be assumed away. Numerous 
research has been done on the desirability of using military force to signal resolve, to be sure; 
they still fall short in addressing the role of other aspects of state power in shaping the 
reputation for superior power.14 In the final analysis, it is incumbent upon scholars to 
examine the effects of competitive status-seeking strategies—not least under what conditions 
they can genuinely enhance geopolitical security and the prospects for political survival of 
individual leaders. 
A related issue is how competitive status-seeking acts can facilitate grand strategic 
adjustments. Competitive status-seeking strategy may enable ambitious statesmen to 
transform a nation’s grand strategy. The issue here is how competitive status-seeking acts 
enable statesmen to shape domestic consensus on the grand strategy they advocate. 
Arguably, leaders do not often find themselves in a position to institute a radical shift, as 
their state apparatus is accustomed to the established ways of implementing policy. They 
accordingly need a solid domestic foundation upon which to institute a new grand strategy. 
To this end, they need to convince the key constituents that the new grand strategy promises 
to further the national interest—while consolidating personal authority for pushing forward 
a novel agenda. Competitive status-seeking strategy could help leaders attain both 
objectives. By displaying state power as a status symbol, such kind of policy holds out the 
promise to establish a reputation for superior power abroad and enhance leaders’ authority 
																																																																		
14 For recent reviews of this issue and a systematic empirical testing, see Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting 
Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics," International Organization 69, no. 2 (Spring 2015). 
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in domestic elite politics. 
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